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Abstract 
This empirical research has been carried out in the context of local governance in Pales-
tine. It focuses on the participation of organized groups of Palestinian civil society 
(NGOs) in local development planning, policy formulation and program implementa-
tion. Since its inception, the Palestinian NGO sector used historically to play the para 
state functions in supplying local communities by social services. However, after the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, a new debate had emerged 
about whether NGOs are considered civil society agents or are replacing the govern-
ment by providing services to the population. Hence, there was a need to revise their 
relations with PA particularly in areas of local development planning. This research 
takes a start from the observation of the poor access of NGOs to decision makers at 
local government levels. The research then questions why having this limited access 
though the Palestinian NGOs have proven in many occasions their relatively high ca-
pacity to participate in development? This research basically investigates the degree to 
which existing policy spaces that are created to involve NGOs in local planning and 
policy formulation can provide sufficient and efficient channels for them as to influence 
local policies and plans in a way to hold local governments more accountable and re-
sponsive to citizens’ needs? Are Palestinian NGOs willing and able to participate in 
local planning and policy making? How are policies made at local level? Whose knowl-
edge accounts?   
This research has revealed many disconnections between NGOs and local govern-
ments at different stages and levels, and between different configurations of actors, 
knowledge and spaces. There is a disconnection between diverse knowledge about the 
experience, causes and impacts of policy formulation and implementation. Although 
there are some scattered mechanisms which are appeared to be committed to enhance 
bottom up approaches, analysis of these spaces suggests that exclusionary power rela-
tions influence the kinds of knowledge that are created within them. Further, the staging 
of an event for participation to occur is little or no guarantee either that knowledge aris-
ing from the event will be used, how it might be used, or by whom? There is a discon-
nection between the perceptions of idealised roles – what should happen – and practice 
– what does happen. There is a disconnection between ordinary citizens and their repre-
sentatives which is a major obstacle to the development of an accountable policy proc-
ess. The limited spaces which are created to involve NGOs are mainly ‘donors led’ and 
more importantly, they have never been integrated in the government’s decision making 
nor the political structures. Palestinian policy spaces face challenges of good representa-
tion, inculcation of key civil society actors and are bound to knowledge of the govern-
ment.   
Several reasons as revealed by this research have contributed to the emergence of 
weak policy spaces and disconnections between Palestinian NGOs and local govern-
ment. They include the following among others: government sees itself as the repository 
of expertise for planning and policy making; Palestinian NGOs emphasise service de-
livery strategies and thereby undermining advocacy strategies; and NGOs’ limited 
knowledge of government’s planning operations, languages and procedures.  
Thought, much is yet to be learnt about which are the most appropriate entry points 
for creating proper spaces, the lessons from this research suggest that the creation of 
inclusive policy spaces will not occur without addressing the power relations which 
surround the interstices of policy and planning processes themselves. That implies 
strengthening the capacities of less powerful actors, democratizing knowledge, and 
broadening the rules at the local level about what kinds of knowledge counts.  
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Preface 
In the 1950s, and particularly the 1960s, early initiatives of development assistance and 
of planned interventions to promote change in less development countries had com-
menced via the actions and processes of community development, sought to involve 
local people in efforts to improve their communities. The notion of “citizens’ participa-
tion” is now widely recognized as a basic operational principle of development pro-
grams and projects. Yet it is a complex process with few universal truths, approaches or 
methodologies. Citizen participation cannot be merely proclaimed, it must be promoted. 
It takes time, resources, understanding and perseverance, but the end result should be a 
development planning process which is not exclusively in the hands of development 
professionals or outsiders experts, but which also involves local people, their represen-
tatives, their ideas, skills and knowledge. Participation does not have to be complicated, 
nor does it have to follow a set formula or pattern of development. The best formula 
should be based on the questions of what is citizen participation (CP)? What are the 
objectives of CP? Who should be involved? What can citizens contribute by their par-
ticipation? What is the scope of CP? When to involve citizens in the planning process? 
What mechanisms should be used? Hence, effective institutionalized participation proc-
ess entails that the actors should be involved in the whole planning process (plans and 
programs formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) and they should 
participate to develop common vision and goals, an agreement to work together, an 
action plan to reach specific goals, and distribution schemes of clear roles and responsi-
bilities among actors. 
In development terms, the last decade or so- after the establishment of the Palestinian 
National Authority (1994)- has been influenced by fragmented efforts to promote citi-
zen participation. This would involve a fundamental shift both in attitudes and in meth-
odology and break decades of top-down, non-participatory practice during the British 
mandate, Egyptian administration and the Israeli occupation. Major donor development 
agencies have put their weight behind and committed resources to promoting participa-
tory development, recognizing the problems caused by non-participatory approaches. In 
general, the challenge facing the Palestinian society and government today is how to 
bring about development that is responsive, accountable, equitable, and sustainable in 
order to meet the new needs, demands and aspirations of the Palestinians and to be able 
to fulfil the national development goals and objectives. Whether this challenge can be 
met depends on how the government affects the policy environment so that efforts 
would establish a specific political and legal framework within which all of the planning 
institutions (governmental and non-governmental), communities and individuals operate 
and thus affect their potential contribution to the development agenda. The enhance-
ment of citizen participation in local development planning is still in its initial stages. 
The absence of legal and political framework beside the weak organizational capacity at 
the grassroots level continues to negatively affect the citizen participation process in 
local planning and decisions making. To this extent, this Ph.D research is carried out ( 
in the University of Dortmund/Germany) in a way to overcome these problems and 
pave the way for establishment of effective legal, institutional frameworks and operat-
ing structures to foster effective citizen participation. 
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1 Introduction to the research focus and context  
The non-governmental sector in Palestine has evolved due to particular historical and 
political circumstances.  If by ‘NGOs’ one means societal organization of varied types 
existing in relative independence from the state, then according to Giacaman (2000), 
such organizations have had a long history in Palestine, beginning during the first dec-
ades of 20th century. In the form of its current and modern structure, the NGO sector 
flourished in the 70s and 80s and continued to grow rapidly in the 90s up to the present.  
Since its inception, this sector has played a para state function to substitute the disabled 
state in providing services, particularly in the social arena.  Currently, Palestine proba-
bly has the highest influence of non-governmental institutions (local and international) 
on the welfare of the people, anywhere in the world.    
The Palestinian NGOs have always played a vital role in Palestinian society. The 
NGO sector’s vitality and dynamism are at the root of the evolution of Palestinian civil 
society, with all aspects of plurality and diversity.  However, Palestinian NGOs histori-
cally used to keep a quite far distance from the state, working in a separate and inde-
pendent fashion. While this might be have been justified in the past during the absence 
of a Palestinian authority, a new kind of relationship now needs to emerge between 
NGOs and government, following the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. 
Although the NGO–government relationship has experienced some developments re-
cently at the central level which culminated in the formulation of the NGOs law in 
2000, close observers observe that wide gaps exist at the co-operation levels between 
NGOs and local governments. This research, as part of its objectives, is intended to 
enrich the discourses of the areas of NGOs- LGUs co-operation and interactions at the 
local level in the fields of policy making, planning process and program implementa-
tion.    
During the years of Israeli occupation, “..civil society organizations including NGOs 
provided almost one third of education services, more than half of primary heath care 
services and hospital care and nearly 100% of all agricultural extensions” (Sullivan 
1996 cited in Al-Shouli 2006:11). However, the role the Palestinian NGOs assumed 
created a debate after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. The debate 
focused on whether NGO’s are considered civil society agents or are replacing the gov-
ernment by providing services to the population. According to Jarrar (2005), due to 
Palestinian NGOs’ history and the transitional and uncertain nature of the Palestinian 
political context, the relationship between NGOs and the Palestine government has gone 
through different phases:  
– Firstly, the uncertainty which occurred directly after establishment of Palestinian 
Authority in 1994.  
– Secondly, mutual acceptance where the government recognized its inability to pro-
vide service alone.  
– Finally, the emerging of collaboration between NGOs and central government to 
formulate the NGOs law in the year 2000.   
This research commences with the last of these phases described by (Jarrar 2005). It can 
be shown that co-operation might have taken place between NGOs and central minis-
tries in various aspects. However, and regardless of the nature and efficiency of this co-
operation, literature has kept silent when talking about co-operation between NGOs and 
governmental institutions at the local level. Is this because the co-operation in principle 
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does not exist?  Or because the NGOs could not widen their co-operation with govern-
ment to reach local level? Hence, another important question can be raised: are the Pal-
estinian NGOs willing and able to participate in local planning and policy making? This 
last question pinpoints an essential issue to be investigated by this research. 
Characterized by weak and disabled state mechanisms, Palestine has seen huge inter-
national interventions and a huge number of local operating NGOs.  Planning and pol-
icy making are heavily dominated by political and factional interests. The Palestinian 
NGOs have neither easy access to decision makers nor are they legally empowered to 
have an influence over local policy formulation and implementation. Thus, the Palestin-
ian NGOs face particular challenges in influencing important policy and planning deci-
sions in such a way as to hold local government more accountable and responsive to 
local needs.  An immediate question we need to ask is: How have the Palestinian NGOs 
coped within the constraints of the government systems – i.e. the disabled state, which 
has been poorly resourced, poorly motivated and resistant to change?  
Most of the opportunities that have been created to bring NGOs and LGUs together 
in policy making were donors' led. This research, as one of its objectives, will also in-
vestigate these opportunities (which we will call spaces in this research context) and 
explore the extent to which they have provided effective and sustainable involvement 
for NGOs to exercise their influence. 
The ‘spaces’1 , which are our main focus, will refer to all opportunities available for 
organized groups of civil society to influence the planning process, and may be any or a 
combination of the following: physical spaces in the environment, contextual spaces, 
formally mandated bodies like councils or committees, informally constituted bodies 
like task forces and special teams, or even a moment in time.  
These spaces may either be ‘invited’ or ‘autonomous ’. ‘Invited’ refers to the spaces 
created by governments to involve non-governmental institutions in its decision-making 
structure, while ‘autonomous’ spaces are the attempts created by the non-governmental 
institutions to influence government’s decisions in the policy making process. These 
attempts might take various forms such as forming special advocacy groups or networks 
or even social movements among others. Each of these spaces may have different rules 
of engagement, and participation in one or the other or both will come with advantages 
and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses.   
This research questions whether the spaces that exist at the local government level 
can provide sufficient opportunities for NGOs to be effectively involved and to have a 
substantial influence on the policy making and planning. While some literature2 reveals 
poor access of NGOs to local government decision making, this research questions why 
despite having this limited access, Palestinian NGOs have proven on many occasions 
their relatively high capacity to participate in developing the Palestinian society.. 
 
This research chiefly investigates these existing spaces and the degree to which they 
can work as efficient channels for NGOs to have an influence on policy formulation and 
implementation. The research also explores the disabling factors together with the exist-
                                                 
1
   Grindle and Thomas (1991) as cited in (Brock at al 2001:22) define ‘spaces’ as “moments in which 
interventions or events throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring relationships between actors within 
these spaces or bringing in new actors, and opening up the possibilities of a shift in direction”. According 
to McGee (2004:16), “the concept of spaces provides a useful lens through which to view the policies and 
practices of actors who are engaged in the policy process, and to examine how their power to act is en-
abled and constraint. It makes it possible to break down the policy and planning processes into observ-
able, influence able elements. It also raise questions about their actions, and what potentials arises as a 
result of these” 
2
 See for example Palestinian Human Development Report (2002, 2004) and Rocard Report (2000) 
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ing potentials for the creation of new institutionalized ‘spaces’ where local NGOs can 
meet, discuss and consult with local municipal councils (LGUs) in areas of local devel-
opment planning and policy making, and also in holding local governments more ac-
countable and responsive to citizens’ needs.  In order to meet these objectives, this re-
search asks basic questions:  
– How are policies and plans made at the Palestinian local governmental levels? 
– Do Palestinian NGOs have spaces where they can be involved in shaping and form-
ing local policies? 
– How could the institutional dynamics of power relations between range of different 
actors at the local level, specifically NGOs and municipal governments make and 
shape local planning and policy spaces?  
– Whose knowledge accounts? Who provides it? How is it used? 
– Who occupies policy spaces and why? How can NGOs gain access to them? 
– How could interplay of power, knowledge and actors hinder or facilitate the estab-
lishment of institutionalized participatory spaces? 
– How to assess the efficiency or success of institutionalized spaces? 
– More importantly as mentioned before, are the Palestinian NGOs willing and able to 
participate in local planning and policy making? 
In order to increase our theoretical understanding and knowledge concerning previous 
mentioned issues, this research made use of concepts related mainly to: 
– Firstly, participation and policy making processes: to understand how local policies 
are made and how could interplay among actors, power and knowledge shape spaces 
(McGee, Gaventa and Brock 2001, 2002, 2004).  
– Secondly, institutionalization of participation: to explore various dimensions of in-
stitutionalized participatory spaces (Brinkhoff and Goldsmith 2001).  
– Thirdly, evaluation theories for measuring successful participation: can successful 
NGOs’ participation be measured? (Webler 2003).  
After having reviewed theories, a conceptual model (terrain) is then drawn up, upon 
which to build the empirical research.   The fieldwork for the research was carried out in 
the context of local governance in Palestine and focused on two local municipal coun-
cils (Rafah and Gaza municipalities) together with 15 NGOs and three local neighbor-
hoods committees working in their municipal jurisdictions. The final objective of this 
research is to find out what could be the best strategies and policies to promote the es-
tablishment of institutionalized spaces for direct participation of organized groups of 
civil society (focusing on NGOs) in local planning and policy making processes.  
Clearly, the challenge of this research is that it works with development of participa-
tory practices in a constantly changing context, with uncertain political environment and 
not yet clearly defined legal frameworks to guide NGOs / government relationships, 
particularly at the local level. On the other hand, and although literature is full of theo-
ries of participation, there is little scientific literature on how to translate these theoreti-
cal approaches into practice and how to adopt these approaches systematically in the 
real world. Indeed, by providing an account of the evolution of these participatory prac-
tices in such a changing context as in the Palestinian case, where in particular NGOs are 
important and LGUs are weak, and examining how these practices might evolve with 
relation to context, would stand as a major contribution of this research by itself in 
planning theories and practices. This contribution is likely to take the form of what les-
sons could be learnt from the Palestinian experience.  
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1.1 Introduction to research concept 
The research is based on an understanding of policy making and local planning proc-
esses as series of complex, dynamic and political processes, rather than as linear pro-
gression from formulation to implementation. Literature revealed clearly that decisions 
in the planning and policy processes are made up of a series of distinct but linked 
spaces, in which a wide range of actors (governmental and non-governmental) engage 
in order to influence and shape policy making and plans . Each actor brings into the 
policy space their own unique version of knowledge and expectations about develop-
ment planning, which inform and guide their actions. Power dynamics between actors 
permeate all spaces in the planning process. Thus, this research explores the dynamics 
of the making and shaping of policy and planning process. It takes as a starting point a 
critique of linear versions of policy making and planning, highlighting the complex 
interplay of power, knowledge and spaces in planning process. The planning process 
involves a complex configuration of interests between ranges of differently positioned 
actors whose interactions are shaped by power relations. This would require an under-
standing of how particular ways of thinking about participation in development plan-
ning have gained ascendancy, coming to determine the frame through which participa-
tory planning is defined, measured and tackled. Making sense of participation in local 
development planning and policy making processes requires that we identify and ex-
plore policy spaces in which various knowledge may be expressed by a variety of 
voices and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that surround them. By examining 
how different actors interact in such spaces – as well as how they may be excluded from 
them - we can better understand the ways in which power and knowledge frame the 
planning and policy process.  
Hence, this research is based on the approach of three interconnected themes.  
– Knowledge: the information on which policies are based: what counts as knowl-
edge? Who provides it? How it is used?  
– Actors: non-government and governmental actors involved in policy making and 
implementation- who occupies policy spaces and why? How can organized groups 
of civil society organizations be empowered?  
– Spaces: the opportunities available for actors to interact and for NGOs to influence 
decision making- Do spaces first of all exist at the Palestinian local level? What 
constraints imposed on them by politics, culture and history? What kinds of poten-
tials and limitations could enable or disable NGOs to have new created spaces 
where they can influence local governments’ policy to be more accountable and re-
sponsive to local communities’ needs? 
It is important to emphasize that this categorization of knowledge, actors and space, 
does not presuppose a fine separation between the categories, but they are used as ana-
lytical signifiers to help us make sense of the process of policy making as it plays out at 
the Palestinian local level scene. 
1.2 Organization of the research  
In order to meet the previous mentioned objectives and questions, the research has been 
structured into eight chapters. In chapter one, we begin by providing a brief background 
to the research, pinpointing the study area in question. In order to give the reader the 
general sense of this research, a brief introduction to the research context and concepts 
will point out major concepts and questions to be covered. The introductory chapter 
 5 
clarifies also the focus of the research in both the theoretical discourses to be reviewed 
and empirical schemes to be investigated. The last part of this chapter deals with the 
structuring of the study, indicating the flow of discussion of various issues and how 
each section leads to the next. 
Chapter two paves the way for deriving specific agenda of participation for more in-
depth analysis and focused investigation. It begins by exploring the historical, cultural 
and political factors that have shaped the evolution of both local governmental struc-
tures and NGOs in Palestine. Conceptual clarifications for what are meant by Palestin-
ian local government and NGOs in the context of this research will be formulated ear-
lier here in order to acquaint the reader with their distinctive and to avoid any confu-
sion. This clarification will be re-enforced in the theoretical review of NGOs in chapter 
three. The last part of the second chapter will present the context of the current local 
planning process and policy making together with the institutional ‘spaces’ that are cre-
ated for NGOs and local councils to meet for shaping policy and making plans. A spe-
cific agenda will then be derived for further analysis to include: appropriateness of legal 
frameworks, types of institutional spaces and the extent they are instrumentalized; locus 
of decision making power at the local level, the extent to which it is shared and the de-
gree to which NGOs influence local policy formulation and implementation; institu-
tional dynamics of power relations, and the knowledge, willingness and capacity of 
each actor to participate. It is believed that deep exploration of these issues will lead to 
determining driving forces that hinder or facilitate establishment of institutionalized 
spaces for effective and direct involvement of organized groups of civil society in local 
planning and policy making processes. 
A conceptual model (terrain) is then sketched out, on which empirical research will 
be built in chapter three.  This chapter takes as a starting point a critique of linear ver-
sions of policy making and planning, highlighting the complex interplay of power, 
knowledge and spaces in shaping planning and policy processes. This research is based 
on the understanding of the planning process as a series of complex and dynamic proc-
esses rather than as linear progression from formulation to implementation. It involves a 
complex configuration of interests between ranges of differently positioned actors 
whose interactions are shaped by power relations. With this specific understanding of  
planning and policy making processes,  the next step will be linking this interpretation 
to the emerging of new collaborative approaches in planning theories pointing out major 
paradigms and challenges in this regards. After explaining the driving forces of shaping 
policy making and planning processes, the next logical step will be to find out whether 
success can be measured or not, and if yes, how can we relate evaluation criteria to the 
interplay of  power, actors, and knowledge? How may these factors result in or deter 
creation of institutionalized ‘spaces’? In order to answer the last question, we will need 
to know what is meant by institutionalized space. What kind of disabling and enabling 
legal factors are seen to be of greatest importance? How, theoretically, will a healthy 
relationship between government and NGOs at the local level look, as a result of crea-
tion of institutionalized spaces? While putting theories into the research context some 
specific assumptions are to be derived. As a major conclusion of clarification of the 
interplay of these conceptual issues, a specific analytical framework will be drawn out, 
on which to build where our empirical fieldwork. 
How will the conceptual framework guide the empirical work? This will be explored 
in chapter four in the form of a methodological framework where the nature of research 
methodology, methods of data collection and analysis will be delineated.  The first sec-
tion will provide a clear framework of research goals and operational objectives. Then, 
some hypotheses as derived in chapter three will be defined together with others based 
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on observations. The research is mainly qualitative in its nature (inductive and deduc-
tive) and makes use of two research methods namely descriptive and casual. Descriptive 
method involves gathering of information concerning existing situations and critical 
inquiry of past events.  While casual research determines which variable (driving force) 
might be causing a certain behaviour.. This kind of research method is very challenging 
since it might be very difficult in the real world to determine exactly which specific 
factor would lead to an exact and certain behaviour since the output is a result of a com-
plex interplay of various interrelated entities. To simplify this issue, the research fo-
cuses only on issues related to planning science narrowing focus more to the local level. 
Types of data collected will be identified on the basis of the derived agenda for research 
which has been identified in chapter two. Selection criteria will be set out to identify 
proper governmental and non-governmental actors to be interviewed in the field. The 
primary data will mainly be collected through three various means: key informant inter-
views, one workshop, and observations. Then, a set of analytical tools will be framed to 
include: stakeholder analysis (matrix), SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportu-
nities and threats) and power distribution matrix. These tools are used due to their sim-
plicity. The last section of this chapter is intended to highlight limitations and major 
challenges as encountered by the researcher in the filed work pointing out their implica-
tions on the research context, coverage and analysis. 
Chapter five is intended to provide briefly the socio-economic data concerning the 
study areas in Gaza and Rafah municipalities together with profiling and classification 
of existing NGOs in Gaza Strip in general and in the two municipalities’ jurisdictions in 
particular.  
Chapter six will be the direct reflection of our conceptual and methodological 
frameworks particularly on the way how data will be organized, structured and ana-
lyzed. Major sections describe key determinant conceptual issues namely: knowledge, 
actors and power relations and spaces. The chapter begins by analyzing the contextual 
legal environment where the interplay of these elements occurs. In conclusion, there is 
an exploration of factors that disable or enable NGOs’ involvement in local policy for-
mulation and implementation and in which legal spaces if exist. This is then followed 
by several sequenced sections analysing the interplay of knowledge, actors and space. 
Here we explore the institutional dynamics of the Palestinian NGOs and local municipal 
councils, pointing out the research findings in this regard. The findings will be based on 
observations, interviews and narratives together with national checklist data and docu-
mentations shared by respondents.  
Key challenges and lessons learnt from experience in the Palestinian context consti-
tute major themes of chapter seven. The challenges include issues facing both Palestin-
ian NGOs and LGUs to forming proper spaces for their engagement in policy formula-
tion and implementation. The second important section of this chapter derives lessons of 
what others could learn from the Palestinian experience. This section also includes deri-
vation of some further hypothesises from the research findings. It is important to em-
phasize in this regard, that due to the very inductive nature of this research, the intention 
was not to test the previously identified hypothesises and assumptions. The derivation 
of practical findings into hypothesises is only to enrich understanding of the issues that 
are assumed and their applicability in the Palestinian context. 
Chapter eight is composed of summarizing conclusion and direct recommendations. 
The direct recommendations target how to promote the establishment of participatory 
spaces in the Palestinian context. A set of important and concrete suggestions in this 
regard will be clearly articulated and will take the form of policy and capacity issues to 
be dealt by various actors namely: central state, local governments, NGOs and donors. 
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2 Contextual factors for evolution of local government 
structures and NGOs; derive agenda for research 
As it appears in the title, this chapter has three objectives:  
– First, to explore the historical, cultural and political environment where both local 
government and NGOs have emerged.  
– Second, to explore the nature and areas of relationships where NGOs and govern-
ment were brought together to interact in development planning pointing out major 
discourses and challenges in this regard.  
– Based on findings of the first two objectives, the third objective is to derive specific 
agenda which will be subject for further research and deep investigation.  
2.1 Evolution of local government structures; historical perspectives 
Local government systems in Palestine evolved through various historical stages from 
the Ottoman Empire (19th century till 1917), passing through the British Mandate (1917-
1948), Jordanian and Egyptian administrations (1948-1967) and finally by the Israeli 
occupation (1967-1993). After 1993, a peace agreement between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis was endorsed and the Palestinian Authority was established.  Hence, since 
19th century, the local government systems have been subject to many changes, obsta-
cles and difficulties. None of the ruling powers (Ottoman, British Mandatory, Jordani-
ans and Egyptians and Israeli Occupation) were working for the empowerment of local 
governments, which were mainly appointed to serve the rulers’ agenda.  The absence of 
any developmental role for the local councils was the main feature of local government 
system in all of these periods. Another feature was the centralized pattern of governing 
and planning that resulted in more consolidation ties between local and central govern-
ments. The combination of the nature o the ruling authorities with the existing culture of 
the Palestinians affected the creation of new forms of local governments. These external 
authorities issued much legislation and set in place institutional arrangements that were 
mainly created to serve their interest and to tighten their control over the Palestinian 
territories. In all of these eras, communities’ views, needs and aspirations were under-
mined.  
Ottomans era; introduction of rural district law  
In the mid 19th century, the Ottomans adopted a group of reform measures seeking to 
tighten their control over the Palestinian territories (Ma’oz 1968:33). The reform meas-
ures included comprehensive institutional arrangements aimed at structural adjustments 
in the financial, military, judicial, administrative, educational, and economic sectors. It 
also included measures and regulations aimed at re-defining the concept of ‘citizenship’ 
in accordance with the western line. Of great concern among these measures was one 
enacted in the1840s which set up Administrative Councils at the provincial level. These 
councils, which enjoyed financial, administrative, and judicial authorities, were set up to 
check the Wali’s3 power, and to serve as institutional foundation for social mobilization 
and political participation.  According to Porath (1974:14), though they succeeded, to 
                                                 
3
 A person appointed by Ottoman (Turkish) authority as a ruler for Palestine 
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some extent, to check the Wali’s authority, they failed to serve as a strong institutional 
foundation for wider political and community participation. The deputies to these coun-
cils, who were appointed by the authorities, were derived from the leading families of 
Palestine, or the Ayan (urban notable). Middle and lower classes of Palestinian society 
were underrepresented and the non-Muslim deputies were marginalized. Consequently, 
the public were denied the right to decide on their local affairs, and the Ayan with their 
strong economic power and social influence, as well as their control over most of Pales-
tinian lands, dominated these councils.  
In 1864, the Wilayet law (rural district law) was introduced to promote local gov-
ernment at village and town level respectively. The law, enacted in 1867, introduced a 
system of Nahiyas (rural districts) at the village and town levels. The Nahiya was said 
to be under the control of the Mudir (chairman) who should chair a local council pro-
posed to each Nahiya (Findley 1986:10-13). Despite this, view councils have been es-
tablished, the Mukhtars (Villages’ chiefs), introduced by virtue of the same law, man-
aged to assume the functions of the local councils (Elazer and Migdal 1994: 18-19).  
With regard to town planning, legislation in Palestine started toward the end of the 
Ottoman era with the promulgation of the 1867 law for regional Wilayet and towns. A 
system of building permits for towns was set up as well as rules for the appropriation of 
land for building roads and for regional development. According to Muhkimar (2005), 
planning under the Ottomans stressed the physical aspects (i.e. roads and building, par-
ticularly in the towns) and disregarded the economic and social aspects. According to 
Abdela'tey (2005:18), at the end of Ottoman era, there were only 22 municipalities, two 
of which were located in Gaza Strip (Gaza and KhanYounis municipalities) whereas the 
others spread across all historical Palestine. 
British mandate; introduction of local elections and regional plans 
The situation was worse under British mandate. The Palestinians were denied any ac-
cess to central state institutions such as cabinet, though they were permitted to take part 
partially on the municipal councils.  The councils’ responsibilities were delineated to 
collect fees, taxes, and other charges with a total absence of any economic or social 
developmental roles. Planning continued to be dominated by physical aspects as it was 
the case in Ottoman era, which may be expected as the plans were formulated mainly by 
the outsiders who had their own agenda and objectives. According to Zahlan (1998: 
211), “The plans were established on the basis of imported concepts orchestrated by the 
town planning consultant, for example, concepts developed in an industrial society like 
Britain”. Indeed, many factors impeded the local councils from an being effective tool 
of wider political and community participation such as: the high illiteracy rate, the mix-
ture of civil domain with the political one and sweeping powers conferred to the British 
commissioner. 
In 1936, the British Mandate issued the ‘Town Planning Order’.  The structural plan-
ning provided by this order established the basis for the planning process, for land use 
and for the planning authority in Palestine. This order still constitutes legal basis for 
planning and government structure in Palestinian to the present, with very little modifi-
cations concerning names and some rewording. The planning institutions set up by vir-
tue of the 1936 ‘Town Planning Order’ were composed of three levels: local committees 
in the towns, regional committees in charge of planning and approving the plans for the 
whole area, and the central level which included the town planning consultant and the 
high commissioner. The office of the town planning consultant (headed by a British 
architect) prepared and approved regional and local plans. The planning institutions at 
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that time, which may have been dispersed in terms of their locations, were centralized in 
regard to performance. The town planning consultant had considerable authority to plan, 
approve and amend local and regional plans. 
As regards involvement of communities in selecting their local councils’ representa-
tives during the British mandatory era, local council elections were conducted three 
times in the years 1927, 1934, 1944. In all of these elections the electoral base was very 
narrow. Voting qualifications included only males of either 21 years old or above with 
tax rate paying qualification. Nominees had to be literate and to pay a specific amount 
of money to run for election. Given that the Palestinian communities were in general 
poor and illiterate; this limited their access to participate effectively in those elections. 
Two factors, according Migdal (1994:96-156) impeded these local councils from being 
an effective tool of wide political and community participation. The first factor was the 
sweeping powers conferred on the British commissioner, and the second was the social 
and cultural setting of the rural areas. The former factor left the future of these councils, 
in some occasions, hostage to the political winds of the country. One main feature of the 
second factor (cultural setting) was its emphasis on community affiliation at the expense 
of any other form of modern affiliation (national affiliation for example). Providing this 
cultural setting, the decision making process was guided by factors other than rational 
choices (Migdal 1994:134).   
Alongside these problems, was the village’s cultural setting which remained hostile 
to any trend of institutionalization. The failure of the British mandate to bring about any 
significant changes as far as this culture is concerned (through education for example) 
left a large percentage of Palestinian villagers hostile to these councils, and prompted 
them to perceive these councils as a threat to their traditional way of life. What strength-
ened such belief among Palestinian villagers was the fact that the Mandatory govern-
ment which provided these councils was a foreign power. When the Mandatory 
government enacted its Ordinances concerning local councils, it was inspired by the 
European culture emphasizing horizontal relations and the individual as self-standing 
entity. This contradicted the traditional cultural setting of Palestinian village emphasiz-
ing vertical relations and community affiliation. The fact that the number of Palestinian 
local councils decreased from 24 in 1924 to eleven in 1948 (the year when the Mandate 
was terminated), and the local councils of incoming Jews (who were European oriented) 
increased from three in 1924 to 26 councils in 1948 (Elazer and Klachheim 1988: 15), 
might confirm how various cultural settings demote or promote the success of any local 
authorities schemes.  
Jordanian regime and Egyptian administration; tightening control over 
Palestinian local governments 
Following the 1948 war, as a consequence of which the State of Israel came into being, 
the Palestinian territories were divided into two regions: the West Bank ruled by the 
Jordanian Kingdom, and the Gaza Strip ruled by the Egyptian Administration. Many of 
the factors prevailing in British mandatory era continue to prevail under the Jordanian 
regime and Egyptian administrations. Both authorities sought to establish strict control 
over the system of local government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through tying it 
to the central authority in Amman or Cairo. They did not prepare plans for the villages 
except in a few cases. According to Khamisi (1998 in Zahlan 1998:212), the Jordanian 
authorities did nothing to amend the planning system established by the British man-
date. They only devised the structural plans for some towns and supervised construc-
tion. These plans disregarded the demographic needs as well as the future economic and 
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social requirements of the population. As for the Gaza Strip, according to (Abd Ela’tey 
2005:34), planning depended on decrees promulgated by the Egyptian administration. 
Instead of having elected local councils in the Gaza Strip, temporarily formed commit-
tees were appointed in order to administer local affairs. These committees lacked auton-
omy and influence on local social and economical development.  
To conclude the situation under Jordanian and Egyptian administrations, the failure 
of the Palestinian municipal system to deliver basic services was not merely due to a 
wide-scale governmental intervention in their work and lack of financial support, but 
also due to the absence of the necessary social prerequisites for the attainment of an 
effective municipal system.  In other words, and as it historically used to be, clan and 
familial background remained the determinant factor in access to social power.  
Israeli occupation; politicizing local governments and development works 
The situation was worst under the Israeli occupation followed the 1967 six days war 
where many aggressive measures were taken to strengthen strict control over the work 
of the municipalities and to reduce their developmental and planning roles. Palestinians 
were robbed of all authority and responsibility for their own regional and planning insti-
tutions. The local government councils were utilized as a political tool to confront PLO 
(Palestinian Liberation Organization) supporters and institutions. Local council elec-
tions were held only twice, in 1972 and 1976, and only in the West Bank. We should 
note, however, that in these elections the electoral base was widened to include women 
(just as voters not candidate) for the first time and that the age qualification was reduced 
to18 years old, and that tax paying qualification was disregarded.  Apart from that, Is-
rael continued the appointment and dismissal of local council members and mayors, and 
the work of local councils was totally controlled by military officers. There was no role 
for the councils in the formulation of any developmental policy, and the several military 
orders issued in this period aimed to strengthen strict control on the work of the munici-
palities. The role of these councils became a mediatory role between villagers and the 
occupation government. According to (Mekkey 2005), the relationship between the 
central authority represented by the Israeli occupation and the local councils in Palestine 
was distinguished by the desire of the Israeli occupation to dominate the Palestinian 
community and land in order to achieve its aim to occupy all Palestine. Therefore, Israel 
restricted the powers of these councils, regarding them as departments of the occupying 
central authority. When Israel failed to do so, it turned to a different policy of resisting 
the elected councils that refused to co-operate with the occupying authority and carry 
out its plans. 
According to Khamaisi (in Zahlan 1998:208), during more than 28 years of occupa-
tion, Israel has imposed restrictions and obstacles, making use of construction laws and 
planning mechanisms to limit the Palestinian urban development, while allowing every 
opportunity for the development of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. 
Despite this, “Palestinian towns and villages did develop, their population increased and 
their built-up areas have expanded, mostly without previous planning” (Khamaisi 
1998:208). There was a little awareness of the importance of planning, since Palestinian 
society is mostly rural with a low economic standard of living, and a relatively slow 
pace of development. Israeli occupation for more than two decades deprived Palestini-
ans of any sovereignty in running their own local affairs.  
Discussion of the competencies and roles played by the municipalities during the pe-
riod of Israeli occupation should not be separated from several considerations related to 
the hindrance of their performance. Palestine has witnessed successive occupations and 
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implementation of different laws that largely viewed municipalities as departments di-
rected by the central authority. Legal, political, and economic restrictions were factors 
hindering the performance of municipalities. The traditional political attitude towards 
the nature and roles of the municipalities, the legal restrictions imposed on them and 
their financial non-independence, in addition to the administrative hindrances, limited 
the functional role of municipalities in providing the citizens with vital basic services 
such as: water, electricity, road pavement, and waste collection. In the late 70s and early 
80s, the non governmental sector flourished as a response to the weak service delivery 
by local and central governments. These NGOs began to play, together with UNRWA4 
affiliated institutions, a vital role in meeting peoples basic needs particularly health and 
education.  
Bringing the discussion of historical evolution of local governments closer to our re-
search context, one can easily conclude how the constantly changing political context 
has affected the emerging of coherent local government in Palestine. Local governments 
are used to working as departments serving a central agenda and policies. In addition, 
communities are used to having very limited access in choosing their representation in 
local councils, as it has been the trend though all historical eras for central authorities to 
appoint local councils’ members and mayors, except in a few cases. Even where these 
councils wielded some power, this had to be focused on physical planning not the socio-
economic needs of their communities. With relation to NGOs, which were new phe-
nomena flourishing in their new modern structures particularly at the end of the 1970s, 
literature reveals a total disconnection between local councils and NGOs. One must not 
forget that some kind of traditional organized groups of Palestinian civil society existed, 
emerging even during Ottoman era. These groups took the shape of family, tribal and 
religious organizations focusing only on charity works (as will be discussed later in the 
evolution of Palestinian NGOs). Even these organizations were found to have little rela-
tionship with local planning with local councils. The local councils themselves had no 
influence over the development of NGOs, nor did they have control over their affairs.  
This situation continued to prevail till 1994, when the Palestinian Authority was es-
tablished. For the first time, Palestinians began to plan for themselves. The major char-
acteristics of government structures and planning system after the inception of the PA 
(Palestinian Authority) will be discussed in the next sections. 
2.2 Current planning system and structure in Palestine 
The modern Palestinian territories are very young. The beginning of an autonomous 
planning process in Palestine was intended to start with the establishment of the Pales-
tinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994, following the endorsement of the Oslo 
Agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. During the period of Israeli occupation, 
the Palestinian influence on local, physical, regional and national planning was, to say 
the least, very limited. According to the Oslo Agreement signed in 1993, the responsi-
bility for planning was conditionally transferred to the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA). This would give the Palestinians, for the first time in modern history, the power 
to initiate, prepare, amend and abrogate their own plans at the national, regional and 
local levels.   
Palestine consists of three major regions: the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Je-
rusalem as an independent city with its own planning system. According to the Palestin-
ian Central Bureau of statistics (PCBS 2000), the area of the Palestinian Territories is 
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6,020 squire kilometers. The Gaza Strip covers 365 square kilometers and the West 
Bank around 5,655 square kilometers. According to the PCBS (2000), the population of 
Palestine is 3,560,000, with 2,260,000 in the West Bank and 1,300,000 in the Gaza 
Strip. According to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA 2002), there 
are 639,450 registered refugees in the West Bank and the refugee population of the 
Gaza Strip is 893,150. PCBS (2000) indicates that the population growth in Palestine 
had reached 4.2% by the end of 2000. The total fertility rate is (5.6).  
 
Figure  2.1: Map of Palestine 
 
The two major regions (Gaza Strip and West Bank) are divided into lower governmental 
structures called governorates. The Gaza Strip consists of five governorates and the 
West Bank consists of eleven. Each governorate itself is divided into municipalities and 
small town and village councils. In general, every governorate consists of at least one 
major municipality representing the largest city in that area and several villages and 
towns. According to Abd Ela’tey (2005:34), there are 444 local councils in Palestine, 
and 108 of them are municipal councils and 334 are village councils.  
The local government units in Palestine are composed of two interrelated institutions: 
local councils (appointed or elected), and municipal government. The local units work 
with local neighborhood committees (to represent communities in their jurisdictions) 
and partially with NGOs in covering some aspects of their governments’ operations. In 
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principle, our research will focus on investigating these areas of interaction between 
these government units on one hand and NGOs and local committees on the other. 
Figure  2.2: Government structure in Palestine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currently in Palestine, there are three planning levels: national, regional and local. It is 
important to emphasize that the regional level is not a government unit in itself in the 
sense that it has a regional governor or administrative structure. At the same time it 
might be the strongest level of planning.  How does this conflict arise? It can be ex-
plained by the prevailing critical political circumstances where the national government 
institutions such as ministries and other national agencies are always divided into two 
regional divisions and parts. Some work to serve the West Bank and the others serve the 
Gaza Strip since there is no continuous geographic connection between the two parts 
(Israel in between). As a result, the two divided national institutions work as regional 
institutions with weak co-operation between them. The only recognized regional gov-
ernment institution is the Central Committee for Building and City Planning (CCBCP). 
Even so, this committee works under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment (MOLG). 
Concerning planning itself in Palestine, Palestinian institutions – as in other countries 
– differentiate between physical and socio-economic planning. However, the relation-
ship between them is recognized to be weak5. The integration of these planning func-
tions remains a great challenge facing the planning institutions at the national, regional 
and local levels. Meanwhile and in actual fact, there are no specific national plans for-
mulated at the national level. The literary collection between regional physical plans for 
West Bank ad Gaza Strip is recognized as national plans.  That indicates why the physi-
cal planning period for the regional plans is relatively long period (20years) since it is 
also the same period for national plans. While planning periods for local plans in gen-
eral are three to ten years.  
In 2003, the Ministry of Planning began the process of formulating a national strate-
gic plan that is supposed to guide future regional and local plans for the first time. On 
                                                 
5
 According to researcher personal experience who himself works for seven years as a regional planner. 
Palestine
Gaza Strip West Bank Jerusalem
(11) Governorates
s108 Municipalities334 Villages/Towns
(5) Governorates
Local Elected Council
Municipal Government
Local Neighborhood Committees
NGOs
 14 
the other hand and as far as social plans are concerned, the Ministry of Planning formu-
lated socio-economic plans with a three year planning period in the form of Palestinian 
Development Plans (PDPs). One of the major challenges that these plans face is the lack 
of clarity regarding an approval process. The Ministry of Planning (MOP) used to con-
sult other governmental institutions and agencies at various levels in order to get their 
feedback through the process of formulating these plans. These plans are always ap-
proved at least one year later, and they are according to the researcher’s view powerless 
and incapable of guiding seriously other socio-economic plans that are formulated by 
other government institutions.   
In general, planning issues are too many; each has its specialist institution within a 
sectoral approach that has been adopted in Palestine. The Ministry of Planning (MOP) 
and the newly established High Planning Council (HPC) are responsible for national 
and strategic planning. According to a presidential order signed in 2000, HPC will be 
responsible for formulating national policies and approve national plans prepared by 
MOP. The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) is responsible for regional planning. 
The institution that is in charge of initiating and regulating regional plans is the Central 
Commission for Building and City Planning (CCBCP). CCBCP is composed of repre-
sentatives of several ministries (health, education, housing, etc) and representatives of 
local governments, and works under supervision of MOLG.  
As for local planning and due to the lack of local government technical capacity, 
MOLG and CCBCP used to support some incapable LGUs technically in formulating 
their local plans6.  The local government units represented by the municipalities and 
village councils, with the co-operation of the MOLG, are responsible for preparing the 
local physical and comprehensive plans. The governorates (as government units) that 
exist in between regional and lo cal levels do not legally have the power to formulate 
plans. Instead they supervise the municipalities and village councils’ functions and op-
erations and in many cases work independently in raising funds and implement addi-
tional projects. According to the researcher’s view, it is very hard to draw clear lines 
among the many government institutions’ roles or to define clearly who might be re-
sponsible for what.  It might be the government’s policy to create several administrative 
structures or committees to widen participation, but in a practical sense, it is hard to 
make them work in harmony.  
With regard to community participation, planning laws put more emphasis on par-
ticipation of land owners in planning. According to the law, the property owner has the 
legal right to reject the plans if they are injured.  Land is a critical issue and a very sen-
sitive area of intervention and can cause many serious problems due its scarcity. Prop-
erty owners are informed about the plans when they are approved by the Central Com-
mittee for Building and City Planning (CCBCP) and after being presented in the local 
news. When land owners have comments or wish to reject the plans, the CCBCP (and 
not the LGU) has to study their objections. The CCBCP has the power either to accept 
or reject these objections. The CCBCP can take up to 25% of the property without com-
pensation (to provide public services including transportation). If the cut of the property 
exceeds 25%, the owners have the right to be compensated. In the next section we will 
explore the context of NGOs-government relationship particularly in field of develop-
ment planning. 
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 According to the interview with the legal consultant for the Ministry of Local Government, 2005 
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2.3 Evolution of Palestinian NGOs and the context of NGOs-
government relationships; derivation of the agenda for research 
“If by ‘civil society’ one means societal organization of varied types existing in relative 
independence from the state, then such organization has had a long history in Pales-
tine.” (George Giacaman, 2000 as cited in Al-shouli 2006:16) 
Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have always played a vital role in 
Palestinian society. Since its inception, the NGO sector has been an integral part of the 
Palestinian national movement and its aspiration for a free and sovereign Palestine. Its 
vitality and dynamism are at the root of the evolution of Palestinian civil society, with 
all its aspects of plurality and diversity. According to Guicaman (2000), civil society 
organizations (CSOs) have been functioning since Ottoman times in the form of pre-
modern associations that were ethnic, tribal, or kinship-based. Modern forms of associa-
tion based on voluntary membership increased in the twentieth century and continue 
until the present time (Giacaman, 2000 as cited in Alshouli 2006:17). The NGO move-
ment in Palestine is deeply rooted within Palestinian society. According to Jarrar 
(2005)7, “charities started their activities at the turn of the 20th century and operated 
within the legal framework applicable to NGOs as stipulated in Ottoman law. Many of 
these early organizations are still functioning and actively involved in civil work up to 
this day. They are currently estimated to constitute around 10 percent of the total num-
ber of NGOs in Palestine.” In the 1920s CSOs functioned as charitable organizations 
during the British mandate, and continued to function during the 1940s and 1950s in 
relief and professional unions (Jarrar  2005). 
Hammami, Hilal and Tamari (2001) also agree that the first ‘modern’ civic organiza-
tions in Palestine arose in the 1920s during the British Mandate. At that time, the major-
ity of CSOs were limited to narrow membership and representation. They were elite-
family based, charities, sports clubs, etc except for the trade union movement that 
reached not only the elite but also other classes of the society (Hammami, Hilal and 
Tamari 2001). The Palestinians continued to establish CSOs but they became more pro-
fessional and relief-oriented especially after the disposition in 1948. The relief organiza-
tions were created to respond to the needs of refugees in terms of health, education and 
so on. Professional CSOs included agricultural unions, chambers of commerce, and 
professional unions. Both types of CSOs still exist (Hammami, Hilal and Tamari 2001). 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a substantial proliferation of NGOs, most of which 
were charitable organizations operating regionally. The legal framework applicable to 
these organizations was based on Jordanian law, which was more or less an extension of 
Ottoman law (Jarrar 2005). With the Israeli occupation in 1967 of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, the demand by the Palestinian population for the provision of services in-
creased; charities assumed the very important role of providing these services in social, 
educational and medical fields. They did so independently of the existing Israeli ser-
vice-provision system. However, the Israeli military authorities placed many restrictions 
on the establishment and registration of new organizations by imposing additional re-
quirements to the already existing legal codes. These military orders impacted nega-
tively on the process of registration as well as the functioning of NGOs, which in turn 
led to severe disruption in their activities.  
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According to Jarrar (2005), during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new phenome-
non took place on the NGO scene - the emergence of voluntary grass-roots organiza-
tions. The new movement started to function in different fields on the ground, without 
obtaining the permission of the Israeli civil administration. This fact placed them, ac-
cording to Israeli legal terms, outside the law.  According to Alshouli (2006:18), the rise 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organizations (PLO) and national organizations in the 
diaspora marked a qualitative change in the Palestinian CSOs that led to mass mobiliza-
tion in the 1970s and early 80s.  
Followed by the first Intifada8 in the late 1980s, Palestinian civil society witnessed 
an expansion of mass organization-type CSOs that were voluntary and locally-based, 
and which were called themselves “popular committees”. These committees were also 
known as neighborhood committees and organized food distribution and garbage collec-
tion under curfew, and provided education to compensate for the closed schools and 
universities under Israeli occupation (Hammami, Hilal and Tamari, 2001).  
Between 1967 and 1993, Palestinian NGO's played a vital role in serving the Pales-
tinian society at the time when the occupation was providing limited services (if any). 
This role was well recognized by the local society and international community. Ac-
cording to Jarrar (2005), Palestinian NGOs have managed to fill the role of a national 
government. They have been providing the Palestinian population with social, indus-
trial, agricultural, medical, housing and public services, making the NGOs an integral 
part of the society. According to Jarrar (2005), NGOs in Palestine provided nearly 60% 
of the primary health services, 30% of the hospital care services, 100% of daycare, 
100% of disability services, nearly 100% of all agricultural training and services and 
30% of educational services before Oslo (1993). Even though the majority of these 
NGOs are local, most of them are entirely dependent on foreign aid. We should also 
mention here that most NGOs were part of or belonged to political parties. 
The Palestinians had been able to manage very well since 1967 in the absence of a 
representative government and throughout the Israeli military occupation, in what Jarrar 
(2005) called a ‘political vacuum’. NGOs have been filling the gap in Palestinian Society 
caused by the occupation, and even now, 13 years after signing of the Oslo Accords and 
establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, the NGO sector services are still 
needed in addition to their role in the overall development process of Palestinian civil soci-
ety. According to Jarrar, “…substantial changes occurred in the political and socioeconomic 
context in which the Palestinian NGOs had been operating, leading them to revise their 
strategies and redefine their role after the establishment of the PNA” (Jarrar 2005:4). Since 
1994, the relationship between the NGO community and the PNA has been unstable and 
consequently led the NGOs to operate within an ambiguous legal framework which left 
them vulnerable to political pressure (Jarrar, 2005). However, the PNA has worked on 
drafting the “Law of Charitable Associations, Social Societies and Private Institutions” that 
is a legal framework that regulates the activities of NGOs and their relationship with the 
PNA, and is known as the 'NGOs Law.' 
According to Izzat Abdel Hadi (2004), the NGO community does not consider itself 
to be merely a service provider, but also an effective body in the national and political 
process of struggle against the occupation. The NGOs have a duty to express the com-
munity’s views on the most critical developments in Palestine such as the right to self 
determination. According to Abdel Hadi (2004), in order to promote the concepts of 
empowerment and popular participation, NGOs have formulated a number of strategies: 
advocacy strategy which includes lobbying for change in laws and legislation, regula-
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tions, and procedures; gaining the support of regional and international public opinion 
for Palestinian national rights; and influencing the process of the reform of the PNA 
institutions that is currently being carried out (Abdel Hadi 2004). The other strategies 
include: awareness building strategy; service provision strategy; institutional, organiza-
tional and human resource development strategy; and finally networking, coordination, 
consultation and cooperation strategy (Abdel Hadi, 2004). If this is indeed the case, then 
this research attempts to examine the effectiveness of these strategies at the local gov-
ernment level, assessing the degree to which NGOs have been able to influence local 
planning and decision-making for improving the responsiveness and accountability of 
local governments to their citizens’ needs.  
Other scholars such as Shawa (2000 in Alshouli 2006:20) argue that some Palestin-
ian NGOs are attempting to build some sense of a ‘civil society role’ in addition to pro-
viding services. Other NGOs are attempting to advance agendas for social change (such 
as gender issues and a concern about poverty reduction) backed by the foreign donor 
community (Shawa, 2000 Alshouli 2006:22). However, Shawa further argues that “the 
rhetoric used by donors and some activists inside and outside the NGOs that NGOs are 
‘building civil society’ has been somewhat overstated.” She explains that the reality is 
that Palestinian NGOs which have “gradually shifted from being organizations which 
served the community in multiple ways under Israeli Occupation are currently shifting 
towards a narrower NGO focus on service provision as a result of institutional and envi-
ronmental pressures which have grown under the PNA and the peace process” (Shawa, 
2000 cited in Alshouli 2006: 22). As Shawa (2000) argues:  
“Palestinian NGOs were active before the arrival of the national authority. Their previ-
ous discourse focused on their roles as part of the resistance movement to the Israeli occu-
pation. With the fading away of the Intifada, and the beginning of the peace process they 
shifted their attention towards ‘development’ issues, which included promotion of social 
change. With the arrival of the PNA to the Palestinian territories, these NGOs were con-
fused on how this arrival will affect them. Some of them anticipated the arrival and started 
the process of self-limitation prior to the actual takeover of the PNA. Preparations included, 
detachment from political factions, finding income generating projects and confining their 
effort to development” (Shawa, 2000 in Alshouli 2006: 23).   
According to Jarrar (2005), due to Palestine’s NGO history and the transitional and 
uncertain nature of the political context, the relationship between NGOs and the Pales-
tine government has gone through different phases: 
– The first phase took place directly after the creation of the PNA in 1993. It was 
mainly characterized by uncertainty about the role of NGOs in the emerging politi-
cal context and the creation of governmental organs. The government was of two 
minds in this respect: on the one hand, it recognized the need for the services pro-
vided by NGOs to fill the gap which it was unable to do. On the other hand, NGOs 
were regarded as competitors to the service-delivery system of the government.  
– The second phase was defined by mutual acceptance. It marked the initiation of 
dialogue between the NGOs and the government. As a matter of principle, the 
NGOs started to formulate their own political discourse on civil society, democracy 
and the rule of law. In this phase, the NGO movement witnessed a big shift in fund-
ing priorities from service delivery to a program approach with its main emphasis on 
gender, democracy and human rights. This led to a change in the activities and 
strategies of some of the NGOs. 
–  The third phase was characterized by the emerging collaboration between the PLC 
and the NGO sector related to the drafting and endorsement of the Palestinian NGO 
law. A professional cooperation between the NGOs and the relevant ministries also 
took place. 
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This research begins from the last phase as described by Jarar (2005). It has been shown 
that co-operation might have taken place between NGOs and central ministries in vari-
ous aspects. However, and regardless the nature and efficiency of this co-operation, 
literature has kept silent when talking about co-operation between NGOs and govern-
ments institutions at the local level. Is this because the co-operation in principle does 
not exist?  Or because the NGOs could not widen their co-operation with government to 
reach local level? Hence, another important question can be raised: are the Palestinian 
NGOs willing and able to participate in local planning and policy making? This last 
question is an essential issue to be investigated by this research as mentioned in chapter 
one.  
According to the researcher’s view, most of the scholars interested in the issue of 
Palestinian NGOs-government relationship have taken a one sided view. In other words, 
they have tackled this issue by looking at what NGOs can offer and the interactions 
from the government to regulate or control NGOs works. Regardless of the form of this 
interaction or relation (whether it was co-operation, complementary, co-optation or con-
frontation), none of them has stressed the question of advocacy of NGOs at the local 
government level, which is a critical issue in studying NGOs-government interaction.  
Hence, this research would rather tackle this issue from the other side, starting with 
what the government offers in local planning or what has been historically perceived as 
role of government as policy formulating and implementing agency, then exploring how 
NGOs can influence these policies, so as to hold local governments more accountable 
and responsive to citizens’ needs.  Therefore there is a need to explore how policies and 
plans are made at the local level, what kind of spaces are available for NGOs to practice 
their influence, how these spaces have emerged, and what kind of constraints surround 
them. 
The historical context in which the Palestinian NGOs emerged explains a lot about 
them. The times in which they arose and the political contexts played a significant role 
in determining their characteristics, evolution, size and scope, types, areas of operation, 
and the roles they have played (and continue to play) within Palestinian society. Fur-
thermore, sources explain that Palestinian NGOs historically drew strength and legiti-
macy from the lack of a national government. However, after the establishment of the 
PNA, NGOs have faced external pressures to ‘let go’ of their previous multiple func-
tions, particularly their political roles, and to embrace development roles. Palestinian 
NGOs (PNGOs) have been leading the efforts to promote economic and social devel-
opment in local communities, while attempting to fill the void first created by the occu-
pation and then by the inability of the PA effectively to devote limited resources to a 
plethora of problem areas - education, housing, health care, day care, agriculture. How-
ever, they were pushed at times, directly and indirectly, by the government and the in-
ternational donor community to assume development and empowerment roles in the 
civil society. Recently, some voices have been raised recognizing that wide gaps exist at 
the co-operation level between NGOs and local government. These voices would also 
include donors who have recognized the importance of adopting participatory ap-
proaches that could bring civil society organizations and government units together at 
the local level, for formulating and implementing local policies.  
In development terms, the last decade or so has been influenced by fragmented ef-
forts to promote citizen participation in development planning. This would involve a 
fundamental shift, both in attitudes and in methodology, and break decades of the top-
down, non-participatory policy making practiced during the British mandate, Egyptian 
and Jordanian administrations and the Israeli occupation. Major donor development 
agencies have recently put their weight behind and committed resources to promoting 
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participatory development, recognizing the problems caused by non-participatory de-
velopment. This was the case in Rafah Municipality, which will be part of the study 
area of this research. These opportunities (which we are calling spaces for NGOs in-
volvement) led by donors will be under deep analysis. This research, as one of its objec-
tives, is to investigate these opportunities and explore the extent to which they provide 
effective and sustainable involvement for NGOs to exercise their influence. To what 
extent do local governments from one side and organized groups of civil society from 
another have the capacity, skills and resources to go through these participatory ap-
proaches led by donors? Why are these newly learned approaches not sustainable in the 
long run, leading to local government planners returning to their traditional way of plan-
ning directly after the withdrawal of donors?  
Civil society organizations have generally also become important channels for deliv-
ery of social services and implementation of other development programs. This is espe-
cially true in situations where government presence is weak or where civil society ex-
perience and expertise complements government action. Palestine is a good example of 
this. During the years of Israeli occupation, CSOs, including NGOs, provided almost 
one third of education services, more than half of primary heath care services and hospi-
tal care and nearly 100% of all agricultural extensions (Sullivan 1996: as cited in Al-
Shouli 2006:11). However, the role the Palestinian NGOs assumed created a debate 
after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993. The debate was whether 
NGOs are considered civil society agents or are replacing the government by providing 
services to the population.  We have to admit that the Palestinian NGO role is still am-
biguous particularly when it comes to their relationship with the government. 
It should be clear that this research seeks to focus the discourses of NGOs-
government relationship on interactions at the local level in policy making and planning 
processes.  At the local level, the local government system includes local councils, local 
neighborhood committees and NGOs of various types. According to the Palestinian 
Human Development Report (2002:74), “a consensus appears to exist on the philoso-
phical basis and the desirable organizational structure for local government and its rela-
tionship with these organized groups of civil society”. Local government units in Pales-
tine consist mainly of two interrelated entities: local council (elected or appointed) and 
the municipal government. The local council is supposed to formulate policies and ap-
prove local plans for referral to upper levels. The municipal government headed by the 
mayor represents the implementation arm for the council. This research is intended to 
investigate to what extent NGOs can influence policy making and planning. This im-
plies the need to investigate the relationship between NGOs and LGUs, including both 
local councils and municipal governments.  
Apart from the fragmented efforts of donors to create new spaces for civil society to 
participate, the organized groups of Palestinian civil society used to have limited access 
to local government decision making (Rocrad 2000, Palestinian Human Development 
Report 2002). This research questions: why having this limited access although the Pal-
estinian NGOs has proven on many occasions their relatively high capacity to partici-
pate in development. 
The only formal opportunity to participate takes place after the formulation of the 
plans when copies of detailed schemes are opened for inspection by any person. This 
process takes the form of public hearing where some local NGOs are invited by the 
local councils to participate and give their views, comments or rejections.  These com-
ments will be gathered by the local councils and forwarded to the CCBCP. The CCBCP 
will study the comments and has the power either to accept or reject them. Another 
space created for civil society to participate in policy making is through local neighbor-
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hood committees.  These committees, which are supposed to represent local communi-
ties within a local council’s jurisdiction, should be consulted early in the  planning 
process. These consultations concentrate on physical issues in relations to building 
roads and the need to confiscate land.  This research questions the relevancy of these 
spaces as a means for civil society involvement in policy making and plan formulation, 
and as a result questions how policy and planning is managed at the local level. Is there 
a potential for a better spaces to be created at the local level? How could participation of 
organized groups of Palestinian civil society be institutionalized? 
The planning law lacks clarification of a comprehensive view of methods of commu-
nity participation in the whole planning process.  According to PHDR (2002:123), “in-
stitutionalization and organization of community participation and local government is 
challenged by the weak institutional performance”. The enhancement of citizens’ par-
ticipation in local development planning is still in its initial stages. The absence of a 
legal and political framework alongside the weak organizational capacity at the grass-
roots level continues negatively to affect the citizen participation process in local plan-
ning and decision making. This research questions how and why legal frameworks 
negatively affect the creation of participatory spaces?  What are the limitations and dis-
abling factors? And how may they be improved in order to foster and promote new rele-
vant spaces for participation?  
Hence, specifically, this research is intended to explore the following areas: 
– Legal frameworks: Investigate the extent to which legal frameworks provide legiti-
macy for organized groups of civil society to participate in local planning and policy 
making. Question whether the spaces created for participation are integrated into the 
political structure. Examine how to make legal frameworks more responsive to fos-
ter new spaces for organized groups to participate effectively in local planning and 
policy making. 
– Policy making and planning: How are policies made at the Palestinian local level? 
Who are the key actors involved? How do they react with each other? Where is the 
power of making decisions located? How does the locus of decision making power 
affect involvement of NGOs in policy making? What are the factors that determine 
the extent to which each actor can influence policy making and planning process at 
the local level? 
– Knowledge and capacity of organized groups of civil society to participate in policy 
making: To what extent are NGOs and local neighborhood committees able and ca-
pable of participating in policy making? Are Palestinian NGOs willing to participate 
in local planning and policy making? 
– Types of participatory spaces: What are the existing spaces created for organized 
groups of civil society to participate directly in policy making and planning proc-
esses? Do they provide relevant means or efficient forums to involve NGOs? Are 
these spaces inclusive or exclusive? What knowledge counts within these spaces? 
– Institutionalizing participation: How could direct participation of organized groups 
of civil society be institutionalized and promoted? How can this to be reflected in 
the political and institutional structure? Who should participate, how and when? 
Who should initiate and lead participation? 
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3 Research issues in the context of theoretical context; derive 
a conceptual framework 
This research is about the participation of NGOs as organized groups of civil society in 
local government planning and policy making processes. Although there is a huge 
amount of literature that discusses theories and approaches of participation, there is a 
little literature on how these theories may systematically be adopted in the real world. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to review all of the literature, but rather to focus on 
some specific conceptual issues that are seen to be of great importance for the research 
context.  These conceptual issues include: participation and policy making, assessment 
and evaluation of participation, and frameworks for NGOs-government relationships in 
areas of development planning.  
In order to draw up a conceptual framework upon which to build the empirical work, 
the methodology of literature reviews follows a specific order. First, since our research 
is about institutionalized participatory spaces in local planning and policy making, the 
research begins by deriving a conceptual understanding and clarification of what is 
meant by the policy making and planning process. Here we will explore the dynamics of 
planning and policy making processes. How are policies made at the local level? How 
may participatory spaces (where NGOs and local governments are brought together) be 
created or shaped within the planning and policy processes? In other words, what are 
the factors that are likely lead to the formation or shaping of spaces? 
The second concern of this chapter is the evaluation of NGO participation.  Can the 
successful participation of NGOs in local planning be measured or assessed? And how 
can success – with relation to institutionalized spaces – be defined?  
The last issue concerns the exploration of the context for healthy and non-healthy 
NGOs-government relationships. What are the more likely contextual factors that effect 
the creation of appropriate spaces for NGOs to have influence on local planning and 
policy making? 
It is important to mention here that within this research context, policy making and 
planning processes effectively mean the same thing. And wherever this research uses 
the term ‘institutional participation’ it is tightly connected to ‘institutional spaces’ and 
both mean the same thing unless distinguished from each other. In addition,  the term 
‘spaces’ as a basic term is used in this research to refer to all opportunities and forums 
which are created for organized groups of civil society (particularly NGOs) to have an 
influence on policy making and planning. They may be any or a combination of the 
following: physical spaces in the environment, contextual spaces, formally mandated 
bodies like councils or committees, informally constituted bodies like task forces and 
special teams, or even a moment in time. These spaces may be either ‘invited’ or 
‘autonomous ’. ‘Invited’ refers to the spaces created by governments to involve non- 
governmental institutions in its decision making structures, while ‘autonomous’ spaces 
are the attempts created by the non-governmental institutions to influence governmental 
decisions in the policy making process. These attempts might take various forms such 
as forming special advocacy groups or networks, among others. This understanding of 
spaces is sufficient for the time being, though it will be extended later in this chapter. 
One other issue which should also be clarified is how to distinguish among the terms 
‘input’, ‘output’ and ‘outcome’ factors which are used regularly in this chapter. It might 
be useful to clarify what is meant by each term to avoid any confusion for readers who 
might be familiar with these terms but in other contexts. The term ‘input’ is used to 
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refer to set of variables where the interplay among them would lead to forming or shap-
ing spaces. The term ‘output’ refers to a set of dimensions that define institutionalized 
spaces which is our research aim. ‘Outcome’ refers to the expected result of having 
spaces institutionalized, specifically the ability of NGOs to hold local governments 
more responsive and accountable to citizens needs.    
3.1 Participation and policy making; Interplay of power, knowledge, 
actors and spaces 
Current approaches to participatory planning emphasize the institutional process and the 
involvement of a broad range of actors. This implies the need for a better understanding 
of the political, legal, bureaucratic, cultural and social processes by which planning 
becomes – or fails to become – favorable to targeted communities. The researcher util-
ized the models designed by Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001), Brock and McGee, 
(2001, 2003) and Brock, Mcgee, Gaventa (2004) in designing tools for analyzing par-
ticipation in the context of policy process. These scholars argue that making sense of 
participation in planning process requires an analysis of the ways in which ‘power’ and 
‘knowledge’ define ‘spaces’ for engagement. Since there is a definite overlap between 
policy and planning processes, therefore, it would also be useful to frame the discus-
sions on participatory planning using similar concepts.  
Emerging of new planning approaches; top-down versus bottom-up 
Planning from above mostly takes place more in technocratically dominated planning 
practices. The development concept, supported by the planning from above approach “is 
based on external demand and innovations as the generator of development...” (Me-
shack 1992:21). According to Cheema (1983:10 in Meshack, 1992:21),  “Planning from 
above was introduced in most developing countries in the 1950s as a means of provid-
ing rational and coherent policies for using scarce resources effectively to promote rapid 
growth”. Arguments in favor of central planning were mostly for national integration 
and for rapid transformation and development as Meshack (1992:22) argued, “planning 
as controlled by central authorities was considered an effective mechanism for rapid 
transformation”. 
However, citizens’ participation in development activities has become increasingly 
widespread in development programs over the last three decades of the 20th century. 
The increasing concern for participation in development planning is a result of the fail-
ure of previous development approaches which dominated development thinking in the 
50s and 60s. Osteria and Okamura (1986) explain that by the end of 60s, it was quite 
evident that the prevailing development paradigms had not brought the result they 
claimed they would.  At the outset of 70s, development planning had turned to address 
the aspects of appropriate technology, self reliance and community participation, equi-
table growth and income distribution. Osteria and Okamora (1986) argue that the grow-
ing interest in participatory approaches is the result of dissatisfaction with conventional 
top down blue print approaches. David Kortnen (1980) noted that top down approaches 
are relevant for big infrastructure projects where the environment is stable and objec-
tives are identified. But with rural development, objectives are multiple, ill defined and 
subject to negotiation, with unclear task requirements, unstable environment and unpre-
dictable time and cost. According to Akmal (1994), there are two other paradigms to be 
considered alongside the top-down delivery paradigm. The first paradigm sees devel-
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opment as a set of projects, which deliver a basket of goods or services efficiently to the 
poor. The second sees participatory development as a process, which involves the par-
ticipation of the poor to build and design for their own needs  
Basically speaking, planning from below (bottom-up planning) is based on the phi-
losophy of developing institutions to enable them to address felt needs in order to im-
prove the situation at local level. Planning from below helps local institutions to be ca-
pable of mobilizing natural, human and institutional resources so as to satisfy the press-
ing needs of the people.  When local institutions plan at local level, they generally ad-
dress the most pressing needs and they have a tendency to mobilize local resources as 
much as possible instead of depending on regional or central level.  Planning from be-
low is one of the ways which can help the poor to have a share in the utilization of na-
tional resources for their own development. 
But changing paradigms of planning from top-down to bottom-up approaches would 
require changes in the traditional models of planning and policy making processes. How 
is this to happen? And how can understanding of planning and policy making processes 
be changed?  How are policy decisions made? Discussion of these issues will be the 
purpose of the next section. 
Policy making as a dynamic process; implications on research context 
Understanding how policy decisions are made requires an understanding of the policy 
process itself. According to McGee and Brock (2001:3), the linear model of policy mak-
ing which has been prevalent since 1950s is variously described as decision-oriented, 
top-down, relying on rational actions in decision-making and implantation, and resting 
on the assumption that an optimal policy is possible.  Traditional models of policy mak-
ing, as well as favoring particular kinds of knowledge over others, also tend to obscure 
the extent to which policy is shaped through interactions between various actors at mul-
tiple levels of the policy process (ibid : 5). Policy making is often seen as a consisting of 
a series of steps that flow in a logical sequence: from identification to formulation to 
implementation to evaluation. According to Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001: 2), it 
has become evident, however, that this linear model fails to capture the more complex 
and contested realities of policy making in practice. A significant feature of the linear 
model is a focus on agenda setting and on policies as statements that are based on de-
termining decisions taken by policy makers. Yet, as Barker (1996:7 as cited in Brock et 
al 2001: 2) points out, “policy is never made once and for all”. A policy may change in 
the process of implantation. Shifting the focus away from ‘policy makers’ to a much 
broader constellation of actors who engage in various ways with the process of making 
and shaping policy brings these dynamics into clearer view. Brock et al (2001:iii) argue 
that “policy process involves a complex configuration of interests (knowledge)  between 
a range of differently positioned actors, whose interactions are shaped by power rela-
tions”. Planning now is more a political process rather than an isolated technical exer-
cise, which means planning has to deal with politics that is embedded in power. Inferen-
tially, decisions related to planning are political decisions which, in turn, means plan-
ning, politics and power are closely interlinked and interact with each other.  
Healey (1997:211) relates politics with planning in two major aspects. While the first 
aspect refers to “relations of power, wherever exercised,” the second refers to “deliber-
ate efforts to gain influence and exercise of power in the public realm, the arenas for the 
public management of collective affairs”.  Forester (1993) explains how policy analysis, 
planning, and public administration are interlinked and are thoroughly political commu-
nicative practices that selectively organize public attention. Specifically, he advocates 
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planning from more practical and communicative perspectives as ‘communicative ac-
tion.’ He explains ‘communicative action’ as a move from technical/instrumental to 
more socio-political, practically sensitive and process oriented planning.  “Communica-
tive approach in planning theory captured the notion of planning strategies, policies and 
their implementation as active processes of social construction, that is, the human in-
vention” (Healey 1997: xii). The table below summarizes the changing planning fea-
tures that show a shift away from the instrumental (technical model) to the more practi-
cal and communicative (collaborative model) (Forester 1993:28):  
 
Table  3.1: Shift in planning practices 
Instrumental  
 
Practical-communicative 
Processing information to  Shaping attention 
Problem solving  Problem reformulating 
Seeking detachment to future 
objectivity 
 Seeking criticism to check bias and misrepresentation 
Gathering facts  Addressing significance: gathering facts that matter and 
interacting 
Treating participation as a 
source of obstruction 
 Treating participation as an opportunity to improve analysis 
Information decisions  Organizing attention to formulate and clarify possibilities 
Supply a single product, a 
document with ‘answers’ 
 Developing a process of questioning possibilities, shaping 
responses and engagement 
Reinforcing political depend-
ency of affected persons 
 Fostering meaningful political participation and autonomy 
Passing on ‘solutions’  Fostering policy and design criticism, argument, and politi-
cal discourse 
Abstracting from social rela-
tions 
 Reproducing social and political relations 
Source: Forester 1993:28 
The integrative planning approach is recognized to be the means to implement the col-
laborative (communicative) model, while the conventional planning approach is the 
means to implement the technical model. According to Lang (1986: 35), “An integrated 
approach to resource planning must provide for interaction with the stakeholders in the 
search for relevant information, shared values, consensus, and ultimately, proposed 
action that is both feasible and acceptable”. Lang suggests that conventional planning 
tends to be dominated by a technical/analytic style where the planner is a detached 
value-neutral expert advising decision makers about the best way to accomplish their 
goals and serve the public interest. The emphasis is on data collection and analysis as 
the means for finding the best solutions to problems and developing a technically sound 
plan. The implicit assumption is that better information leads to better decisions. Suc-
cess in conventional planning is measured by the extent to which the objectives of the 
plan are achieved. While interactive planning, according to Lang (1986), is based on the 
assumption that open, participative processes lead to better decisions. The planner en-
gages directly with stakeholders to gain support, build consensus, identify acceptable 
solutions, and secure implementation. Success in interactive planning is measured by 
the extent to which balance can be achieved among competing interests and consensus 
is reached on appropriate actions. The table below provides a comparison of interactive 
versus conventional planning (Lang 1986: 39): 
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Table  3.2: Interactive planning versus conventional planning 
Interactive Planning  Conventional Planning 
Includes information/feedback, consulta-
tion and negotiation  
 Limited information/feedback;  
 
Includes information/feedback, consulta-
tion and negotiation  
 maybe some consultation 
Interaction occurs early on and through-
out the planning process, with full range 
of stakeholders 
 Early interaction with implementers; af-
fected interests not involved until late in 
process 
Assumes that open participation leads to 
better decisions 
 Assumes that better information leads to 
better decisions 
Planner as value-committed advocate  Planner as value-neutral expert 
Focuses on mobilization of support  Focuses on manipulation of data 
Plan = what we agree to do  Plan = what we should do 
Success measured by achievement of 
agreement on action 
 Success measured by achievement of plan's 
objectives 
Source: Lang, 1986: 39  
Lang suggests that much of planning practice is dominated by a perspective that is 
sometimes called ‘technical rationality’. However, three other perspectives, in addition 
to the technical, are central to resource planning. These are organizational, political, and 
personal (Lang 1986: 41). Lang notes that “multiple perspectives comprise an essential 
feature of integrated resource planning”.  
What is important for this research context, is that both Forester’s (1993) and Lang’s 
(1986) similar views of collaborative or communicative planning would imply the need 
to include sharing and coordinating the values and inputs of a broad range of agencies, 
publics, and other interests when conceiving, designing and implementing resource 
policies, programs or projects. Planning and policy making processes are hence under-
stood in this research as a series of dynamic processes rather than as a linear progression 
from formulation to implementation. How does this understanding of policy as a dy-
namic relate to our research context?  First and foremost, policy arenas can be concep-
tualized as ‘spaces’. This understanding – which is the starting point of our conceptual 
framework – would clearly mean that decisions in the policy making and planning proc-
ess are made up of a series of distinct but linked spaces, in which a wide range of actors 
(governmental and non-governmental) interact and engage in order to influence and 
shape policy. According to Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001), Brock and McGee, 
(2001, 2003) and Brock, Mcgee, Gaventa (2004), making sense of participation in local 
development planning and policy making processes requires that we identify and ex-
plore “policy spaces” in which various kinds of knowledge may be expressed by a vari-
ety of voices and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that surround them. By exam-
ining how different actors interact in such spaces – as well as how they may be ex-
cluded from them – we can better understand the ways in which power and knowledge 
frame the planning and policy process. The next step will be to understand these dynam-
ics and how this interplay can frame spaces. 
Role of Knowledge in the process of making participatory planning 
Conceptual shifts in the way that planning and policies are understood can be related to 
broader changes in the mainstream development paradigm which has increasingly come 
to embrace a wider range of actors, and their activities in the sphere of policy making 
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(Brock and Gaventa 2001:4). McGee and Brock (2001:1) argue that, closely linked both 
to the planning process and to the operationalization of mainstream development poli-
cies, the evolution of participatory methods is framed by these broader discourses. The 
nature of this frame means that certain methodologies and types of knowledge are privi-
leged, while others are excluded. McGee and Brock (2001: 1) suggest that knowledge is 
made up of multiple spaces in which a wide range of actors shape policy through the 
construction and application of different kinds of knowledge. It would help to determine 
the way that legitimate knowledge is framed in the planning process and how the frame 
changes if process is understood differently, as a more chaotic course of action with 
multiple actors involved. The other essence of knowledge’s definition is related to the 
ways that knowledge about planning process has come to be articulated within devel-
opment discourse. Knowledge is seen “as a resource, to be mobilized to influence policy 
debates about prescription and implementation – what ought to be done and how to do 
it?” (Wuyts, Mackintosh et al 1992, Gaventa and Cornwall 2000 as cited in McGee and 
Brock 2001:3).  
Hence, we take as our starting point the methodological dynamics which surround the 
production of information for planning. More precisely, and for the purposes of this 
research, we take a broad definition of knowledge ranging from formal to informal 
types of knowledge that are brought into a participatory planning process. Formal 
knowledge has three perspectives: 
– From one side, it is directly related to the information that is used to generate the 
substance of the plans, for example statistics, reports, academic studies and other 
technical data, 
– Know-how of planning languages and procedures, 
– Know-how of participatory approaches which indicates their skills and capacity to 
participate in local planning and policy making in any current or future created 
spaces. Related to this issue is also the NGOs’ perception of participation either by 
looking forward to their involvement in local government planning or looking back 
to the involvement of communities they serve in their social activities. In the same 
while, perception of LGUs regards participation is another dimension of formal 
knowledge. 
In contrast to this, ‘informal knowledge’ would encompass the priority felt-needs of 
communities as well as their experiences of development planning and marginalization. 
This ‘informal knowledge’ includes knowing how to organize and influence within the 
communities.  
These distinctions are useful in order to emphasize that there can no longer be one 
form of ‘expert knowledge’. And that as with actors, there are power relations concern-
ing the knowledge that is brought into the participatory planning process. ‘Whose 
knowledge counts?’ then becomes an important consideration. In the same way, the 
methods used may have more consideration because these can help facilitate bringing 
informal knowledge into the formal process, or keep them blocked out altogether.   
Power relationships between and among actors invariably bear upon the dynamic of the 
participatory planning process itself, as well as on what results are derived. As a next 
step, a clear understanding of power will be conceptualized to match this research con-
text.   
Conceptual clarification of Power  
The term ‘power’ as a concept appears on many occasions in this research. The purpose 
of this section is not to repeat what has already been discussed. It is rather intended to 
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derive a specific interpretation and delineate what is meant by ‘power’ in this research 
context. How may ‘power’ as a concept be identified? How can it be related to collabo-
rative planning and decision making policy? 
Power is an elusive concept. It is a complex issue and could mean many things ac-
cording to the context in which it is applied. According to Gaventa (2004: 276), “power 
is a highly contested concept, understood in policy analysis, political science, and social 
theory in many different and often conflicting ways”. Detailing these ways would 
broaden our focus, whereas our main concern is issues of power in the institutional dy-
namics of participation in the planning process and policy making. Power and politics 
are important components in shaping the process of making policies. Gidens (1984 as 
cited in Brooher and Innes 2001: 13) classifies power into three types: power of action; 
power of ideas, modes and methods; and the power of deep structure.  Politics evolve 
around power and location of power is an important element of politics and democracy. 
However, Flyvbjerg (1998:5 as cited in Adhikari 2006 – unpublished research) explains 
that it is not easy to locate power centers while regulation is equally complex. Most 
importantly, the manner in which power is exercised determines who wields the power, 
as Flyvbjerg (1998:5 ) describes: “it is not simply localized in ‘centres’ nor is it some-
thing one can effectively ‘possess’ and regulated by law. The central question, in addi-
tion to who has power and why they have it, is how power is exercised?” 
Power as described in general theory refers also to the ‘potential ability’ to influence 
behavior, events and resistance which is enabled by having access to resources due to 
position, whereas politics refers to the deployment of influence as a process or behavior 
through which potential power is realized (Burnes 1969 and Pfeffer 1992 in Leermakers 
2003:37-38 as cited in Adhikari 2006/ unpublished research). Foucault (1977:92 as 
cited in Gaventa (2004:277) argue that “power is at the center of all social relations” 
and is “dispersed through a network of discourses of possibility that govern people’s 
thought and action”. This view places less emphasis on power as held and exercised 
through actors in the policy process, and more on how power shapes and bounds social 
relations. 
  According to McGee and Brock 2001:5), many alternative visions of the policy and 
planning processes emphasize the importance of power. These range from theories 
which focus on the political power relationship between different interests in a policy 
and planning process to those which suggest that the relationship between power and 
knowledge is an integral part of planning process, and that it is critical to understand the 
mechanisms through which certain versions of ‘reality’ are filtered. Others suggest that 
the key issue is how to challenge dominant power relations in order to make the plan-
ning process more responsive to complex local realities (McGee and Brock 2001:5). 
This has led to a focus on issues of governance and policy.  
Recently the issue of power has moved more to the fore in planning thought, in part 
because of the growth of collaborative planning and consensus building. These sets of 
practices involve a variety of stakeholders in long-term, face-to-face discussions to pro-
duce plans and policies on controversial public issues (Brooher and Innes 2001: 5-6). 
According to Gaventa (2004: 278), “as power can be viewed with more multi-
dimensions, then, inclusive participation is not only the right to participate effectively in 
a given policy space, but the right to define and to shape that space in the first place. We 
must go beyond the important questions of which actors act on particular policy issues, 
to ask which actors do not engage in potentially relevant policy processes, and indeed 
why certain potentially important policies are defined as out of bounds in certain aspects 
as well”. Indeed, the Gaventa view of power is of great importance for this research. It 
implies that power as it shapes actors’ interactions within policy spaces, can at the same 
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time constrain the creation of spaces from the outset, which might well be the case in 
many developing countries including Palestine, where location of power in the center 
has forced other civil society actors to keep their distance from the state.  
In relation to our research context and given that power in real life is unequally dis-
tributed and some actors have fewer resources and less influence, power is understood 
simply as a strong attribute that shapes actors behavior and actions and this implies that 
actors struggle to gain power and hence influence over policies and planning. What also 
matters in this research, and is revealed by previous schools of thought, is the locus of 
decision making power and its effect in constraining or enabling access for all actors to 
have influence. Power as a term then becomes simply the ability of a certain actor to 
influence decisions to be taken at the local level concerning making and implementation 
of policies and planning actions. Locus of decision making power, the degree of power 
accessed, possessed or shared will all be determined by positions taken by a certain 
actor within broader frameworks of power relations, as well as the ability to network 
power (diversity, interdependence and dialogues) and access resources (who owns can 
decide). Hence, the questions to be tackled by this research in relation to power are: 
Where are power decisions located or made at the Palestinian local government level? 
How will actors that are characterized by different power relations be excluded or in-
cluded in making policies? How would these power relations together with locus of 
decision making power lead to creating or not creating exclusive or inclusive ‘spaces’ 
for communication among actors in areas of formulating and implementing policies? 
The next section tries to uncover how the dynamics of power relations among actors 
implicate policy shaping. 
Actors; dynamics of power relationship 
We have shown that knowledge and power are defining forces in determining and shap-
ing planning and policy processes. Then the roles of different actors and their perspec-
tives on knowledge become more important to understanding the planning process. 
Long and Long (1992 as cited in McGee and Brock 2001:6 ) emphasize “the importance 
of agency and action in creating knowledge, and noted that  expressions of agency result 
in both intended and unintended outcomes”. Although actors in some processes may be 
very complex, however, the planning and policy processes may be responsive to multi-
ple ways of knowing and knowledge creation. Further, “certain kinds of actor who are 
often excluded can have influence in terms of new forms of insight and action” (Lipsky 
1990, Verschoor 1992 as cited in McGee and Brock 2001:7). The analysis of planning 
as a process leads us to focus on the different actors involved. Simultaneously, efforts to 
implement participatory approaches have frequently encountered difficulties due to the 
residual power of rules and norms concerning what constitutes legitimate knowledge 
(McGee and Brock 2001:7). As Brock et al (2001:22) argue, different kinds of actors 
have different opportunities for influencing and shaping policy (planning) process as 
they position themselves, and are positioned by others, in the different sites in which 
policy (planning) takes shape. According to MCGee (2004:9), “actors hold opinions and 
interests; they are embedded in institutional and political cultures; they exercise agency. 
Each is power-holder”. McGee (2004:10) argues that there are several characteristics 
which actors contribute to the definition of their agency and their power. One is how 
long they have been engaged with policy processes, which has an effect on their credi-
bility and validity, while the second is the networks to which actors belong. As Hay-
ward (1998:2 cited in McGee 2004:24) states, power impacts on actors’ actions, “a net-
work of social boundaries that constrain and enable action for all actors”. What one can 
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learn from Hayward’s definition is that the very nature of spaces, and of action within 
them, is fundamentally determined by power. It is not exerted by one individual or 
group over another, but it is part of social relations. That implies the need to re-shape 
power to re-define what is possible and hence, enable action for all actors in these 
spaces.  
In the Palestinian context, there are many actors involved in participatory planning 
processes. These include central government, local government, civil society organiza-
tions, private sector/business organizations, experts (academics) and donors, to name 
but a few. Each of these actors comes into a participatory planning process with their 
own distinct organizational cultures and backgrounds to planning. Each would partici-
pate in a planning process for a variety of reasons that may not be shared with the other 
actors they deal with. Actors that participate in a planning process are not neutral. Each 
can be expected to defend and promote their interests. The power relationships between 
and among these actors will invariably bear upon the dynamic of the participatory plan-
ning process itself, as well as what results are derived.  
This research is not intended to cover this very wide range of actors involved in plan-
ning process. It will rather focus on the two key actors at the local level: NGOs and 
Local Neighborhood Committees (LNCs) as organized groups of Palestinian civil soci-
ety, and LGUs (municipal councils and municipal governments). However, these two 
actors are not working alone in this arena nor are they in total charge of decision mak-
ing. So this research will shed more light on the dynamics of power relations between 
NGOs and LGUs on one hand and central state and donors on the other, as a way to 
explore the implications on defining spaces at the local level.      
Spaces; venues and mechanisms for interactions 
We have introduced briefly some clarification of what is meant by spaces in the intro-
duction part of this chapter. We have learnt that making sense of participation in plan-
ning process requires a closer exploration of the planning spaces and the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion that surround them. Conceptualizing policy (planning) arenas as 
‘spaces’ focuses attention on arenas as sites where different actors interact. It also high-
lights the ways in which these spaces are permeated with power relations and bounded 
by forms of discourse used within and about them, raising questions about who partici-
pates, how and to what effect? 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) as cited in Brock at al (2001:22) define ‘spaces’ as “mo-
ments in which interventions or events throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring 
relationships between actors within these spaces or bringing in new actors, and opening 
up the possibilities of a shift in direction” .  What we share with Grindle and Thomas’ 
definition is the sense that each policy process, and each governance system, is not itself 
one space but throws up many spaces. Hence while one whole policy process might be 
referred to as an opportunity or an area, we do not refer to it as one space, but view it as 
harboring many different moments, opportunities, sites and events – spaces – all of 
which are interrelated parts of the process. An examination of spaces enables us to un-
derstand more closely the dynamics of power, actors and knowledge in shaping the 
planning process.  
According to McGee (2004:16), “the concept of spaces provides a useful lens 
through which to view the policies and practices of actors who are engaged in the policy 
process, and to examine how their power to act is enabled and constrained. It makes it 
possible to break down the policy and planning process into observable elements, able 
to be influenced. It also raises questions about their actions, and what potentials arise as 
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a result of these actions”. In general, we will have to analyze the planning process as 
multiple spaces of contest involving complex configurations of actors, discourse and 
knowledge. By looking at how differing discourses and actors interact in such spaces, 
we can better understand the ways in which power mediates policy and planning proc-
ess. According to Brock et al (2001:35), “the relationship of knowledge and method, 
power and action are intertwined, so they may vary across types of policy (planning) 
spaces”. Our research will not only need to analyze power, knowledge and action in 
discrete spaces, but how each in turn serves to widen and limit the boundaries of other 
spaces as well. In this sense, we will need to understand not only the horizontal con-
struction of policy and planning space, which organize certain views and voices in 
while excluding others, but also their vertical construction, examining power relations 
that are re-enforced or created through interactions at different levels of the process. 
For the purpose of this research, as mentioned earlier in the introductory part of this 
chapter, space will refer to all opportunities to influence the planning process and may 
be any or a combination of the following: physical spaces in the environment, actions in 
the environment, contextual spaces, formally mandated bodies like councils or commit-
tees, informally constituted bodies like task forces and special teams, policy processes, 
or even a moment in time. These spaces for participation may either be ‘invited’ or 
‘autonomous or claimed’. ‘Invited’ refers to the spaces created by government to in-
clude non-governmental institutions while ‘autonomous’ spaces are the attempts created 
by the non-governmental institutions to have additional spaces in which to influence 
governmental decisions in the policy making process. These attempts might take vari-
ous forms such as forming special advocacy groups or networks, mobilizing communi-
ties in specific forms, social movements among others. Each of these spaces may have 
different rules of engagement, and participation in one or the other or both will come 
with advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses.  
The interplay of power, knowledge and actors to shape spaces does not happen in a 
vacuum, rather it is being affected by a range of factors that are related to the context of 
political and legal structures. In the next section we will discuss how legal frameworks 
may enable or disable the creation of institutional settings for participatory spaces in the 
context of local planning. 
3.2 Legal frameworks: Enabling and constraining characteristics 
Our basic understanding of legal frameworks is that they encompass within their legis-
lations the contextual factors where actors interact and policy spaces are shaped. The 
importance of legal frameworks in our context results from the belief that they consti-
tute a major driving force to guide and institutionalize the participation process, particu-
larly when they are accompanied by supporting codes and operational standards. 
According to McGee et al (2003:46), it is useful to understand ‘legal framework’ as a 
‘bundle’ which embraces the constitution, national laws and policies relating specifi-
cally to participation, the supportive guidelines accompanying policies and laws, and 
the other local or national laws, which can impinge on citizen participation in a positive 
or negative sense. The concept of the ‘bundle’ has some important implications. Within 
the bundle there will be differences between the way the component laws and policies 
address participation. Some will do so by making explicit provision for it, legislating for 
the establishment of specific kinds of space or process which involve citizens. Others 
will do so by giving implicit permission, leaving open spaces which citizens or organ-
ized groups of civil society can claim into which they can insinuate themselves, either 
alongside government actors or alone as civil society actors but working to impinge on 
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government processes. In case of the latter, it is clear that the outcomes will be very 
heavily determined by the degree of dynamism, capacity and maximization of opportu-
nities on the part of civil society actors (McGee et al 2003:46). 
McGee et.al. (2003:45-46) suggests that where decentralization acts transfer signifi-
cant legislative powers to local government,  national law may also set a national ‘mini-
mum standard’ in terms of participation, and what might be of real interest is the scope 
for local governments to introduce laws that actively promote, or at least do not inhibit, 
citizens’ participation. Being local in origin and application, these laws might constitute 
the most crucial elements of the legal framework for participation in local planning 
where they exist. It became clear that in some cases, the operational provisions regulat-
ing how laws and policies get enacted, and the supportive guidance issued by 
governments to accompany them and enhance the chances of successful implementa-
tion, are as important as the laws and policies themselves. The balance between the 
promulgation of laws and the production of supportive operational guidelines seems to 
be partly a product of legislative and policy tradition in a given country or region. 
We can identify four sets of issues that are essentially the purview of legal frame-
works for citizen participation: Who is involved in local planning and governance? 
What do local governments do in terms of fostering or allowing citizen involvement in 
planning process and program implementation? Which enabling structures need to be 
put in place and maintained so that these things can be done? And what resources are 
needed? 
Enabling and constraining characteristics of legal frameworks 
The table below sets out the dimensions in which frameworks differ from each other, 
arranging these to show which appear to be more enabling and which more constraining 
for effective citizen participation (McGee et al 2003:63): 
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Table  3.3: Enabling and constraining characteristics of legal frameworks 
Enabling characteristics of legal frame-
work 
 Constraining characteristics of legal 
framework 
Promulgated in response to demand from 
below and with citizen inputs. 
 
 
Imposed from above without groundswell 
of popular demand, and overly inspired by 
prevalent international discourses and 
tendencies to the neglect of home-grown 
discourses and in-country or regional 
aspirations and sources of inspiration. 
Seeks to strengthen and improve institu-
tions of representative democracy by better 
representation of those with least voice, 
better quality of representation and per-
formance, and by complementing with 
mechanisms of participatory democracy. 
 
Seeks only to make the institutions of 
representative democracy work better, not 
to challenge these or extend governance 
relationships beyond them. 
Recognizes people and civil society or-
ganizations as citizens with rights, includ-
ing the right to participate in governance 
and auxiliary rights. 
 
 
Treats people and civil society organiza-
tions as relatively passive subjects, to be 
engaged with only in non-binding consul-
tations at a relatively late stage of deci-
sion-making. 
Builds in accountability measures that 
ensure representatives can be recalled and 
government actors held to account for poor 
performance. 
 
No accountability measures, or measures 
that are impracticable in real life situa-
tions. 
Provides for or contemplates in future a 
significant degree of fiscal decentralization 
and citizen participation in fiscal proc-
esses, as both an incentive to citizens to 
participate in local governance and assur-
ance that local government can allocate 
resources to participatory processes 
 
Centralized power retained over fiscal 
matters—revenue-raising and alloca-
tion—or no participation envisaged in 
them, contradicting spirit of decentraliza-
tion and citizen participation and reducing 
incentives for citizen involvement in local 
governance. 
 
Law(s) accompanied by set of operational 
guidelines, policies or capacity-
strengthening measures to ensure that the 
relevant actors are enabled to apply them. 
 
 
Excessive reliance on laws and on a legal-
istic approach to the neglect of opera-
tional guidelines or the provision of prac-
tical support and capacity building for 
implementation. 
 
Adopted from McGee et.al 2003:63  
What else is needed as well as a legal framework? Beyond the nature of the legal 
framework itself, additional factors that are identified by McGee et al (2003) as con-
straining or enabling citizen participation relate to the historic and cultural setting, the 
nature and background of the actors involved and the availability (through legislation or 
other channels) of ‘auxiliaries’ to facilitate the operationalization of laws and promote 
citizen participation. Again, these dimensions of context can be represented as continua, 
as shown below: 
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Table  3.4: Enabling and constraining features of context 
Enabling features of context  Constraining features of context 
As well as disposition and commitment 
from above to participation, a strong de-
mand from citizens and civil society actors 
below, which implies a relatively mature 
and strong—or strengthening—civil soci-
ety. 
 
Weak, immature or inexperienced civil 
society and government with weak com-
mitment to participation in local govern-
ance. 
 
Advanced process of political, administra-
tive and fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
Limited or early-days decentralization of 
all kinds, or tightly restricted fiscal decen-
tralization. 
Relatively open, trusting relationship be-
tween citizens and state. 
 
 
State–civil society relations marked by 
mutual mistrust and lack of familiarity, as 
in immediate wake of authoritarian re-
gime. 
Discourses of participation, governance, 
decentralization and democracy locally 
derived, or if from elsewhere, strongly 
appropriated and adapted to national set-
ting. 
 
Discourses of participation, governance, 
decentralization and democracy borrowed 
wholesale with no attempt to translate and 
adapt for the national context. 
Existence of progressive political parties 
with their roots in democratization move-
ments and/or social movements and strong 
commitment to internal representativeness 
and transparency, and to participatory 
democracy. 
 
No political parties (as in ‘no-party’ 
states) or limited freedom for political 
opposition parties, which tends to favor 
conservatism and preclude pressure on 
government for change of a progressive 
sort. 
 
A culture of ‘bureaucratic hygiene’, open-
ness and transparency, including informa-
tion disclosure policy and measures of 
active disclosure. 
 
 
 
A culture of corruption and/or lack of 
transparency, which generate resistance to 
opening up governance processes to scru-
tiny or interference. 
Other laws and policies that are supportive 
of, or at least consistent with, participation 
legislation. 
 
 
Contradictions between participation leg-
islation and other laws and policies, or 
incomplete legislation leading to ambigui-
ties and stalemates in implementation. 
Ongoing momentum for and commitment 
to movement along the spectrum from elite 
towards participatory democracy. 
 
 
Political transition (e.g. from authoritarian 
regime to elite democracy) seen by gov-
ernment and/or civil society as finite 
process, now concluded; conformity with 
status quo. 
Opportunities for experimentation, adapta-
tion and innovation within and outside the 
spaces provided by legal framework, by 
state and non-state actors 
 
No spaces for experimentation or innova-
tion, through excessively tight and restric-
tive framework. 
 
Adopted from McGee et al 2003:64  
Challenges of enabling legal frameworks  
While legal frameworks are important entry points for citizens and organized groups of 
civil society to mobilize and engage with their local authority, they are not sufficient. 
As Blackburn (2000), argues, laws developed to promote citizen participation in local 
governance and planning do not necessarily lead to democratic social change. It is nec-
essary to create new spaces and mechanisms for direct democracy that complement 
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broader legislation. Such mechanisms are more likely to succeed if they are the product 
of collaboration or convergence of citizens’ initiatives and demands with state respon-
siveness. If a mechanism for participation and downwards accountability is devised and 
implemented by elites, it is unlikely that the barriers to participation faced by marginal-
ized groups will be addressed. Hence, it might be clear that the existence of legal 
frameworks is an insufficient condition for citizen participation to happen. McGee et al. 
(2003:47) argues that “one reason for this insufficiency is that laws are not always ap-
plied due to the fact that ‘legal frameworks’ embraces not one but a bundle of related 
laws, policies and guidelines implies not one but several potential ‘implementation 
gaps’ at several levels in any one country. What about the content and potential of legal 
frameworks? This supposedly includes measures, processes and spaces established by 
the laws and policies”. 
While legislative innovations have also succeeded in strengthening local governance 
and planning and creating new spaces for citizen participation in the legal realm, they 
have not always been translated into new practices of governance with the same suc-
cess.  Heller (2001) and Osmani (2000) argue that the main difficulties encountered are 
the unwillingness of central governments to relinquish power, and the weakness of 
newly-established institutions of local governance. Central governments, and those who 
control them, have little interest in distributing power and resources. Some authors ar-
gue that such resistance is reflected in the vagueness of the legislature regarding their 
procedures and powers. Others point to the financial legislation, which denies local 
institutions complete control over their natural and physical resources and allocates 
them only a small – and often tied – share of state and central government total reve-
nues. Another obstacle with relation to implementation of legal frameworks, is that even 
when there is political will on the part of government, the institutional change required 
is great (Heller 2001:135). The highly centralized and top-down formal modes of gov-
ernance and planning are difficult to overcome because “…though top-down planning 
has lost much of its luster in the past decade, it remains a powerful organizational re-
flex” (ibid.:135).  These previously discussed challenges together  those  discussed un-
der the power section regarding problems revealed in the difficulties around relinquish-
ing power, are taken as a basis to formulate one of our research assumptions concerning 
power.  The assumption is clear, that participation processes and involvement of organ-
ized groups in government planning will certainly involve confronting the power struc-
ture. And since power and privilege are hardly ever renounced voluntarily, the concept 
of a truly participative society will necessitate the struggle for power to create condi-
tions for people to become effectively involved in shaping their own history, collec-
tively and individually. Empowerment is a multi-dimensional cultural, economic and 
political participation. Without political participation there is no empowerment, and 
without participation in governance there is no genuine participation. 
Edralin (1996) argues that appropriate training and capacity-building are needed in 
order to foster a shift from the traditional style of management, which emphasizes con-
trol, to one that stresses local accountability, participation of stakeholders and co-
operative leadership. The transfer of power and resources to local governments and 
building their capacity are crucial for promoting meaningful citizen participation in 
local governance, but there are still more obstacles for the attainment of the latter. 
Blackburn’s (2000) points to the political context dominated by patrimonial and clien-
telistic features. In such political culture, it is argued, the introduction of participatory 
forms of local public planning largely fail to empower poor citizens or to make local 
governments more accountable to them. While the role of the central government in 
promoting meaningful citizen participation in local governance cannot be overstated, 
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local government willingness to engage citizens in civil society institutions in govern-
ance, and their ability to intelligently exploit newly created legal spaces, are also cru-
cial. The ability of local governments to exploit new legal spaces is reflected in their 
capacity to establish innovative and enduring mechanisms for participation in local gov-
ernance and planning, which allow decision-making to reflect citizens’ needs and priori-
ties.  
Another important factor which influences the potential of citizens to participate in 
local planning is the motivation of the authorities to encourage new, participatory forms 
of governance. According to Bur et al. (1999:22), citizens’ initiatives to increase their 
participation in local governance may be co-opted, or else manipulated, if the motiva-
tion of local officials is to keep control. In their view, “effective participation only oc-
curs when the motivation behind it is fuelled by a belief that all people have a right to a 
greater degree of control over the decisions that affect them” (ibid: 22). All of the pre-
vious mentioned issues revealed in the literature are important challenges to implemen-
tation of new creative legislations and legal frameworks that target promotion of direct 
participation in civil society institutions in local governance.  
So far, we have identified how the interplay of power, knowledge and actors shape 
the institutional dynamics of the spaces that are created for the various actors to influ-
ence policy and planning process. And how these spaces could be tackled (enabled or 
disabled)  within legal frameworks and pointing out major challenges in this regards.  
But how can we judge or assess weather these spaces - as output of this interplay – are 
institutionalized or not? Can success be measured? What are the more likely institu-
tional dimensions that could shape these spaces?  These to be explored in the next sec-
tion. 
3.3 Analyzing participation; evaluation, measurements and modeling 
In this section we highlight how difficult – as it appears in theory – it is to measure suc-
cessful participation. How can success be defined? The second issue to be tackled in 
this section is to provide a cursory review of the most important models of participatory 
approach that have been created in order to understand the dynamics of the participation 
process and leveling of civil society involvement. This section ends by presenting vari-
ous dimensions that could work as determinants for institutional participation of organ-
ized groups in local planning. 
Oakley et al. (1991:241) outline the differences between the evaluation of participa-
tion and participatory evaluation. The first involves the evaluation of a specific objec-
tive or outcome of a development project, whereas the second is a technique used in 
evaluation across sectors (The technique must not be confused with the evaluation of 
the process itself). It is often used in association with participatory action research, 
which can serve as a catalyst to promote group cohesion through group discussions. The 
key emphasis here is that people must be accepted as subjects, rather than treated as 
mere objects, and given a greater role in development projects. 
Among the efforts that are created to help understand how to analyze participation 
where the ones of Paul (1987), Rifkin et al. (1988), Bichmann et al. (1989),  Rifkin 
(1990) and Taal (1993).  Paul (1987) introduced a framework for measuring and testing 
the effect of citizen participation in two areas, resource mobilization and the efficiency 
of resource use, in an attempt to incorporate citizen participation into the project plan-
ning and implementation process. This approach was adapted and expanded by Schu-
bert (1990).  Paul and Schubert identify three variables: functional participation, the 
intensity of participation and the extent of participation (see table below). The numeri-
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cal ranking in this approach is achieved through a weighting and a mathematical for-
mula. This is used to compare participation levels across projects.  
 
Table  3.5: The level of participation = Functional * Extent 
Functional Participation Intensity of Participation Extent of Participation 
6. Overall Management 
5. Planning 
4. Implementation 
3. Maintenance 
2. Distribution 
1.Utilization 
4. Initiating Action 
3. Decision making 
2. Consultation 
1. Information 
 
4. All Households 
3. All Interest groups 
2. Women’s groups 
1. Leaders only 
Source: Schubert 1990:16  
This approach is innovative, though it seems not to reflect entirely the full range of 
processes and choices in each category, especially the category headed ‘extent of par-
ticipation’. On the other hand, the index is limited to the project; it does not include 
wider aspects of citizen participation, such as links with the local state in strengthening 
local organizations nor the efficiency of spaces created to involve various actors. De-
spite such drawbacks, the approach does add to our conceptualization of the immense 
problems in measuring citizen participation. 
Rifkin et al. (1988) and Bichmann et al. (1989) introduced a framework for the analysis 
of citizen participation. The framework has been amplified by Shrimpton (1989) and 
Rifkin (1990). Rifkin (1990) identifies ‘descriptive’ and ‘action’ in her analysis (see 
table below). The descriptive factors are those variables describing the local and na-
tional context in which programs and plans are developed. They may reflect cultural, 
economic, social, political or historical aspects. Some related issues are the degree to 
which national policy responds to local aspirations and needs, the degree to which the 
civil service has been decentralized, the degree of organization at the local level and the 
degree to which there is communication between the centre and the periphery at both 
the local and national levels. Factors such as ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’ could be taken as 
givens, while others, such as ‘decentralization’ or ‘core/periphery communication’, 
would inevitably influence any programme directly. Hence the need for integration 
through the set of ‘action factors’, which influence the success of developmental or 
social programs. Some attributes of these action factors involve the ways community 
needs are assessed, community organizations developed, programs managed, and finan-
cial and human resources mobilized, as well as the ways the problems of the poor, espe-
cially the very poor, are treated. 
Table  3.6: Factors in program formation 
Descriptive Factors Action factors 
Cultural 
Economic, Social and Political 
Historical 
Governmental Policy 
Decentralization 
Local Level Organization 
Core/Periphery Communication 
Assessment of needs 
Community organization 
Programme management 
Resource mobilization 
Leadership development 
Attention to the needs of the poor 
Source: Rifkin 1990:17 
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Taal (1993) has added two other variables (decentralization of decision making and 
institutional support) to improve the analytical framework for citizen participation cre-
ated by Shrimpton (1989) in order to expand it to be applicable for other aspects of so-
cial service provision and local development, including an analysis of local government 
institutions.  
The previously discussed schools of thoughts highlight functional and descriptive 
factors or variables that contribute to shaping participatory process. Closely related to 
this context, other literature and case studies have tentatively identified a host of factors 
seemingly associated with success (by virtue of their presence) or failure (by their ab-
sence). Many have intuitive appeal. However, there is still a lot to learn about the requi-
site nature of these factors: their independence and interdependence, their importance in 
different situations/contexts and at different stages of the decision making process; and 
their relative contribution to successful participatory efforts. In general, even if success 
can be defined and measured, there is both a practical need and an academic interest in 
identifying factors associated with success and failure. Peelle et al. (1996) have summa-
rized the long list of factors commonly identified in the literature and case studies as 
associated with successful public participation. These include factors such as: early 
involvement, inclusiveness, two-way communication, adequate information and re-
sources, particular types of mechanisms, degree of citizen control, incentives and/or 
compensation, prior community experience; agreement on goals; etc. Peelle et al. 
(1996) highlight the following factors as essential in most cases: 9 
– Agency clarity on goals and stakeholder roles in public participation; 
– Top management commitment to the public participation process; 
– Manager/leader goes beyond legal minimum; 
– Agency responsiveness to stakeholders; 
– Two-way communication and education; 
– Interactive and iterative public participation; 
– Adequate resources; 
– Development of provisional trust between agency and public; 
– Giving priority to trust building actions; and 
– Openness of the agency 
In addition to the previous issues, literature reveals additional factors among others with 
relation to evaluation of participation such as: 
– The extent actors involved are capable of participating, in terms of knowledge,   
skills and access to information;  
– Agreement and clarity of goals;  
– Structured and clear roles and delineate clear responsibilities; 
– Legal mandate and historical, socio-cultural and  political context; 
– Accountability and transparency;  
– Understanding group dynamics; 
– Aware of power sharing and mechanisms; 
                                                 
9 See Nicholas A. Ashford, “Public Participation in Contaminated Communities”. MIT's Technology and 
Law Program.  Online: http://web.mit.edu/ctpid/www/tl/TL-pub-PPCC.html. Retrieved on Jan 5th, 2005 
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– Consensus on representation, diversity and inclusiveness of formed interested 
groups; 
– Interactive and iterative process; 
– Diversity of views represented and integration of various concerns; 
– Promotion of equal power to influence process; 
– Early involvement in decision making;  
– Flexibility, adaptability and durability; 
– Facilitation skills; 
– Opportunity for learning and understanding; and 
– Conflict resolution mechanisms. 
It is evident from the previous discussions that most of the studies on successful partici-
pation have concentrated on identifying what factors of the participation process are 
important for success and what outcomes the participation process should achieve. 
However, very little research exists to show which process factors influence a certain 
outcome – for instance, researches to show which process variables are associated with 
the outcome goal of building trust in agencies, which process factors influence the out-
come of improved quality of decisions, whether greater external communication within 
the process has any influence on the goal of educating public, and so on. However, 
theories here provide a set of group factors that lead to a desired outcome and provide a 
comprehensive view over a set of inter-related factors and criteria that can lead to suc-
cessful and effective citizen participation process. Webler (2003) suggests that success 
is perceived by seeing fair and just process and achieving the desired outcome. In his   
‘fairness and competence theory’ he introduces two central components, namely fair-
ness and competence. ‘Fairness’ refers to what people are permitted to do, such as: at-
tend the discourse, initiate discourse, participate in discourse, and participate in decision 
making. ‘Competence’ refers to the construction of the best possible understandings and 
agreements. It is conceptualized as two basic necessities: access to information and its 
interpretations and use the best available procedures for knowledge and selection. The 
strength of this theory is that it conceptualizes a comprehensive framework of what 
would make “good” participation process.  What can we else learn from this theory in 
particular? 
The four necessary opportunities identified are relevant to each of the three basic ac-
tivities that constitute a citizen participation discourse: agenda and rule making, mod-
eration and rule enforcement, and substantive discussion of the issue.  It makes certain 
that people have the opportunity to get in touch with their own authentic desires and 
concerns (expressive or subjective claims). More importantly, is that effective participa-
tion process must be fair and competent in order to result in just output. This issue in 
particular has been taken as a basis to formulate our assumptions for deciding our re-
search focus. This assumption is based on the idea that fair processes are more likely to 
result in just output. ‘Fair’ in this research context refers to the extent to which ‘spaces’ 
created to involve organized groups of civil society in policy making provide wider and 
equal opportunities for them to have influence. This entails, in relation to fair process, 
that spaces are institutionalized in a way to provide substantial and sustainable influence 
for NGOs on local planning and policy making. ‘Just’ outcome refers to the extent to 
which NGOs will be able to hold local governments (as a result of their institutional and 
fair involvement) accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs. Hence, the plans and 
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policies formulated will also be responsive to the real problems, needs, and priorities of 
local communities. 
This assumption is also justified by procedural justice theory which is concerned 
with making and implementing decisions according to fair processes.  According to this 
theory, what makes procedures fair are: consistency, impartiality and neutrality, repre-
sentativeness, suppression of bias and transparency. A fair procedure is a matter of set-
ting down rules. Fair rules of collaboration are central to successful mediation or 
negotiation processes.  This theory stresses process and procedures rather than outcome. 
Some believe reaching fair outcomes is far more important than implementing fair 
processes while others believe that fair procedures are the best guarantee of fair out-
comes. 
To conclude, fair procedures are likely to ‘translate’ into fair outcomes. A competent 
process is one that pursues mutual understandings before agreement, and explicitly de-
cides how disputes will be resolved. To produce competent understandings and judg-
ments, a process must ensure that the best rules and procedures are used to gather, 
evaluate, and select knowledge. People feel affirmed if the procedures that are adopted 
treat them with respect and dignity, making it easier to accept even outcomes they do 
not like.  
Modeling, classification and leveling of participatory approaches 
In the last few decades, there have been a number of conceptual or theoretical ap-
proaches to understanding citizen participation. We provide a cursory review of some 
well-known theories, approaches and models. For each approach, a brief description, 
and its weaknesses, strengths and relevance to the context of the research are indicated 
in the table below: 
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Table  3.7: Models' classification, strengths, weaknesses and relevance to research  
Theory Definition & Descriptions Weaknesses Strengths Relevance to Research Context 
1. Participation models 
Arnestein (1969) Ladder 
8. Citizen Control 
7. Delegation Power 
6. Partnership 
5. Placation 
4. Consultation 
3. Information 
2. Therapy 
1. Manipulation 
 
- Presents ranges & degrees of 
citizen participation in a form of 
ladder 
- Consists of three degrees begin 
with non-participation (manipula-
tion- therapy), then degrees of 
tokenisms (information- consulta-
tion- placation) and at the top, 
degrees of citizen power (partner-
ship- delegation power- citizen 
control) 
- The higher up the ladder you 
are, the more effective the in-
volvement is. 
 
 
- Appropriate type of involve-
ment can only be achieved on 
climbing to the top of ladder 
which is not appropriate for all 
of projects 
- To some degree and in prac-
tice, it might be difficult to 
distinguish degree of involve-
ment and identify exact de-
lineation 
-  Does not provide clear ideas 
about factors behind the de-
gree type. It only provides 
characteristics for each type 
    
- Helps understand what citi-
zen involvement means in 
practice 
- Provides a descriptive tool 
for a framework and degree of 
citizen involvement based on 
some characteristics 
- Highlights the existence of 
various types of citizen par-
ticipation 
- It defines better participation 
as more citizens’ power and 
control to influence decision 
making. 
“Need to increase citizen power, 
resources & control” 
The application of this framework 
might not be appropriate to all pro-
jects. On the other hand, it empha-
sizes the concept of the existence of 
various degrees of citizen involve-
ment based of the extent they influ-
ence project formulation, implemen-
tation and evaluation in a way that 
the higher up the ladder you are, the 
more effective involvement is. It 
highlights the need to delegate more 
power, control and resources to citi-
zens in order to strengthen their par-
ticipation  
 Force & Mclaughlin (1982) 
Continuum  
  
 
- Describes a continuum for so-
cial learning.  
- The framework includes four 
levels of participation: 
=No formal public input, 
=Information exchange, 
=Knowledge gain by both sides; 
citizens & government, 
=Total involvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Doesn’t provide a clear idea 
about methods & mechanisms 
to accommodate this social 
learning process 
- Disregards other factors apart 
from knowledge and informa-
tion as a motivation for the 
process 
- It highlights the importance 
of information exchanges and 
equal knowledge as reasons to 
move up this process 
- It is a rational process which 
means existence at a level will 
necessarily lead to the next 
one. The main axis of this 
process is citizens’ experience 
and awareness 
 
 
“More access to information and 
equal knowledge leads to more op-
portunities for citizens to participate” 
Previous mentioned point would 
present a major precondition factor 
for genuine participation 
No Input 
Info. exchange 
Knowledge 
Involvement 
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Theory Definition & Descriptions Weaknesses Strengths Relevance to Research Context 
Pimbert & Pretty (1994) Levels 
 
Passive Participation 
Information Giving 
Consultation 
Material Incentives 
Functional Participation 
Interactive Participation 
Self Mobilization 
 
- It is a typology ranging from 
“passive participation” in which 
people are told what is going to 
happen or has already happened, 
through gathering information 
from participants, followed by 
increasing levels of participation. 
- At the higher levels, joint analy-
sis leads to action plans and 
groups taking control over local 
decisions. The final stage is self-
mobilization, in which people 
participate by taking initiatives 
independent of the agency. 
 
 
- Almost all of responsibility 
to increase participation is 
taken by the other party not 
from citizens. 
- It disregards the role of citi-
zens in the beginning of this 
process to initiate participa-
tion. It recognizes self mobili-
zation as an expected best 
output & result of a process 
initiated by the external party 
(government or agency). 
-  Concentrates on a descrip-
tion of characteristics of each 
level and disregards what kind 
of factors might lead to these 
characteristics. 
- It presents a descriptive tool 
for each level’s characteris-
tics. 
- It provides some useful 
methods and techniques for 
the translation of each level 
into practice. 
“The process of participation should 
be interactive and citizens have to 
take initiatives and mobilize them-
selves” 
This framework shows that local 
communities should possess the or-
ganizational skills and technical 
knowledge to participate effectively 
in planning and project implementa-
tion. There is a need for the other 
party apart from the agency and 
communities to initiate participation 
and provide training where and when 
it is needed. Communities must take 
initiatives and should acquire skills 
and be able to mobilize themselves. 
 Davidson (1998) Wheel  
 
- This method considers which 
parts of the exercise are appropri-
ate for different purposes 
- It divides the participation proc-
ess into four major influential 
factors: Information , Consulta-
tion- Partnership and Empower-
ment   
- For each factor, each one would 
range from low, moderate and 
high use and implementation  
- The extent to which these fac-
tors are effectively implemented 
will determine the strength of 
citizen involvement. 
-There is no sequence in arrang-
ing these factors (package im-
plement.). 
 
- This model is a descriptive 
framework concerned with 
characteristics of the process 
without input regarding factors 
and reasons leading to these 
characteristics. 
 
- The most important feature 
of this model compared to that 
of Arnstein, is that an appro-
priate level of community 
involvement is reached with-
out the desire to climb to the 
top of the ladder. 
- It provides a comprehensive 
view of participation which 
considers many features at the 
same time. 
- More realistic model and 
conceptualization of what 
really happens in practice 
“appropriate level of citizen partici-
pation is reached without the desire 
to climb to the top of the ladder” 
This model considers four important 
features of participation such as in-
formation, consultation, partnership 
and empowerment. It analyzes these 
features together and at the same time 
when implemented which makes it 
more close to what really happens in 
practice. 
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Theory Definition & Descriptions Weaknesses Strengths Relevance to Research Context 
UNDP (1998) Levels 
 
Manipulation 
Information 
Consultation 
Consensus building 
Decision making 
Risk sharing 
Partnership 
Self management 
 
- The process of citizen participa-
tion can be understood along a 
continuum and can range from 
participation essentially as an act 
of manipulation, to a degree of 
participation in which stake-
holders become partners in the 
development initiative and begin 
to assume full responsibility for 
its management 
- Almost the same levels as Pim-
bert (1994) model: 
Manipulation- Information- Con-
sultation- Consensus building- 
Decision making-  Risk sharing- 
Partnership- and Self manage-
ment 
- It gives little attention to 
reasons and factors that could 
result in each level 
- Well described operational 
framework for each level’s 
characteristics with some 
focus on technical issues. 
 
“Citizens are essential partners in the 
development initiatives” 
This framework recognizes citizen 
participation as end (objective) and 
as a means in the same time. It high-
lights the need for structural and 
institutional arrangements and 
changes from one side and the need 
for creative methods and techniques 
to accommodate genuine participa-
tion. 
Two way communication, informa-
tion exchange, mutual goals, citizens 
understanding and interactions in the 
learning process are considered as 
major driving issues for genuine par-
ticipation. 
2. Managerial Theories 
Thomas (1995) Model 
 
- It is based on observations of how 
managers make effective decisions 
and could choose among a variety 
of participatory strategies through 
the application of the Vroom-
Yetton (1973) model. It is con-
cerned with three questions:  1) 
Who to involve?, 2) What specific 
forms or techniques to use?, and 3) 
When and how often to involve 
citizens? 
- It is decision tree structure. The 
model “inputs” are the manager’s 
answers to questions about the 
characteristics of the issue in hand. 
The “outcome” of the model is five 
different decision making ap-
proaches. 
- When the need for manage-
rial efficiency and technical 
competence is great, less 
public involvement is rec-
ommended, using the Tho-
mas model. 
- Development of this proc-
ess is totally in the hands of 
the planner and manager who 
dominates the motivation, 
initiatives, nature and direc-
tion of participation. 
 
- Provides a clear understand-
ing of the place of citizen 
involvement in the manage-
ment and planning process. 
-It has practical value for pub-
lic managers and planners. 
“Match methods with purposes” 
It attempts to combine “ a balanced 
perspective on what  can realistically 
be expected from citizen involvement 
and a contingent perspective on how 
those expectations should vary ac-
cording to the situation” 
This framework finds that the greater 
the need for public legitimacy of the 
decision, the more involvement is 
needed 
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Theory Definition & Descriptions Weaknesses Strengths Relevance to Research Context 
Lawrence (1996) Model 
 
- The previous model was subse-
quently modified slightly to allow 
for citizen participation in general 
and in natural resource decision-
making in specific 
- It is a binomial decision tree 
structure. The model “inputs” are 
the manager’s answers to six ques-
tions about the characteristics of 
the issue in hand. The “outcome” 
of the model is five different deci-
sion making approaches. 
- It is based on observations of how 
managers make effective decisions 
and could choose among a variety 
of participatory strategies. 
-When the need for manage-
rial efficiency and technical 
competence is great, less 
public involvement is rec-
ommended. 
- Development of this proc-
ess is totally in the hands of 
the planner and manager who 
dominates the motivation, 
initiatives, nature and direc-
tion of participation. 
 
- Same as previous model 
where it provides a clear 
understanding of the 
place of citizens' in-
volvement. 
- It widens the range of 
choices for managers and 
planers to choose among 
Varity of participatory 
strategies. 
 
 
“Match methods with purposes” 
It attempts to combine “ a balanced 
perspective on what  can realistically 
be expected from citizen involvement 
and a contingent perspective on how 
those expectations should vary ac-
cording to the situation” 
This framework finds that the greater 
the need for public legitimacy of the 
decision, the more involvement is 
needed 
Collaborative Learning (CL)   
Theory 
First stages emphasize common 
understanding.  Activities include 
information exchange, imagining 
best and worst possible futures, 
and visual representations of the 
situation.   
In middle stages, participants 
focus on concerns and interests, 
and how those concerns relate to 
each other, then identify possible 
changes that could be made; 
"situation improvements." 
In latter stages, the participants 
debate these improvements, ad-
dressing whether or not they 
represent desirable and feasible 
changes in the present situation. 
-It is developed by Daniels & 
Walker (1996) based on Vroom-
Yetton model and designed specifi-
cally for policy conflict 
- It is an approach appropriate for 
natural resource, environmental, 
and community decision-making 
situations with the following fea-
tures: multiple parties, deeply held 
values, cultural differences, multi-
ple issues, scientific and technical 
uncertainty, and legal and jurisdic-
tional constraints.  It emphasizes 
activities that encourage systems 
thinking, joint learning, open 
communication, constructive con-
flict management, and a focus on 
appropriate change. It incorporates 
communication methods to pro-
mote negotiation 
 
-CL stresses process more 
than outcome; it re-defines 
the task away from solving a 
problem to one of improving 
a situation.  
-It seeks to make incremental 
improvements to mutual 
understanding, rather than 
seeking final resolution of a 
conflict (in some cases this 
issue might not be consid-
ered as a weakness) 
 
 
 
 
- CL views the situation as a 
set of interrelated systems. CL 
respects value differences and 
provides an opportunity for 
transforming value disputes 
into interest disputes 
- CL promotes integrative 
negotiation , stresses commu-
nication competence and em-
phasizes common understand-
ing, learning dialogue  & sys-
tems thinking 
- Integrates scientific & tradi-
tional knowledge. It increases 
respect & trust & produces 
tangible improvements. CL 
operates on three levels:  a 
philosophy, a framework & as 
techniques. 
“Talking with rather than talking at”  
Any public policy-making necessar-
ily involves learning. Learning-
cantered processes need to be flexible 
enough to accommodate various 
learning styles. CL presumes that 
situations are dynamic, systemic, and 
changing. It emphasizes activities 
that encourage systems thinking, 
joint learning, open communication, 
and focuses on appropriate change. It 
seeks to enhance parties' competence.  
CL also emphasizes the goal of im-
proving the situation over problem 
solving. This sets a more realistic 
standard for successful participation, 
given the complex and ongoing na-
ture of resource management issues.  
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Theory Definition & Descriptions Weaknesses Strengths Relevance to Research Context 
3.Decision Analysis Concepts - It is based on a systematic value-
structuring approach developed by 
Keeney (1992), Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986), Dienel and Renn 
(1995). It consists of four concepts: 
1) Value-Focused Thinking 
:deciding what is important and 
how to achieve it 
2) .Adaptive Management: moni-
toring the consequences, learning 
from the results, and avoiding 
costly failures 
3) A Structured Decision Process: 
providing a responsible, informa-
tive and complete structure for a 
decision process 
4) An ‘‘Informative’’ Decision 
Rule: recommending risk manage-
ment alternatives and approval 
voting 
-Typically, the number of 
participants and the groups 
they represent might not be 
rigorously structured as a 
legislative body with a repre-
sentative structure 
- It emphasizes the pre-
eminent role of values in all 
decision-making. It involves 
value-structuring approaches 
- It creates more attractive 
alternatives that stand a better 
chance of wide support 
- It copes with profound un-
certainties in managing com-
plex issues 
-It provides a responsible, 
informative and complete 
structure for a decision proc-
ess 
 
“Decision making is considered as an 
iterative process rather than a one-
time exercise” 
These concepts emphasize the role of 
learning from successive manage-
ment choices. It is an informal impe-
tus to seek opportunities for learning 
over time in any iterative decision 
context. 
 
The values of participants are consid-
ered as an important input when initi-
ate citizen participation. 
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Participation and institutionalization; core dimensions and elements  
This section has one basic objective, which is to understand how the end output (in 
the form of institutionalized participatory spaces) should theoretically look. The lit-
erature review has provided interesting insights into citizen participation, as seen by a 
number of researchers, academicians and practitioners. To find an ideal definition is 
difficult, as each is historically linked to different ideologies, thus acquiring different 
meanings. While some view citizen participation as a result of a bottom up empower-
ing process, others see it more in a project context. In this section, basic elements of 
the definition and interpretation with relation to institutionalization will be examined.  
Brinkhoff and Goldsmith (2001:4) define participation as “a process through which 
stakeholders shape and share control over development initiatives”. Important ele-
ments of this definition include:   
– the process character as opposed to one-off participatory events,  
– the term stakeholder including all societal actors, and  
– the understanding of a form of joint policy-making.  
Institutionalized participation is: sustainable, structurally integrated, thematically em-
bedded, politically relevant, broad-based and inclusive, decentralized, qualified, rep-
resentative, conflict-aware, and safeguarded by the rule of law. Institutionalized par-
ticipation thus as understood leads to open, learning societies that develop their own 
potentials (Eberlei 2001:2 as cited in GTZ 2001:14). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 
(2001: 9) stated that “Create administrative structures, procedures, and mechanisms 
will facilitate the institutionalization of policy participation”.  
According to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001: 4) institutionalized participation can 
be defined as “a right-based, structurally integrated and legitimized process through 
which capable stakeholders shape and share control over development initiatives”.  
This emphasizes that institutionalized participation: 
– has to be rights-based;  
– has to be integrated in the political structures of the country;  
– needs legitimacy; and  
– is inconceivable without capable stakeholders who have the capacity to be deeply 
involved in the process 
This research clearly adopts this definition as a general framework where the four 
elements mentioned above constitute necessary attributes of institutionalized partici-
pation as an output of institutionalizing process (spaces). Participation without these 
four elements runs the risk of being no more than ad hoc, one-off participatory events, 
staying tentative and fragile. What else can be learnt from the definition of Brinker-
hoff and Goldsmith (2001)? 
Participation must be ensured by institutional measures in order to be effective in 
the long term. Institutionalized processes would allow civil society to exert influence 
on a continuous and long-term basis and to become more qualified by learning from 
experience. In other words, institutionalization of participation increases its effective-
ness. Institutionalization of political participation allows the outcome of participatory 
processes to be preserved for future political decisions. According to Elberli 
(2002:10), “in the past, new structures for participatory processes were established – 
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often under time pressure exerted by the creditors – on a temporary basis, but they 
were not embedded in institutions”. Thus, formerly developed participatory structures 
were weakened and the long-term effectiveness of participation was limited. Institu-
tionalized participation must be equipped with instruments and/or forums for continu-
ous dialogue. 
The capacity question is also addressed. A strong participation of societal stake-
holders requires well-developed human, technical and organizational resources.  Par-
ticipation must be ensured by institutional measures in order to be effective in the 
long term. Institutionalized processes would allow civil society to exert influence on a 
continuous and long-term basis and to become more qualified by learning from ex-
perience. 
Participation can develop its full effectiveness, only if the participants in political 
processes are able to represent their interests adequately. This requires the knowledge 
of the rules, resources for the definition and articulation of political positions and ex-
periences with political negotiation processes. According to McGee and Norton 
(2000: 65 as cited in Elberli 2002:11), “representatives of civil society rarely had ex-
perience in planning processes and [were] not familiar with processes, procedures and 
issues”. Qualified participation presupposes adequate material and personnel support 
as well as an adequate time schedule. 
Furthermore, it must be considered that political capacity is developed to varying 
degrees within the civil society of a country. For example, it is usually more difficult 
for women to bring in their valid positions in participatory processes. Also the ine-
quality of urban and rural areas within a civil society has a negative effect on oppor-
tunities for participation. At worst, unequal development of political capabilities may 
have the consequence that existing imbalances of power are even perpetuated by par-
ticipation. According to Elberli (2002:11), politically capable participants require: 
– Comprehensive and timely access to relevant information; 
– Sufficient resources for accessing and analyzing information and for lobbying and 
campaigning activities; 
– Time and space for processing this information, critically reflecting political con-
cepts and developing independent positions; and 
– Physical and legal access to public debates. 
Institutionalized participation needs basic political rights as well as specific rights of 
participation within the concrete planning process context. Citizens as well as an 
organized civil society have to have a rule-based and clear picture as to which role 
they can play in their society. According to Elberli (2002), legally ensured access to 
the political arenas of a country is a major prerequisite for politically capable action, 
for example the right to participation. Effective participation requires legally 
guaranteed access to the political arenas. This also means that the ‘powerful’ actors 
should express their willingness to share power and to ensure participation even in 
respect to central political issues, such as the following (Elberli 2002:12): 
– On principle, effective participation is inconceivable, as long as fundamental po-
litical rights are not guaranteed. Furthermore, fundamental principles of separation 
of powers are unrenouncable prerequisites for effective participation. An inde-
pendent jurisdiction which is in the position to enforce these fundamental rights, if 
necessary, is an essential prerequisite for sustained and effective participation; 
– Guaranteed access to information and transparent action of the government; 
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– Rights of participation are critical. Representatives of civil society must be guar-
anteed a right to participation in political processes. Participation cannot and must 
not be a matter of the government’s discretion; and  
– Prohibitions must not hang over the participating groups of civil society.  
Another element of institutionalized participation, as in Brinkhoff and Goldsmith 
definition, is the legitimacy of decisions. This has several dimensions. Parliaments, 
which in many countries in the third world are institutionally weak but usually pos-
sess at least a formally legitimate mandate, have to be involved. Regarding civil soci-
ety organizations, it has to be said that they do not possess the formal democratic le-
gitimating to determine political decisions that are binding upon a government. How-
ever, civil society actors can increase their legitimacy making sure that they are or-
ganized in a representative and inclusive manner, that they are independent from gov-
ernment and other major players, and that they are internally organized in a democ-
ratic way. In the long run, there will be no meaningful and legitimized participation in 
a country without structures of bottom-up-planning and decision-making procedures 
and sharing of power. Democratic legitimization in a narrower sense means that rep-
resentatives are elected by the people. Usually, this does not apply to representatives 
of civil society. From the point of view of Jürgen Habermas (2001 in Elberli 
2002:14), political systems must be legitimated by decision of the majority to be al-
lowed to take action. In his opinion, civil society derives legitimization from a sen-
sory function by absorbing problem situations within the society and forming public 
opinion. This public opinion cannot rule itself, but can direct administrative power 
towards certain objectives (Habermas 2001: 356). This reason for legitimating should 
be based on a multifaceted foundation (Elberli 2002:14): 
– Public and transparent participation as well as accountable actors; 
– Representative participation; and 
– Internal democratization. 
In addition, institutionalized participation has clearly defined political structures for 
dialogue between all stakeholders at national as well as at regional and local levels. 
To conduct just one or two national workshops with a handful of civil society repre-
sentatives is not a structured dialogue but an ad hoc event. Necessary structures have 
to be shaped on a continuing basis. Their competences and rights have to be clearly 
described, their membership outlined transparently. One necessary part of these struc-
tures is an open information policy of the government which allows a comprehensive 
insight into the implementation of the plans and strategies. And another structural 
aspect is that the implementation of plans cannot be conducted in a centralized way. 
The requirements and institutional dimensions for institutional participation as 
adapted from Elberli (2002:16) follow:  
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Table  3.8: Requirements for institutionalized participation 
 Elementary requirements for partici-
pation 
Extended requirements for participa-
tion 
Institutionalization 
 
• Parliament must be involved (dis-
cussion/decision) 
• Planning  based on previous proc-
esses and existing structures 
• Clear agreements with civil society 
on participatory procedures 
• Parliament must assume “watch 
function” in co-operation with civil 
society 
• Clear structures for co-operation 
between government and civil soci-
ety as to the control of  processes 
• Civil society  has the right to par-
ticipate in implementation (e.g. 
budget hearing) and review process 
• Independent civil society network-
ing 
Political capability 
 
• Access to essential information; 
• Sufficient time for participation 
• Basic equipment for analyzing and 
lobbying work 
 
• Comprehensive and timely access 
to information; essential documents 
must be available in native lan-
guages  
• Regular consultations. 
• Networks are adequately equipped 
for analyzing and lobbying work  
Political rights 
 
• Inclusive approach: representatives 
of civil society cannot be rejected by 
governments 
• Freedom of opinion 
• Freedom of press 
 
• Legally ensured right to participa-
tion 
• Unlimited freedom of peaceful 
assembly, association and network-
ing 
• Freedom of Information Act 
• politically independent NGOs 
Legitimization 
 
• Parliament must be involved 
• Sufficiently large number of civil 
society representatives, some of 
which should represent local or rural 
groups; clearly defined criteria for 
participation 
• Transparent, public debates and 
negotiations 
• Representativeness must be en-
sured 
 
• Democratic legitimating ensured 
by parliamentary decisions 
• Participating civil society networks 
must have internal democratic struc-
tures 
• National, decentralized participa-
tion must be fully implemented 
• Protection of minorities  
• Positions of civil society must be 
disclosed in official documents  
 
Adapted from Eberlei 2002: 16 
 
To sum up, institutionalized participation creates a room for societies to debate their 
development status, goals and priorities, and to take democratically legitimate deci-
sions on those issues. Societies which create this space for themselves institutionalize 
not only participation rights, but also the exchange of expertise and ideas on solving 
their problems. They therefore institutionalize learning processes, and sustainable 
spaces where all actors are brought together to discuss, consult and formulate better 
responsive policies and plans.  
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So far we have considered the general framework of institutional dimensions and 
elements of participation. However, the focus of this research is only on participation 
of organized groups of civil society in local government planning and policy making. 
The next step will to examine the context for institutionalizing relationships between 
NGOs and government and what would constitute a healthy relationship, questioning 
some paradigms concerning the context where these interactions occur. It is impor-
tant, when promoting participation within a particular context, to be sure exactly what 
benefits it would bring, what would be its added-value and, equally, what could be 
some of the unforeseen consequences of its implementation. 
3.4 NGOs and the state; context for healthy and institutional 
relationship 
“The aim should be to empower ordinary people to take charge of their lives, to make 
communities more responsible for their development, and to make government listen 
to their people. Fostering a more pluralistic, institutional structure including NGOs is 
a means to these ends” (World Bank, 1987 in UNDP 2003:7)10 
With regard to the NGO-state relationship, the essential question according to Cross 
(1997:2)11 has been whether NGOs should be competitors or partners with the state, 
that is, whether NGOs should maintain their distance from the state so as to retain 
their autonomy, or whether they should work hand in hand with state projects. At the 
same time, concern has been raised in some countries about the repression of NGOs 
by the state and the relative merits of politicization of NGOs, particularly if they are 
to undertake an advocacy role on behalf of the citizens. Another important issue con-
cerning the NGO-government relationship is the nature of their collaboration itself. 
Does it mean that NGOs implement state policy or that the state contracts NGOs to 
implement its programs? Can NGO dependency on or independency from government 
impact on the autonomy and efficiency of NGOs in their involvement in local policy 
making? According to Edwards and Hulme (1993: 57-58), “obstacles of such collabo-
ration between NGOs and government must be addressed and made explicit. Collabo-
ration will challenge old institutional identities and autonomy and will introduce new 
constraints as well as potentials”. 
There are other issues concerning the NGO-donor relationship, Cross (1997:2) also 
emphasizes that the concerns are about dependency itself, and whether over-reliance 
on donors and particularly foreign donors may affect the way that NGOs operate. The 
issue goes beyond the simple question of whether NGOs may ‘sell out’ to the donors 
to consider whether the administrative procedures and requirements of donor funding 
may in themselves have an adverse effect on the effectiveness of local NGOs in repre-
senting citizens, and considers the question of to whom such NGOs are ultimately 
accountable: the ordinary citizens they service or the donors that fund their service 
                                                 
10
 UNDP, (2003), “State-NGO relationship in transitional democracies”. Online report: 
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docsjuly03/GiskeC%20Lillehammer.pdf 
11 John C. Cross, (1997), “ Development NGOs, the State and Neo-Liberalism: Competition, Part-
nership or Co-conspiracy”, Department of Sociology, The American University in Cairo, ((Pub-
lished in Proceedings of the Fourth Annual AUC Research Conference. Office of Graduate Studies and 
Research, The American University in Cairo. July 1997): online: 
http://www.openair.org/cross/NGOS.htm 
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activities. Before detailing these issues and their implications in the context of NGO-
government relationships, it is useful to first clarify what is meant by the term NGO, 
both in general and in the Palestinian context in particular. 
Conceptual clarification of NGOs 
The term ‘NGO’ encompasses a broad array of different organizations, varying enor-
mously according to their purpose, philosophy, sectoral expertise, and scope of activi-
ties.  According to the UN (1995)12, “it is a non-profit group or association that acts 
outside of institutionalized political structures and pursues matters of interest to its 
members by lobbying, persuasion, or direct action. The term is generally restricted to 
social, cultural, legal, and environmental advocacy groups having goals that are 
primarily non-commercial. NGOs are therefore typically independent of 
governments”. According to Clarke (1996 cited in UNDP 2003:6), NGOs are defined 
as “private, non-profit professional organizations, with a distinctive legal character, 
concerned with public welfare goals”. In the developing world, NGOs include 
philanthropic foundations, religious development agencies, academic think-tanks, 
human rights organizations and other organizations focusing on issues such as gender, 
health, agricultural development, social welfare, the environment, and indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, literature is full of definitions of NGOs where they mainly emphasize 
the concepts of non-profit and independent institution from the state, and having a 
wide range of developmental focus.   
NGOs are usually associated with the concept of civil society. Civil society, as de-
fined in the literature, is the level of organization that exists between households and 
the state. It is made up of many types of voluntary associations where people combine 
for their collective interests. UNDP (2003: 6) view civil society as “a third sector, 
existing alongside and interacting with the state and profit-making firms…. They con-
sist of non-profit organizations and special interest groups, either formal or informal, 
working to improve the lives of their constituents”. According to London School of 
Economics Centre for Civil Society13, its working definition is illustrative: “Civil so-
ciety refers to the set of institutions, organizations and behaviors situated between the 
state, the business world, and the family. Specifically, this includes voluntary and 
non-profit organizations of many different kinds, philanthropic institutions, social and 
political movements, other forms of social participation and engagement and the val-
ues and cultural patterns associated with them”. The importance given to civil society 
is due its potential to serve as the institutional channel that enables citizens to raise 
their voices and affect government policies as to serve their interests and needs. Devas 
et al. (2001:19) see “...civil society as the institutional solution to people centered, 
participatory and inclusive development” (as cited in Grant 2002:11). Taking the view 
that NGOs might seek wider social and political participation to increase their effec-
tiveness and legitimacy, how does this research perceive NGOs in the Palestinian 
context?  
We mentioned end of the last chapter, that George Giacaman (Palestinian Expert) 
views civil society and hence NGOs as “societal organizations of various types exist-
ing in relative independent from the state” (Giacaman 2000 cited in Alshouli 
2006:16). This definition emphasizes two major characteristics of NGOs: first the 
social focus and secondly independency from the state. However, with regard to inde-
                                                 
12
 As cited in Wikipedia, online : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization 
13
 Wordiq online : http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Civil_society. Retrieved on July 16th, 2004 
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pendency, it is true that Palestinian NGOs had enjoyed total independence from the 
government before 1993. This can be construed since the government itself was alien 
in its nature. But after the establishment of a Palestinian Authority and in a practical 
sense, this issue is not clear and can raise additional questions of what meant by inde-
pendency? Ideally, we have seen that a major strength of NGOs is that they work in-
dependently from the government; however, in the Palestinian context many NGOs in 
some sense are not even dependent but also affiliated with political parties including 
the ruling one.  If adopting independency is a criterion in its practical sense, this 
means excluding the major part of existing NGOs. It is also obvious that there is no 
scientific way to distinguish among independent and dependent Palestinian NGOs.  It 
is important to highlight this issue, since our definition – as was shall later – will in-
clude independency as a criteria but in its ideal sense. It will be a concern of this re-
search to question the practical implications on the context of our study. 
The Palestinian Law of 2001 (Art. 2) defines NGOs as “any charitable association 
or community organization with an independent judicial personality, established upon 
an agreement concluded among no less than seven persons to achieve legitimate ob-
jectives of public concern, without aiming at attaining financial profits to be shared 
among the members or achieving any personal benefits”. This definition did not em-
phasize clearly the essential role played by NGOs in development planning. There-
fore, the Palestinian NGOs network (2005)14 widened this definition to define NGO 
“as a non-profit institution of a civil nature, which is active in development work of a 
scientific, charitable, educational, legal or religious kind and operates without any 
discrimination with regard to ethnicity, religion or sex”. We might add registration as 
other criteria, as some Palestinian NGOs have failed for various reasons to get accred-
ited, and hence registered in the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, according to the law. 
Thus these organizations continue to work as NGOs beyond the law. Regardless of 
their substantive contribution to development, these organizations will not be covered 
in our definition since it will be impossible to get access to these NGOs which are 
known sometimes only by their members or target groups if any. Observers would 
see, if one were to count these NGOs, that the number of existing NGOs in Palestine 
might even double.   
Therefore, NGOs in the context of this research refer to the non-profit organiza-
tions that work as organized groups of civil society to mediate between citizens and 
the state. These organizations are not part of the legal and political structure of the 
government, hence they enjoy some sense of independency in deciding their own 
activities. These organizations are engaged in a wide range of developmental sectors, 
such as social and relief, charity organizations, rehabilitation, research, health, agri-
culture, human rights, training, unions, democracy, friendship associations, youths, 
women, art and culture, education, childhood, heritage, environment, co-operatives 
and loaning organizations, housing associations, religious organizations and unions. 
These organizations must be legitimized by the state and accredited by the Ministry of 
Interior according to the law of 2001. 
Context for healthy and institutional NGOs-government relationship: ideals and 
realities 
In NGO relations with the state, Clarke (1991cited in UNDP 2003:7) presents the 
liberalist view that NGOs can fulfill three roles: complementing, reforming, and/or 
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 Palestinian NGOs Network. Online: http://www.pngo.net/pngo_ara/arabic.htm 
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opposing the state. The idea of the complementing NGOs is one of NGOs as service 
providers and implementers of development activities. In this case, NGOs fill in the 
gaps left by public services. By the 1990s, the prevalent ideology among donors was 
to see the state as an ‘enabler’ rather than a ‘provider’. The reforming role of NGOs is 
related to NGOs as agents of advocacy and contributors to policy dialogue. NGOs can 
represent the interest of the people they work with and, hence, ensure that policies are 
adapted to ‘real life’. In this way, policies are legitimized. NGOs can also contribute 
to generating informed public judgment which can be referred to as ‘mediation’. Fi-
nally, NGOs can oppose the state, by acting as watchdogs and holding it accountable. 
This can either be done directly through lobbying, or indirectly by supporting groups 
that are adversely affected by government policy (Clarke 1991). 
Lewis (2001 cited in Al-Shouli 2006:7), on the same tack, suggests that in the 
development field, NGO roles can be broadly summarized in three sets of activities: 
implementer, catalyst, and partner.  
According to Lewis, the implementer role is about mobilizing resources to provide 
goods and services such as healthcare, education, or emergency relief. This service 
could be part of the NGO’s own program or a government or donor agency’s pro-
gram. A donor can contract a local NGO to provide a service within its program struc-
ture as in the case of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) or WB projects. Lewis identifies some problems associated with this role, 
mainly that the relationship with the government is not well defined; “…are those 
NGOs complementing, replacing or undermining the role of the government in pro-
viding the services themselves?” (Lewis, 2001 cited in Al-Shouli 2006:8). However, 
there is another side to the coin: some argue that when there is a gap, it should be 
filled regardless of the problems associated with doing so. It is more important to 
judge the development impact when there is a need than to judge the relationship, 
especially when there are limited sources of public service provision (Lewis, 2001 as 
cited in Al-Shouli 2006: 8).  
The catalyst role of NGOs is about empowering the beneficiaries of the NGO start-
ing at the community level. According to Lewis (2001), the word ‘empowerment’ has 
many different meanings. However, in the context of development, it means making 
people aware of the power dynamics in their lives, developing capacities and skills for 
further control without infringing others, and supporting empowerment of others in 
the community. Lewis adds that empowerment has become a central idea in develop-
ment. Empowerment is brought about either by an outside professional facilitator or 
by the NGOs themselves. In addition to empowerment, Lewis identifies another key 
role of the catalyst NGO: advocacy. To Lewis, advocacy is crucial in building sus-
tainable development and influencing policy change, and it is usually an activity un-
dertaken by Northern NGOs (Lewis, 2001 cited in Al-Shouli 2006: 8-9). It is the ad-
vocacy roles played by Palestine NGOs which is of central concern in this research, 
particularly the extent to which they are able practice this role and spaces in which 
they may be active. 
Hadenius and Uggla (1996) see civil society, hence NGOs, as having two func-
tions: the pluralist and the educational. The former refers essentially to the external 
and mutual relations of organizations while the latter looks at their internal life. The 
pluralist function concerns the distribution of power in society and political life. The 
idea is that by organizing themselves, people obtain power resources. The outcome of 
a multiplicity of well developed associations with access to channels for popular in-
fluence, is a balance between power centers, interests and opinion. This ensures the 
best possible coherence between individual preferences and collective choices. The 
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pluralist function is closely related to Clarke’s second and third role. The basic idea 
behind the educational function is that the “spiritual support for democracy’s funda-
mental principles” (Hadenius and Uggla 1996:1622 in UNDP 2003:8-9). 
NGOs have become important actors in development assistance for at least three 
reasons according to Clark (1993:5-7)15: first, because of their scale; second, because 
of their style of work and third, because of their representation of poorer or otherwise 
disadvantaged people.. Many NGOs have demonstrated an ability to reach poor peo-
ple, work in inaccessible areas, innovate, or in other ways achieve things which are 
difficult for official agencies; many NGOs have close links with poor or disadvan-
taged communities. Some are membership organizations of poor or vulnerable people. 
Others are skilled at participatory approaches.  
The NGO sector does however often suffer from several weaknesses. Some of 
these are internal to NGOs while others are linked to their relations with external 
agents, including the government. Internally, according to UNDP (2003:9-10), NGOs 
are to varying degrees suffering from weak sectoral, financial and organizational ca-
pacities. NGOs often lack financial resources. Consequently, they are dependent on 
external funding.  Finally, organizational capacity refers to an NGO’s ability to per-
form certain functions, such as knowledge management or service delivery. It is re-
lated to the concept of internal governance, an issue that has received substantial at-
tention in recent years. NGOs have been accused of lacking transparency and democ-
ratic internal procedures, and some even for having hidden agendas. Consequently, 
some governments and populations have become suspicious of NGOs. This issue is 
also related to the question of accountability and democratic mandate, as members of 
NGOs are not selected through elections. Clayton et al. (2000:19 cited in UNDP 
2003:10) note that “accountability downwards – from service providing NGOs to the 
beneficiaries…is generally weak”, as is their accountability towards the state. In prac-
tice, Thomas (1992: 138 cited in UNDP 2003:10) further argues that  “there is a risk 
that community organizations represent the interest of better-off and more powerful 
individuals and groups better then they represent the interest of the poorest members 
of the community”. 
In theory, NGOs can help develop civil society, advocate on behalf of and increase 
the organizational capacity of the poor, provide services more efficiently, flexibly and 
innovatively than the public sector, remain accountable to their client base, and so on. 
But in practice, as Cross (1997) argues, the larger NGOs grow, the less accountable 
they are to their clients and the more accountable they are to the donors who allow 
them to grow. The more dependent they become on outside funding – and particularly 
official or international aid – the less able are they to take on an advocacy role or a 
role that might be seen as critical to the national government. The more ‘professional’ 
they become, the more they depend on outside funding and the less likely they are to 
be innovative and flexible in dealing with local problems.  
Fisher (1994 in Cross 1997:4-5) assumed that, while NGOs may in some cases be 
dominated by elite groups, or tied to state interests, on the whole they provide the 
possibility for an alternative route of popular expression that helps to balance the 
state, which is assumed to be dominated by elite interests. This may be especially 
apparent where NGOs seem to have come into direct conflict with the state. Indeed, 
this perspective reduces the issue of NGO-state relations to the question of relative 
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 John Clark, (1993), “The Relationship between the State and the Voluntary Sector”, the Global 
Development Research Centre. See online:   http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/relationship.htm. 
Retrieved on July 15th, 2005  
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autonomy of NGOs from the latter, which is where most of the debate in the field lies. 
Given that NGOs are generally regulated and to some extent supervised by the state, a 
lot of debate revolves around the question of whether this is good (in terms of pre-
venting corruption in NGOs or improving coordination between the state and NGOs) 
or bad (in terms of implying state control and limits on NGO activities) and how it 
may be optimized. 
 ‘Advocacy’ work, often combined with the goal of ‘empowerment’ of the poor, 
thus, according to Edwards and Hulme (1996:965 in Cross 1997:5) creates an “unre-
solved dilemma for grassroots organizations and NGOs in most societies as to how to 
engage in the political process in order to achieve fundamental changes in the distri-
bution of power and resources without becoming embroiled in partisan politics...”.  
The popularity of NGOs has been based on the argument that they provide a number 
of benefits on economic, political and social levels.  According to Cross (1997:6-7), 
the idea that NGOs represent ‘civil society’ while states represent ‘elites’ is predicated 
on the argument that NGOs are potentially more ‘participatory’ than the state and 
market structures, and therefore potentially more ‘accountable’ to the needs of subal-
tern groups in society. This provides them with greater ‘legitimacy’ in representing 
the needs of society, or at least of the ‘masses’. John Clark (1995:593 in Cross 
1997:9) notes, “Many argue that NGOs may be best placed for the tasks of fostering 
popular participation which include articulating the needs of the weak, working in 
remote areas, changing attitudes and practices of local officials, and nurturing the 
productive capacity of the most vulnerable such as the disabled or the landless”.  
Meanwhile, there are occasional warnings about ‘bogus’ NGOs, set up by local elite 
groups or even set up by governments (GONGOs).  Cross (1997) also noted that, as 
NGOs become larger and more dependent on aid from official donors, or other large 
donors, they also tend to become less innovative and flexible as they become more 
bureaucratized and have to meet donor standards and stipulations.  
As the NGO sector has grown, and funding has increased, a number of authors 
have pointed to the danger that this may actually decrease the legitimacy and account-
ability of NGOs to the communities they are supposed to be serving. Furthermore, 
there is an even deeper question mark here. As Edwards and Hulme (Edwards and 
Hulme 1996 cited in Cross 1997:7-8) point out: “There are a deeper set of concerns 
about the possible ‘rewriting of the social contract’ between government and its citi-
zens as a result of NGO substitution for the state in key aspects of the development 
process... The accountability of a non-elected NGO when providing services to ‘cli-
ents’ is very different from the formal relationships established between governments 
and citizens”.  
Clark (1993) described three kinds of NGO-government relationships. The first 
form of relationship is where NGOs are in a dependent-client position from the gov-
ernment; in which NGOs implement state-prepared programs and/or receive funding 
through the state (a dependency of money, ideas and resources). The second type of 
relationship is adversarial in which there are no common starting points and no wish 
from either side to search out areas of agreement. The third and most constructive 
relationship emerging in certain liberal democracies is a collaborationist one; a genu-
ine partnership to tackle mutually agreed problems, coupled with energetic but con-
structive debate on areas of disagreement. A healthy relationship is only conceivable 
when both parties share common objectives. However, such relations are rare, even 
when the conditions are met. The mutual distrust and jealousy appears to be deep-
rooted. Governments fear that NGOs erode their political power or even threaten na-
tional security (Fowler 1992 in Clark 1993:7). And NGOs mistrust the motivation of 
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the government and its officials. Though controversial and risky, many of the more 
strategic NGOs are overcoming their inhibitions and are seeking closer collaboration 
with governments. In this way, NGOs believe they will be better able to achieve de-
sirable impact, and they will be able to expose the government to a grass-roots per-
spective which might otherwise be neglected. However, with closer collaboration 
comes increased risk of corruption, reduced independence, and financial dependency.  
World Bank experience indicates a strong correlation between project success and 
the participation of grassroots organizations. However, even with a largely adversarial 
relationship, consultation can be a surprisingly productive process and reduce ten-
sions. Conversely, dialogue with NGOs may not be very productive when the State-
NGO relationship is too cozy. In such situations NGOs tend to accept uncritically 
both the government’s information and the government’ role in coordinating all de-
velopment activities, including those of NGOs. The NGOs are largely content to fill 
in gaps as directed by the authorities and rely on such commissions. They do not 
question state activities, and therefore fail to inject the grassroots perspective. A de-
gree of financial autonomy of the NGO sector is necessary to ensure their independ-
ence. NGOs can play an important role in helping certain population groups, or filling 
in the gaps in state services, or in pressing for a change in the national development 
strategy, but they do not offer realistic alternative pathways. Their innovations may 
test out new approaches, but these only become sustainable or of significant scale if 
they influence national development.  When both parties see that their solutions are 
not competing alternatives but are complementary contributions, the possibility for a 
genuine collaboration is opened. (Clark 1993:11-18). 
Hadenius and Uggla (1996) define a continuum of five stages from a situation in 
which the state is hostile to civil society to one of benevolence. The first stage charac-
terizes totalitarian regimes where all organizational activity is banned. In the last 
stage, the government actively promotes civil society. These stages are summarized in 
the table below:  
Table  3.9: State treatment of civil society 
Stage State treatment Type of State 
1 The State does not tolerate independent  civil activity 
Threshold: de facto right to form autonomous organizations 
Hostile 
 
2 The State accepts autonomous organization, but does not provide a 
space for it. 
Threshold: state withdrawal opening up a space for independent 
activity. 
 
3 A space for independent activity exists, but the practice of govern-
ance does not promote autonomous organization. 
Threshold: favorable institutional structures. 
Benevolent 
State 
 
4 The State provides favorable structures, but no active support. 
Threshold: active state programs in support of civil society. 
 
5 The State actively promotes autonomous organizations  
Source: Hadenius and Uggla 1996 in UNDP 2003:11 
 
As seen in the table above, the different stages are separated by four thresholds. Each 
of them corresponds to one of the following situations in which the state: 
– Permits the formation of autonomous organizations; 
– Leaves space for civil society: The state withdraws, either intentionally or other-
wise, from various social spheres; 
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– Provides beneficial institutional structures: In this case, the state can install a fa-
cilitative legal-administrative framework (registration/legal status, tax exemption, 
etc.), mechanisms for solving conflicts and arenas for interactions; and 
– Actively promotes civil society. 
Indeed, there are many examples from the literature that can provide additional frame-
works for NGO-state relationships. In his discussion of these frameworks, (Najm 
2005)16 concludes that their relationships vary between co-operation, comple-
mentarity, co-optation, and confrontation.  The kind of relationship depends on the 
similarity and dissimilarity of means and goals for both, where the best relationship 
will occur when both NGOs and government have similar goals and means. This 
framework, an addition to others that are discussed before, provides us with more 
knowledge about the nature of NGO-government relations. However, though these 
frameworks treat in depth the characteristics of each relationship, they put less em-
phasis on core causes that could shape such relations. In addition, and more impor-
tantly, the interaction between them does not happen in a vacuum. It occurs within 
spaces where most of frameworks fall short in describing and analyzing these spaces. 
What additional lessons can be learned from the previous discussions regards dis-
course of NGO-state relationships in relation to the institutionalization of NGOs’ in-
volvement in local planning and policy making?  Obstacles to such collaboration be-
tween NGOs and government must be addressed and made explicit. Collaboration 
will challenge old institutional identities and autonomy and will introduce new con-
straints as well as potentials. In collaboration with larger institutions (e.g. government 
and donors), NGOs can easily be pushed into a position in which they implement 
other institutions’ programs. According to Edwards and Hulme (1993: 59), NGOs are 
seen – in many cases – by government and donor institutions as “simple vehicles for 
program implementation”. It should be emphasized that institutional collaboration in 
policy making and planning processes means working together in a mutually interde-
pendent fashion. This implies, according to Edwrads and Hulme (1993:51), “more 
than simply linkage or interaction”. 
Some might think that is the only governments which are responsible for institu-
tionalizing NGO participation in local planning, by legitimizing civil society partici-
pation as right-based and integrating the process into its political structure. In some 
sense this is true, but as we understood from literature, power is not easy to relinquish 
and the state by itself might be reluctant to share its power with other actors in par-
ticular situations. The state might even suspect political roles could be being played 
by some NGOs, as in Palestine. On the other hand, the state might create a dependent 
relationship with these NGOs, decreasing their autonomous or independent actions. 
So, it is becoming clearer now that the state is responsible for creating enabling struc-
tures, policies and legitimization. But this issue to happen, it has to be accompanied 
by additional efforts exerted by NGOs to facilitate the creation of these new innova-
tions. It is important for NGO initiatives to meet state responsiveness. The NGOs 
have to prove their capacity to participate and their accountability to the communities 
they advocate.  
                                                 
16
 Adil Najam, (2005), The four Cs Government-Third Sector Relationships; Cooperation, Confronta-
tion, Complementarity, Co-option. Boston University, journal Non-profit Management and Leader-
ship, Vol 10,No.4: Online: http://www.bu.edu/cees/research/workingp/pdfs/0100.pdf. Retrieved on 
July 14th, 2006 
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The four elements of institutionalized participation as described by Brinkhoff and 
Goldsmith (2001): legitimacy, rights based, integration of political structure and ca-
pable stakeholder, would occur only as a result of mutual efforts to be exerted by both 
government and NGOs. ‘Structure’ is to examine the existence of structural dialogues, 
information flow, and an enabling or disabling framework. While ‘capacity’ questions 
the professionalism of  the NGO contribution, their human and technical resources, 
and the knowledge of NGOs of central issues concerning government planning and 
access to information. The last issue, ‘legitimacy’, questions who is legitimized by 
whom, and whether organized groups of civil society are included and well repre-
sented in the process of making policies and planning. Do the NGOs themselves rep-
resent local communities or factional interests? Do the civil society organizations 
have either the willingness or the technical capacity to articulate pro-local commu-
nity’s policy issues? And are they well located to represent the interests of these 
communities? What are the capacity building issues – both for the government as well 
as for the civil society groups? Does participation of NGOs in local policy formula-
tion and implementation really contribute to pro-poor policies; if so, how may this 
contribution be assessed? 
It is becoming clearer that there is a need for addressing power imbalance and 
building capacity which emphasizes the need to find new mechanisms that allow 
power to be exercised as closely as possible to citizens and local communities. In this 
way, by addressing power imbalances and designing mechanisms and methods for 
participation that are informed by citizens’ own demands, local government can begin 
to enable citizens to play an active role in integral local development. There is ‘recip-
rocal causality’ between good local government and strong civil society, through em-
powerment, accountability and capacity building. For this reciprocity to come about, 
existing power imbalances must be taken into account. Different actors involved in 
the same process may have very different understandings about what outcomes to 
expect, and different capacity to pursue their interests, especially in scenarios where 
central and local government, international donors, NGOs and social movements are 
vying for influence over the process. Underlying these and other questions is the cen-
tral issue of where citizens are positioned, and how we envisage their engagement in 
processes of participation in local governance. Is their role peripheral, instrumental, or 
central to the process? Have the obstacles to their participation been properly ad-
dressed?  
3.5 Drawing a conceptual framework 
It was evident from the theoretical context reviewed that changing paradigms of plan-
ning approaches from top-down to bottom-up has affected our understanding of how 
policy decisions are to be made (section 3.1). Policy making and planning process is 
seen as series of dynamics and political processes, rather than as linear progression 
from formulation to implementation. That means decisions are made up of a series of 
linked spaces, in which a wide range of actors (government and non-government) 
engage to influence and shape policy making. Section (3.2), emphasized that interac-
tion between NGOs and the state does not happen in a vacuum. There may be many 
disabling and enabling factors within legal frameworks among other contextual fac-
tors which are socio-cultural and historical.  
In section (3.3), we have seen how difficult it is not only to measure success in re-
lation to civil society involvement in planning, but also in defining success. The more 
fair and competent the process is, the more likely it will yield a just output. Just output 
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in this research context means appropriate and fair access of NGOs to have influence 
within institutional spaces over local policy and planning formulation and implemen-
tation, in order to result in the desired outcome, so that NGOs will be able to hold 
local governments more accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs.   
The frameworks that assure institutionalization of the process would mean a guar-
antee of legitimacy, rights based, with integration in the political structures and exis-
tence of capable stakeholders (section 3.3). In the NGO-government context, institu-
tionalizing collaborative relationship does not simply mean linkages and interactions, 
it rather means working together in a mutually interdependent fashion where both 
government and NGOs have to collaborate to establish such relations (section 3.4). 
The combination of the issues discussed in each section is seen as complementary 
elements, where in combination form a clear pictures of spaces, showing how are they 
formed or shaped, and how can they be assessed (section 3.1);  how their contextual 
frameworks  disable or enable fostering of these spaces (section 3.2); how we may 
assess the efficiency and success of these spaces ( section 3.3); and finally, what are 
the more likely patterns of relationships which happen between NGOs and govern-
ment and what are their characteristics and challenges? (section 3.4). 
Keeping in minds that our focus is on how spaces are created and shaped in local 
planning and policy making, the following diagram constitutes our analytical frame-
work: 
 
Figure  3.1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from McGee, 2004: 23 
 
Our understanding of policy suggests that it is a complex, dynamic process, rather 
than a linear progression from formulation to implementation. This process comprises 
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a multiplicity of distinct but linked spaces, in which a wide range of actors, govern-
mental and non-governmental, engage in order to influence and shape policy. Each 
actor brings into a policy space their own knowledge about planning. Our framework, 
therefore, is divided into three conceptual categories, actors, knowledge and space. 
This categorization does not presuppose a fine separation between the categories, but 
they are used as analytical signifiers to help us make sense of the processes of policy 
making and planning as played out in the Palestinian arena. Participation and inter-
play of actors, knowledge and spaces does not take place in a vacuum, but its devel-
opment and progress will be influenced by a variety of factors inherent in the context 
Actors are characterized by a power relationship which defines their actions. Hence, it 
is critical that efforts to promote NGO participation in development planning under-
stand and examine the locus of decision making power, and the political and socio-
cultural context in which participation is to occur, in addition to the influence of his-
torical evolution for both LGUs and NGOs in a particular context. More precisely, 
literature has revealed clearly that the critical issue to bear in mind is concerned with 
two things: 
– Structural relationships and the importance of developing people’s capacities and 
skills to negotiate, communicate and to seek the resources and changes which they 
require in order to improve their lives; and 
– The methods and techniques whereby local people can be brought to play a part 
and to develop a stake in development programs and projects.  
Both purposes are of equal importance; the former seeks to secure a more long-term 
and sustainable development, and latter is crucial in providing immediate access to 
the benefits of development. Participatory processes do not necessarily follow struc-
tural, predetermined and linear directions. Participation must not be seen merely as 
input into the planning process, but as an essential operational principle which should 
underpin all activities.  The structure of the social system is a very important element 
in understanding its operation. It details the overall social relationship among person-
nel and provides the appropriate framework by which inputs are transformed into 
outputs. In principle, we will examine how the contextual environment may be af-
fected by the evolution of both local government systems and organized groups of 
civil society (NGOs), and how their interactions have emerged. 
 ‘Power’ as a variable itself is understood to include three indicators. First, con-
cerns with the locus of decision making power and its implications on institutional 
structures. Second, concerns with ability to network power. Third, concerns about the 
willingness of government to include or exclude organized groups of civil society in 
planning process and decision making, and their willingness to relinquish power and 
introduce communication mechanisms and legal frameworks. These together imply a 
need to question the ability of organized groups of civil society to form strong net-
works to influence decision makers from one side, and their ability to claim or initiate 
new spaces for them to participate in policy making. This issue in particular is af-
fected by various factors like diversity NGOs, interdependence, dialogues, focus, na-
ture and other characteristics of NGOs.  Finally, we need to question whether these 
mechanisms are systematically organized and integrated in the political structures. 
 ‘Knowledge’ as another variable is concerned with the capacity of each actor to 
participate in planning and policy making in terms of skills and resources. Whether 
involved actors have access to information concerns planning in general and the 
‘know how’ of planning rules and languages (formal knowledge) and whether they 
know how to organize and influence within communities (Informal knowledge). 
  
           
60 
The concept of ‘spaces’ provides us with a useful lens through which to view the 
policies and practices of actors who are engaged in the policy process, and to examine 
how their power to act is enabled and constrained. It makes it possible to break down 
the policy and planning process into observable elements. It also raises questions 
about their actions, and what potentials arise as a result of these spaces. It is intended 
to examine invited forums of participation created from above and the autonomous 
spaces created from below through more independent forms of social action.  These 
spaces can be judged in terms of their structural efficiency, use of adaptable and 
flexible procedures, and time of involvement in planning, facilitation skills, inclusive-
ness and gender participation and relations. The invited spaces are concerned with the 
receptiveness of the government and whether these spaces provide for transparent and 
accountable government actions. The autonomous spaces are concerned with the ini-
tiatives of civil society institutions to demand and create new civil and influential 
channels for themselves to have an influence on local policy making and implementa-
tion, so as to hold local governments more accountable and responsive to citizens’ 
needs.  
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4 Methodological Frameworks 
The research uses triangulation methods in order to pursue its objectives. This study is 
conclusive, qualitative and inductive in nature. It makes use of three research meth-
ods, namely: descriptive, causal and historical. The descriptive research involves the 
gathering of information about existing conditions; historical research involves a sys-
tematic and critical inquiry of past events while causal research is concerned with 
determination of which variable might be causing a particular behavior. The use of 
multiple methods or triangulation reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth under-
standing of the phenomenon in question.  
This research was conducted in the context of local governance in Palestine. The 
empirical work focused on two municipal areas in the Gaza Strip: Gaza and Rafah 
Municipalities. It covered, in addition to these two LGUs, 15 NGOs as representing 
organized groups of the Palestinian civil society. The matter which was subjected to 
deep investigation was the spaces created for NGOs to have influence over local gov-
ernment planning and policy making so as to hold local government more responsive 
and accountable to citizens’ needs. The questions to be investigated as mentioned 
before in chapter two were: 
– How are policy and plans made at the Palestinian local level? 
– What kinds of spaces exist at the Palestinian local level? 
– Have do these spaces provide sufficient access for NGOs to have influence, and 
hence make local government more accountable and responsive to citizens’ 
needs? 
– How do the institutional dynamics of power relations between the range of differ-
ent actors at the local level (specifically LGUs and NGOs) make and shape local 
planning and policy spaces in which the various kinds of knowledge are ex-
pressed?  
– In principle, are the Palestinian NGOs willing and able to participate in local 
planning and policy making? 
4.1   General goal and operational objectives  
The research aims to find out what could be the best strategies and policies to promote 
the establishment of institutionalized spaces for organized groups of civil society (fo-
cusing on NGOs) to participate effectively in local planning and policy making proc-
esses. In order to meet this goal, following operational objectives are identified: 
a) To investigate the status and level of NGO participation in policy making and 
local planning through either invited or autonomous spaces. 
– Identify key development actors in local planning processes concerning organized 
groups of civil society and local governments, 
– Profile and classify the actors,  
– Present the context, legal framework and action environment where interactions 
among various actors occur, 
– Identify kinds and nature of planning spaces exist at he Palestinian local level, 
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– Explore dynamics of actors interaction within them; their roles and responsibili-
ties, 
– Identify basis and contents of participation,  
– Explore how interplay of actors, power and knowledge shape spaces, and 
– Investigate degree of actors’ influence within these created spaces.  
b) To determine the facilitating and restraining factors. 
– Explore core dimensions of institutionalized participatory spaces in policy making 
and planning process, 
– Identify potentials and limitations for the establishment of institutionalized spaces, 
and 
– Identify issues and challenges. 
c) To recommend improvements and suggestions   
– Identify areas of improvements at both policy and capacity levels, and 
– Highlight important considerations when institutionalizing participatory planning 
and policy spaces. 
4.2 Hypotheses of the research 
Observations in the field in addition to a review of literature were the basis for formu-
lating our research hypotheses. The research is based on the following assumptions:  
– That Palestinian NGOs are willing and able to advocate citizens’ needs at the local 
policy and planning “spaces”. (This assumption in particular will be tackled as a 
question at the same time)   
– NGOs are assumed to be a social virtue, have an identity with clear boundaries 
and separate entity from the state. 
– The participation process will certainly involve confronting the power structure. 
And since power and privilege are hardly ever renounced voluntarily, the concept 
of truly participative society will necessitate the struggle for power to create con-
ditions for people to become effectively involved in shaping their lives. 
– Fair process is more likely to lead to just output. In this context, fair process 
means proper spaces for involvement that guarantee fair and competent access for 
NGOs in local planning and policy making.  A likely outcome as a result of fair 
process would be the greater ability of NGOs to hold local government more ac-
countable and responsive to citizens’ and communities’ needs. 
4.3 Rationales of the research 
The importance given to the aspects mentioned above will enable the municipal gov-
ernments (local government units), together with actors of the other part of the equa-
tion (such as civil society organizations and NGOs), to promote participation in local 
development planning. Municipal governments are expected to be more effective and 
efficient in the discharge of their powers and responsibilities, and to be judicious in 
the utilization of their resources, if they allow organized groups of civil society to be 
actively involved in development planning. And, as a result, NGOs will be in a better 
position to hold local governments more accountable and responsive to citizens needs. 
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It is believed that this research will be able to give concrete recommendations for 
improvements that will pave the way for promoting and institutionalizing participa-
tion in the local development planning process, policy making and program imple-
mentation in a sustainable manner.  The outputs of the study are also expected to be of 
significant value to the following: 
– Regional and national planning institutions such as the Ministry of Planning 
(MOP) and the Ministry of Local Government (MLG), High Planning Council 
(HPC) and the Central Committee for Building and City Planning (CCBCP), so 
that they will be able to assess the practice and progress of local governance per-
taining to the   participation of organized groups of civil society in local develop-
ment planning. The evidence and suggestions of this research are expected to be 
utilized by these institutions in their future interventions and legislative innova-
tions. 
– Local government units (LGUs) represented by municipal governments and vil-
lage councils, in addition to interested NGOs and POs working at the grassroots 
level, so that they can utilize the results and outputs for the creation of better fo-
rums and spaces for their future interaction, consultation and collaboration. 
Strengthening the participation of civil society in local development planning will 
contribute to: 
– Optimum utilization of the communities’ resources, knowledge and skills, 
– More responsive development decisions to the needs and priorities  of local com-
munities,  
– Better designs and suitable development plans, 
– Community participation that can ensure sustainability, and can help build local 
capacities, 
– Decreasing the gap between planning at national and local level, and 
– Strengthening the decentralization and democratization processes in Palestine. 
4.4 Inductive versus deductive research 
This research is qualitative in nature and makes use of inductive and deductive meth-
ods. Inductive research is characterized by a reasoning process of generalizing from 
facts, instances, or examples. While deductive research is characterized by a reason-
ing process of logical reasoning from stated propositions. Qualitative research is 
phrased as research statements or questions; it implies inductive reasoning to under-
stand a particular situation or historical period. It uses terms like how, what and why. 
17
  
Glaser and Strauss (1967: 103-105) emphasize that analytic induction involves 
generating theory as well as testing theory in a provisional manner. While analytic 
induction is a generative approach, it can be combined with enumerative strategies. 
The analytic induction is particularly useful in the initial phases of research and is not 
limited to a specific variety of analytic unit. Bogdan and Biklen (1982: 65-68) empha-
size that the initial hypotheses in analytic induction are derived from data, particularly 
from initial observation and interviews. Katz (1983:132) emphasizes that several hy-
                                                 
17
  Economic about.com newsletter. Online: http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/ . Re-
trieved on Feb.15th , 2005 
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potheses are held at the beginning of a study and “a mass of hostile evidence” is con-
fronted very early in the analysis. 
In deductive research theorizing comes before research. Research then functions to 
produce empirical evidence to test or refute theories. Inductive is when research 
comes before theory and we seek to generate theoretical propositions on social life 
from our data (May 1999:30) 
 
Figure  4.1: Deductive versus inductive research 
 
Source: William M.K. The web for social research method, online: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/. Re-
trieved on Feb15th , 2005 
In other words, deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more spe-
cific. Sometimes this is informally called a ‘top-down’ approach. We begin with 
thinking up a theory about our topic of interest. We then narrow that down into more 
specific hypotheses that we can test. We narrow down even further when we collect 
observations to address the hypotheses. This ultimately leads us to be able to test the 
hypotheses with specific data – a confirmation (or not) of our original theories. On the 
other hand, inductive reasoning – which is the very nature of this research – works the 
other way, moving from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories. 
Informally, we sometimes call this a ‘bottom up’ approach. In inductive reasoning, 
according to (William 2005), we begin with “specific observations and measures, 
begin to detect patterns and regularities, formulate some tentative hypotheses that we 
can explore, and finally end up developing some general conclusions or theories” 
(William 2005). 
This research makes use of both deductive and inductive reasoning mechanisms 
(but is more inductive in nature). It is partially deductive, since we used theories re-
lated to policy making, institutionalizing and evaluation of participation to form a 
theoretical base and conceptual framework upon which to build our fieldwork. It is 
also deductive, since knowledge gained from theories has been used partially to for-
mulate our hypotheses. Our observations were the other basis used in formulating 
hypotheses, which is a major characteristic of inductive research. Hence, these hy-
potheses – as an inductive reasoning – are going to be explored in view of our practi-
cal findings and not to be tested.  Another aspect of inductivity in this research is that 
it commences with the basic observation regarding the poor access of Palestinian 
NGOs to decision making. From there this observation was extended to a broader 
generalization. 
This research also made use of two research methods in this regard: descriptive and 
causal which constitute what is called conclusive research. Conclusive research, ac-
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cording to (Joppe 2004)18 seeks to provide information that is useful in reaching con-
clusions or decision-making. It relies on both secondary data, particularly existing 
databases that are re-analyzed to shed light on a different problem from the original 
one for which they were constituted. The purpose of conclusive research is to provide 
a reliable or representative picture. According to (Joppe 2004), conclusive research 
can be sub-divided into two major categories: descriptive or statistical research, and 
causal research. Descriptive research can only describe the ‘who, what, when, where 
and how’ of a situation, not what caused it. Therefore, descriptive research is used 
when the objective is to provide a systematic description that is as factual and accu-
rate as possible. It involves gathering information of an existing situation and critical 
inquiry of past events. It provides the number of times something occurs, or fre-
quency, lends itself to statistical calculations such as determining the average number 
of occurrences or central tendencies (Joppe 2004).  One of its major limitations is that 
it cannot help determine what causes a specific behavior, motivation or occurrence. In 
other words, it cannot establish a causal research relationship between variables which 
is a major concern of this research. That is why we also make use of causal research 
which involves the creation of a systematic indicator system to determine which vari-
able might be causing a certain behavior and cause / effect relationship.  In order to 
determine causality, it is important to hold the variable that is assumed to cause the 
other variables to change constant, and then assess the changes in the other variables.  
The best example for this utilizing this causality is our conceptual model which was 
derived at the end of previous chapter.  
4.5 Data Collection and analysis; contents and tools 
Collection of data includes both secondary and primary data. The secondary data 
judged of great importance in this research covered the following: 
– Evolution of local governments and NGOs in Palestine; 
– Legal, organizational, administrative, institutional, and socio-culture structures; 
– Characteristics of the Palestinian local development planning  system and process; 
– Planning laws and regulations; 
– Type and number of civil society organizations (classification and profiling); 
– History and nature of the existing citizen participation process and spaces for 
NGOs involvement in local development planning; 
– Areas of co-operation, roles and functions of each actor; and 
– Existing tools, mechanisms, methods and techniques that are used for participa-
tion. 
The researcher made use of documentation shared by interview respondents, as well 
as reports, books, and data available in municipal libraries, central and local govern-
ment institutions, in addition to newspapers, magazines, universities’ libraries and the 
internet. 
 
There have been also a number of primary data sources which had to be collected 
directly from interviewees in the field. These include the following:  
– Range of actors who play significant role in making local policies and plans;  
                                                 
18
 Ryerson University; Dr. Mario Joppe. Online: www.ryerson.ca. Retrieved on January 26th , 2004 
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– Current status of NGO involvement in local policies and plan formulation and 
implementation; 
– Nature of NGO-local governments relationships; major features, roles, functions 
and activities; 
– Perceptions of NGOs and government organizations about working with each 
other in local development planning , policy making and program implementation; 
– Willingness and capacity of NGOs to participate in local development planning 
and policies process together with their efforts to create new spaces for ordinary 
citizens to participate directly or indirectly in decision making 
– Type and efficiency of spaces created to involve NGOs in development planning; 
– Institutional, procedural and organizational contexts of local development plan-
ning systems and process; 
– Receptiveness of LGUs towards involvement of NGOs in local planning process 
and program implementation; 
– Political will and commitment of government to create enabling environments and 
favorable policies for effective NGOs involvement; 
– Locus of decision making power and willingness to share decision making and 
resources; 
– Whose knowledge counts in making policies; 
– Gender relations in policy spaces; 
– Access of NGOs to government information and operation systems (tax, revenue, 
expenditure and budget); 
– Problems, difficulties and challenges in NGO involvement in policy making as 
perceived by each actor; and 
– Suggestions and recommendations for effective participation as seen by NGOs 
and LGUs. 
The primary data will be collected through three means: key informant (open ended) 
semi-structured interviews, observations and a workshop for focus group discussion: 
– Key informant interviews: A detailed and carefully structured questionnaires was 
developed to be used as a guideline to questions. Since the interview was open, 
the intention was not to follow a strict sequence but rather to ensure that all of re-
quired information was elicited. The nature of interviewees covers a wide range of 
actors involved in local development planning as follows: 
– NGOs: selected based on specific criteria detailed later in this section. The in-
terviews were conducted with director managers of 15 NGOs and CBOs in 
addition to three local neighborhood committees (LNCs) distributed through-
out Gaza and Rafah municipalities. Where the director manager was not avail-
able, the second in charge was interviewed. 
– LGUs: a guiding list of questions was developed to cover two LGUs in Gaza 
Strip, one being Rafah municipality in the south and the other Gaza municipal-
ity in the north. The target interviewees were planning officers and local coun-
cil members in each LGU.  Gaza municipality was selected since it represents 
one of the biggest municipalities not only in the Gaza Strip but in Palestine it-
self. In addition it enjoys the existence of the most developed and biggest 
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NGOs in the area in terms of size and number. Around 60% of total NGOs in 
Gaza Strip are located in Gaza municipality. On the other hand, Rafah munici-
pality is relatively medium LGU located in the extreme south of the Gaza 
Strip, with a limited number of NGOs working in comparison. Only around 
6.7 % of total NGOs in the Gaza Strip are located in Rafah municipality. 
– Central government: the researcher interviewed three target institutions in this 
regard: the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Local Government and Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. The target interviewees were planning officers and people 
in charge. 
– Experts and scholars: Five experts in NGOs and planning who work in variety 
of organizations were interviewed. 
– Workshop for focus group discussion: One workshop was conducted in Deir El 
Balah municipality which is located in the middle of the Gaza Strip.  The atten-
dees at this workshop included representatives of the central state (Ministry of 
Health and Water Authority), various department representatives of the Deir El 
Balah Municipality (health, sanitation and water), the mayor and local council 
members, 22 NGO representatives and a number of ordinary citizens. The main 
purpose for conducting this workshop was to examine attendees’ perspectives, vi-
sions, behavior and attitudes, and to explore ideas and complaints. 
– Observation: a primary method of collecting data. Observation techniques are part 
of qualitative research as well as quantitative research techniques. For the purpose 
of this research, behaviors, attitudes, facilities, and dynamics among people were 
studied.  
As a first step, the researcher began with an inventory, profiling and classification of 
the various NGOs, particularly the more prominent ones existing in the geographical 
areas of study. The typology or classification of the NGOs was based on their princi-
pal concerns, such as welfare, socio-civic and professional, development (rural and 
urban), issue oriented, people and grassroots organizations (women, youth, children, 
farmers, etc) and networks. The Ministry of Interior classifies NGOs according to 
their sector of specialization as follows: charity organizations, rehabilitation, research 
centers, agriculture, human rights, training centers, health, democracy, handicaps, 
friendship associations, youths, art and culture, education, childhood, heritage, society 
development, environment, loaning organizations, woman, housing, religious organi-
zations, press, and economic development. This research has adopted this classifica-
tion in principle. After classification, a number of NGOs were selected according to 
the following criteria: 
– Since many of the NGOs working in Palestine are affiliated with political parties, 
and for the purpose of inclusion, the interviewees were determined to include 
NGOs from various political parties for and against the government, together with 
independent NGOs; 
– Organizational purpose of NGOs should have a social and developmental focus; 
– More prominent and active NGOs of different size: small, medium and large; 
– Covering a wide variety of specializations; 
– Preferably had taken part in partnership or had at some time established some kind 
of co-operation relationship with government in the field of local development; 
– Preferably participated in formulation of local plans and programs (if existing); 
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– Track record of good performance; and 
– Geographical distribution of NGOs (south and north, urban and rural)  
For the purpose of achieving the analysis objectives, and in addition to the systematic 
presentation of data sorting and analyses, several tools were used to process collected 
and sorted data: 
– Stakeholders and interest groups analysis; 
– Power distribution matrix; and 
– SWOT analysis  
These tools will be used because of their simplicity. The participation process will be 
analyzed so as to have a clear idea about facilitating and constraining factors affecting 
NGO involvement in local planning and policy making processes.  
4.6  Challenges and limitations of the fieldwork 
As the first step in the fieldwork, a range of policy actors and institutions are selected 
to be interviewed. From this range of actors, the researcher was able to conduct 29 
interviews to include NGOs, LGUs, key central institutions and experts. The research 
used a semi-structured dialogue as the key research tool, as well as reviewing docu-
mentations shared by the respondents. The checklists and guiding questions were re-
spondent specific, based on the profile of a specific interview. At the same time, they 
were open-ended to ensure opportunities for respondents to make their own analysis. 
However, not all of the purposes of the interviews were met. In addition to limited of 
time and lack of financial resources, the researcher has encountered several challenges 
and difficulties in conducting some of fieldwork activities. These challenges range 
from the severe socio-political upheaval which negatively affected access of the re-
searcher to various geographic areas and hence interviewees in the Gaza Strip, to the 
unwillingness of some interviewees to be open and critical in their views, because of 
concerns about where the information would end up. 
Data collection in the field occurred between mid May and early August 2005. At 
that time the Gaza Strip was continuing under the Israeli occupation and suffering a 
number of severe restrictions on movement. Clashes between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis made transport and movement between various parts of Gaza Strip extremely 
very difficult. On many occasions the Gaza Strip was divided into three or even five 
parts by the Israelis with movement or connection between these parts. Sometimes 
these military closures lasted for several days which affected the access of the re-
searchers to some areas and hence lead to the cancellation of some planned inter-
views. For the same reasons two workshops planned to be conducted in Rafah and 
Gaza Municipalities were cancelled. However, the researcher managed to conduct – 
with the assistance of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights – only one workshop 
in Deir El-balah Governorate in the middle of Gaza Strip. 
Regardless of the very difficult ever-changing political environment, the researcher 
managed to interview 15 NGOs, five experts, several key staff from local and central 
governments. Not all of the interviewees were open or able to be critical. Some were 
very cautious about expressing their views freely while others refused even to record 
their interviews. One of the government members interviewed for example even in-
sisted the discussion not be documented. Due to lack of time of some interviewees, 
some meetings lasted only around 30 minutes, while they were intended to last at least 
  
           
69 
one hour.  This happened with four NGOs, which forced the researcher to raise only 
the most important points out of the prepared guideline questions.  
Some other interviewees were found very open, knowledgeable and willing to talk. 
These included the Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, TADAMON for Social and 
Charity Works, Union of Health Works Committees, TAMER Institute for Commu-
nity Education and the Women's Affairs Technical Committee. Hence, these organi-
zations are taken as key informant interviewees from among the NGOs, and will be 
quoted regularly in the analysis part of this research. In addition, one of the experts 
interviewed (Salah Abd Ela’tey) has shown a great knowledge of NGOs works. He is 
member of four non-governmental organizations and provided the researcher with 
many useful points and insights. He – as an NGO expert – will also be quoted regu-
larly in this research. 
One other important issue that also had an effect on fieldwork methodology was 
that the researcher intended to interview two municipalities intensely as examples of 
LGUs. However, the researcher’s difficulties with free access in the field forced him 
to focus more on Rafah municipality where he was able to stay two working days 
observing and interviewing staff.  This sustained opportunity to get access to 
interviewees and data was not available in Gaza municipality. 
Although the checklist questions were intended to be comprehensive, in use they 
were found to be long and required more time to be fully investigated. In addition, 
some of the questions have lead to similar answers. This has forced the researcher to 
minimize and revise questions regularly transferring the experience learnt from each 
interview to the next.  
In addition to the previously mentioned practical difficulties and challenges, these are 
some other issues which were experienced in the field: 
– In interviewing some NGOs, the researcher found difficulty to separate between 
general talking about NGOs and specific information provided by the interviewee 
regarding his/her own NGO. It was observed that some of interviewees tended to 
talk in general, particularly regarding problems and shortages, shifting the lens 
away from their own organizations. Tendency to talk in general may hide some 
problems of that particular NGO. 
– It was clear to the researcher that some analysis and critical views provided by 
some NGO respondents were based on their political stands. While this revealed 
situations to exist, it raises the question of the extent to which their political views 
affected their analysis.  
– It was very difficult to collect exact data regarding financial issues, either from 
NGOs or governments. This issue – as observed in the field – was treated as a se-
cret which should not to be revealed outside the organization. This might show a 
lack of transparency in these organizations. However, it was possible for the re-
searcher to depend on other sources of data to get this information, such as inde-
pendent research centers and the internet.  
– Some interviews might have gained the impression that there could be opportuni-
ties to raise additional fund by highlighting their lack of resources during the in-
terviews. In order to lower their expectation in this regards, the researcher empha-
sized that the data are only to be used for academic interests.  
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5 Background to the study areas; socio-economic situations 
and profiling of Local NGOs 
This research is based on primary research among civil society groups in two geo-
graphical zones of the Gaza Strip. Civil society groups in Palestine, in this research 
context, refer to a combination of NGOs and local neighborhood committees as iden-
tified at the beginning of this research. The researcher interviewed 15 NGOs and 3 
neighborhood committees distributed between two municipal councils: Rafah munici-
pality in the south of the Gaza  Strip and Gaza municipality in the north.  
5.1 Gaza Strip; Basic facts 
The Gaza Strip is a small area (360 square kilometers) located on the south-western 
edge of the Palestinian territory.  The total population is around 1,370,000, distributed 
in five governorates:  Gaza, Northern, Dayr Alabalah, Khan Yunis and Rafah Gover-
norates.  According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1997)19, the total 
fertility rate is (5.7) in Palestine and population growth is (4.2).   
Figure  5.1: Gaza strip map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics . Online: pcbs.gov.ps. Retrieved on January 15th, 2005 
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Gaza Municipality 
Gaza is the largest Palestinian city and the temporary administrative capital residence 
of the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip. The first local council was 
established in 1893 during the Ottoman period.  According to the Palestinian Partici-
patory Poverty Assessment Report (2002:3), the area of the city is 45 squire kilome-
ters while the area of the whole governorate is squire kilometers. The number of 
inhabitants is about 400,000 people. There are three universities with a total of 28,500 
students. According to the Municipality website20, the gross domestic product per 
capita was 1,763US$ in the year 1997. Gaza city together with El-Shate’ camp and 
Gaza Valley constitute Gaza governorate. The population of Gaza City alone consti-
tutes 81% of the governorate population (Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assess-
ment Project 2002:3). Gaza city is divided into eleven neighborhoods: El-Shaja’e a, 
El-Daraj, El-Tofah, El-Zaytoon, El-Rimal, El-Shyck E’jleen, El-Naser, El-Sabra, El 
Shyck Radwan, El-u’da, and Tal Elhawa. 
Gaza city is considered the administrative, cultural and economic centre of the 
Gaza Strip. It enjoys relatively good infrastructure in terms of sanitation, water and 
electricity and telephone installation. All of main streets are paved while many secon-
dary roads are not. According to the Palestinian Participatory poverty assessment pro-
ject (2002:3), Gaza is characterized by random settlements and uncontrolled urban 
expansion which threatens the agricultural area.  
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1997), the number of 
employed in Gaza was 70, 000 in1997, and women composed only 7%, half of them 
working in the education sector. Around 38% of the total working force is working in 
service sector, 19% in construction, 19% in mining and industry, 6% in trade, 4% in 
agriculture and fishing, while 12% work as laborers in Israel. Although there are sev-
eral cultural centers, libraries and sports centers, the Municipality is seriously lacking 
sufficient to serve the high number of residents ((Palestinian Participatory Poverty 
Assessment Project 2002:4). 
With regard to NGOs operating in Gaza Municipality, there are 414 NGOs with 
126 organizations working in the social and charity sectors, as registered in the Minis-
try of Interior (2005). This number of NGOs operating in Gaza city constitutes more 
than 60% of the total number of NGOs operating in Gaza Strip.   
Rafah Municipality 
Rafah governorate is located in the far south of Gaza Strip with an area of 58.5 squire 
kilometers (Atlas of Gaza Strip 1997:26). The agricultural land of this governorate 
constitutes 30% of the total area (Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment Report 
2002:3). The governorate consists of Rafah City in addition to Rafah Camp and two 
villages; El-Shokah and El-Naser.  The current total population of Rafah according to 
the planning department of the city is 151,000.  Rafah city is divided into twelve 
neighborhood areas.  
The quality of infrastructure is relatively lower than that in Gaza city. The water 
network supplies 84.8% of the city’s households, electricity supplies 89%, while the 
sanitation network supplies only 42% of the total households (according to the Pales-
tinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1997). Some16,500 are employed, of which 8.7% 
are women,  half of whom work in the education sector. Around 37% of the total 
work force is in private business, 33% in government, 3% in international organiza-
                                                 
20
 Municipality of Gaza. Online: http://www.mogaza.org. Retreievd on July 5th, 2005 
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tions, 5.5% with UNRWA, and 0.4% with NGOs. As regards distribution of the work 
force to economic activities: 41% work in service industries,  18% in agriculture and 
fishing, 14% in construction, 11% in trade, 7% in industry, and 6% other monetary 
and economic activities (Palestinian Participatory Poverty Assessment Report 2002:3-
4).. The city is furnished with three government and two UNRWA clinics and two 
government hospitals.  
 With regard to NGOs operating in Rafah, there are 47 NGOs; around 60% of them 
are specialized in social and relief works.  These organizations constitute 6.7% of the 
total NGOs operating in Gaza Strip. While 60 % of the total NGOs are working in 
Gaza city alone. 
5.2 Mapping and classification of the Palestinian NGOs sector in the 
Gaza Strip 
Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have always played a vital role 
in Palestinian society. Since its inception, the NGO sector has been an integral part of 
the Palestinian national movement and its aspiration for a free and sovereign Pales-
tine. Its vitality and dynamism are at the root of the evolution of Palestinian civil soci-
ety, with all its aspects of plurality and diversity. Nevertheless, NGOs have been per-
forming a much-needed job filling the gaps left by the government’s service delivery 
system. According to (Jarar  2005:3), it is believed that the share of the NGO sector in 
service provision covers over 60 % of all health-care services, 80% of all rehabilita-
tion services, and almost 100 % of all preschool education. The same is true of other 
sectors, such as agriculture and water. It is worth noting that the NGO sector employs 
more than 20,000 people working in the different areas, whereas around 150,000 peo-
ple are employed by the government (Jarrar, 2005:3). The crucial role of the NGOs 
has become particularly evident in recent times – since the second Intifada in Septem-
ber of 2000 – especially with regard to the emergency and relief work they have been 
carrying out. NGOs have proven their ability to function in very difficult circum-
stances, with flexibility and a high level of performance. NGOs have been invaluable 
in assuring the provision of essential services to the Palestinian population living un-
der the strict sieges, closures and curfews imposed by the Israeli occupation forces. 
According to the Palestinian Economic Policies Centre21 (MAS 2000 as cited in 
Abdelhady 2002)22, the number of Palestinian NGOs in mid 2000 was 926, distributed 
as follows: 76.6 % in the West Bank and 23.4% in the Gaza Strip. Most (60.2%) of 
the NGOs were located in urban centers23, followed by 29.3% in rural centers and 
                                                 
21 Palestinian Economic Policies Centre; MAS (Ma’had Abhath El Seyasat El eqtesadeya el fa-
lasteeneya- MAS) 
22  As cited in Abdelhady, Ezzat,  (2002),  “The role of the Palestinians NGOs in the current stage, 
Comprehinsive view for Reform Process”, Markaz Beisan lelbohooth wal Inma’, Ramallah (Arabic 
Doc). Online  http://www.cfip.org/arabic/new/fnf/civilsocpaper.htm. Retrieved on April 5th,  2005 
23
  According to (MAS 2004), definition and percentage of urban and rural centres as follow: Urban 
centres (53.1 %): any centre with a population of 10,000 people or more. The definition includes all 
governmental centres, regardless of their size, all centres of 4,000 to 9,999 people, on the condition that 
at least four of the following services are available: a public electricity network,  a public water net-
work,  a post office,  a health centre with a full time physician available all days of the week  and a 
secondary school. Rural centres (31%) :  any centre with less than 4,000 people, and any centre with 
a population of 4,000 to 9,999 but not having available at least four of the above mentioned services. 
Refugee camps (15.9 %): All centres that are called camps and are run by UNRWA. Number of refu-
gees population : 41.4 % 
 
  
           
73 
10.6% in the refugee camps. According to MAS (2000), 37.6% of these NGOs were 
established after 1994, which was the point at which the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
was established. The charity NGOs formed the highest number among all of NGOs 
(40.4%), followed by Youths and sports clubs with 30.4%. The remaining percentages 
(29.2%) were distributed as follows: cultural NGOs (10.2%); aid organizations (4.8 
%); development organizations (4.9%); researching organizations (3.5 %); human 
rights and democracy (2.6%); with 0.5% unclassified.  
According to MAS (2000), the NGOs sector in Palestine in the year 2000 accom-
modated 10,375 paid employees distributed across 573 organizations. The remaining 
organizations were running with unpaid volunteers. The percent of women workers in 
these organizations is higher than men (54.1 %   women and 45.9 % men). The MAS 
(2000) study also points out that there are 64,936 volunteers working with 62.3 % of 
these NGOs.  
According to 2005 figures released by the Ministry of Interior24 (the government 
body responsible of accrediting NGOs), the number of Palestinian NGOs increased 
rapidly between 2000 and 2005, to reach more than 2000 throughout Palestine (West 
Bank and Gaza Strip). There are currently 692 NGOs working in the Gaza Strip 
which constitute around 35% of the total NGOs in Palestine. According to a senior 
official in the Ministry of Interior, almost one third of these NGOs in Gaza are not 
active.  
The Ministry classifies the NGOs in Gaza according to their sectors of specializa-
tion as follows: social services and charity organizations (36.0.0%), culture and arts 
(9.5%), youth and sports (8.4 %), motherhood and childhood (7.3%) , unions, associa-
tions and syndicates (6.0%), medical and health organizations (5.6 %), handicaps and 
rehabilitation (5.1%), agriculture organizations (3.7%), family and tribal organizations 
(3.6%), foreign organizations (3.5%), brotherhood and friendship (3.2%), Islamic 
organizations25 (2.6%), environment (1.5%), graduate  organizations (1.3%), higher 
education (1.0%), education (0.7%), archaeological and tourism (0.7%) and finally  
housing (0.3%) (see table 5.1) 
                                                 
24
 Figures are collected directly during the fieldwork from the department of NGOs in the Ministry of 
Interior, 2005 
25
 They are mainly charity and social organizations. They are considered a main provider for basic 
services and relief activities in the Palestinian society. 
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Table  5.1: Distribution of NGOs in the Gaza Strip according to their sector of specialization 
 
 
Gaza 
Governorate 
Middle 
Governorate 
Khan Younis 
Governorate 
North 
Governorate 
Rafah 
Governorate 
Total 
(number) 
Total % 
Social Services & Charity Organizations 126 34 39 26 24 249 36.0% 
Culture and Arts 38 12 4 7 5 66 9.5 % 
Youth & Sports 34 7 9 6 2 58 8.4 % 
Motherhood & Childhood 23 10 9 5 4 51 7.3 % 
Unions, Associations & Syndicates 39 1 1 -- -- 41 6.0% 
Medical  & Health Organizations 31 1 2 4 1 39 5.6% 
Handicaps and Rehabilitation 17 2 3 7 6 35 5.1% 
Agriculture Organizations 9 3 6 7 1 26 3.7 % 
Family and Tribal Organizations 14 4 1 3 3 25 3.6% 
Foreign Organizations 22 2 -- -- -- 24 3.5 % 
Brotherhood & Friendship 22 -- -- -- -- 22 3.2 % 
Islamic Organizations 12 3 2 1 -- 18 2.6 % 
Environment 5 2 2 -- 1 10 1.5 % 
Graduate Organizations 7 -- 1 1 -- 9 1.3 % 
Higher Education 5 -- 2 -- -- 7 1.0% 
Education 4 -- 1 -- -- 5 0.7% 
Archaeological & Tourism  4 1 -- -- -- 5 0.7% 
Housing 2 -- -- -- -- 2 0.3% 
414 82 82 67 47 692 Total 
60.0 % 11.8% 11.8% 9.7% 6.7% 100% 
100% 
Source: Ministry of Interior; fieldwork 2005 
Governorate 
Sector 
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One major point revealed by the previous table is that charity organizations with a main 
focus on social and relief activities form the highest proportion of Palestinian NGOs ( 
36.0%). If we add the Islamic organizations with the same focus, the percentage in-
creases to 38.5%.  Around 60% of NGOs operating in the Gaza Strip are located in 
Gaza city while only 6.7% are located in Rafah governorate in the far south (See Table 
 5.1: Distribution of NGOs in the Gaza Strip according to their sector of specialization 
It might be useful to compare figures available in MAS (2000) together with those 
collected in the field by the Ministry of Interior in 2005, although these two organiza-
tions have used different classifications and definitions which make direct comparison 
difficult. However, assuming that same definition of social organizations have been 
used in classifying NGOs by both MAS and the Ministry of Interior, we can conclude 
that this sector in particular continues to occupy paramount importance. Both sets of 
figures indicate that around 40% of the total NGOs were engaged in this sector in the 
years 2000 and 2005. 
In the Palestinian context, the category of NGOs includes all non-profit organizations 
with a social or developmental focus and working independently from the government 
(as discussed in chapter three). It is also important to emphasize that this research dealt 
only with registered NGOs. In Palestine an NGO has to be accredited and get a license 
for its establishment through the Ministry of Interior as mentioned before. Fifteen 
NGOs among the ones which are accredited were interviewed in the field, eight located 
in Gaza municipality and seven in Rafah municipality.  The following tables indicate 
name, kind and size of these organizations:   
 
Table  5.2: Interviewed NGOs in Gaza municipality 
Name of interviewed NGO Sector Size 26 
Palestinian NGOs Network                                (PNGON) Network Big 
Women’s Affairs Technical Committee              (WATC) Women Medium 
TAMER Institute for Community Education Education  Medium 
Union of Agricultural Work Committee             (UAWC) Agriculture Big 
The Palestinian Progressive Youth Union Youth Small 
Palestinian Housing council                                   (PHC) Housing Big 
Union of Health Work Committee                        (UHWC)  Health Big 
The Islamic Society                        Social and relief Big 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 The size of the organization has been judged by the researcher based on qualitative assessment of the 
wealth of the organization, resources, number of working staff, its coverage and degree of its involvement 
in social and development works.  
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Table  5.3: Interviewed NGOs in Rafah municipality 
Name of interviewed NGO Sector Size  
TADAMON for Social and Charity Works Social and relief Small 
YABOUS for Social and Charity Works Education Medium 
Islamic Association  Social and relief Big 
General Service Association for Canada Camp  Socio-cultural Small 
El-Amal Association for Handicaps Rehabilitation Handicaps Medium 
The Friends of Martyrs Society Social and relief Small 
World Vision - Area Development Program Development Big 
 
The selected NGOs cover a wide range as possible of the spectrum of specializations, 
including five social and relief, two education and training, and one NGO for each of 
woman, agriculture, children, youth, health and housing (see 2.2).  They also have a 
variety of sizes: small (four NGOs), medium (four NGOs) and large (seven NGOs). In 
the selection process, attempts were made to select those NGOs that had good reputa-
tion and covered a variety of political standpoints together with some independent ones 
(selection criteria are illustrated in section 4.5). 
 
Figure  5.2: Classification of the interviewed 15 NGOs in the field according to sectors 
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Education and training (2 NGOs- 13%)
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Handicaps/children (1 NGO- 6.7 %)
Housing (1 NGO- 6.7 %)
Development (1 NGO- 6.7 %)
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6 Actors, knowledge and space: exploration and analysis 
As discussed in our analytical framework, our understanding of policy planning sug-
gests that it is a complex, dynamic process, rather than a linear progression from formu-
lation to implementation. This process comprises a multiplicity of distinct but linked 
spaces, in which wide range of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, en-
gage in order to influence and shape policy. Each actor brings into a policy space their 
own knowledge about planning. Our analysis is abased on an approach of understanding 
the interplay of the interplay among three conceptual categories (themes) within the 
policy process: actors, knowledge and space. This categorization does not presuppose a 
fine separation between the categories, but they are used as analytical signifiers to help 
us make sense of the processes of policy making as it plays out at the Palestinian local 
level. Before turning to our discussion of these themes, it is be important to point out 
the contextual environment where the interplay of these elements occurs. These factors 
will include legal frameworks and major characteristics of each actor that shape their 
reactions. 
Hence, this research starts by drawing attention to the institutional and legal frame-
works where the interaction between Palestinian NGOs and local governments occurs 
(6.1). In this section we indicate major potentials and limitations that would enable or 
disable the creation of better spaces for the Palestinian NGOs to participate in local 
planning and policy making processes.  By utilizing our conceptual framework, we then 
examine what kind of limitations have deterred the establishment of institutional spaces 
for NGO involvement, taking into account characteristics of Palestinian NGOs (section 
6.2), knowledge of PNGOs (section 6.3), characteristics and practice of local govern-
ment (section 6.4), actors relations, locus of decision making power and receptiveness 
of local governments to NGOs’ involvement (section 6.5). The spaces that are created 
as a result of the interplay of actors, power and knowledge will be pointed out in (sec-
tion 6.6). Finally, key institutional dimensions that are captured through the analysis of 
policy spaces are concluded in (section 6.7).  While the purpose of next chapter will be 
to examine major challenges as captured through analysis, together with lessons learnt 
from the Palestinian experience. 
6.1 Legal policy frameworks for local governments and NGOs; 
enabling and disabling characteristics 
To start discussion of Palestinian legal frameworks, it is important to point out two is-
sues which are also considered as direct observations in this regard: 
– First, the direct legal framework that would be expected to organize relationship 
between NGOs and local governments in field of local development planning 
(which is our focus) does not exist in such a direct form or regulations. The laws 
rather regulate – or may even control as we will discuss later – the work of NGOs 
by the central government. This important distinction is made after in-depth investi-
gations of all laws concerning both local governments and NGOs since 1993. 
– Second, concerning laws that target local governments (local councils laws of 1996 
and 1997), they are more intended to regulate operations of LGUs with respect to 
central government, disregarding regulations that could organize relations with civil 
society organizations.   
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However, we should not forget that Palestine is a new emerging state. The debate con-
cerning the NGO-state relationship is new and continuous discussion among concerned 
actors is still in progress.  A series of conflicts have beset the NGO-government rela-
tionship post-Oslo (1993). According to Rema Hamari (2000:18)27, the following issues 
characterize these conflicts: 
– Political legitimacy: some highly vocal NGOs are acting as the political alternative 
to the PNA. In addition many NGOs are questioning the authority and legitimacy of 
the new government sector to regulate their activities. 
– Government/NGO overlap and competition: a number of local NGOs (usually in 
service and development) had evolved in ways specifically to meet the absence of 
state services in specific sectors. As such, some health and agricultural extension 
NGOs have huge capacity and are seen as undermining the formation and growth of 
the relevant ministries. 
– Conflicts of representation and autonomy: sectors of the Palestinian National Au-
thority (PNA) find the existence of an independent NGO infrastructure alarming - 
especially as the latter has begun to mobilize to protect their rights. This has resulted 
in raising additional conflicts, particularly where these NGOs continue to perform 
functions like development of refugee camps, human rights, democracy, etc, where 
– as thought by government sectors – that would undermine their emerging role. 
Having said that, and under these circumstances, this section will analyze separately the 
frameworks that target local governments (particularly the local council elections law of 
1996 and local body law of 1997) and the laws that target NGOs (1995 and 2000 NGOs 
laws). These laws will be analyzed to find out how they could negatively or positively 
affect the potential to create spaces to involve NGOs in local planning and policy mak-
ing. To this extent, we will point out major characteristics of the newly established local 
government system after the arrival of PNA. We will explore the effect of new legisla-
tions and practices, particularly in the work of local councils and NGOs. We will ana-
lyze the newly enacted laws in regard to local elections and local bodies, and show how 
they could influence participation of organized groups of civil society in local planning. 
In 1993 the Israelis and the Palestinians signed a peace agreement as a way of estab-
lishing a new independent Palestinian State. Palestinians began for the first time in his-
tory to plan for themselves and rule their own affairs. As was discussed in chapter two, 
Palestinians inherited non-effective operating systems from the previous periods. The 
legal frameworks of local governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consisted of a 
combination of Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Egyptian legislations, in addition to the 
military decrees of the Israeli occupation. The formulation of a new local election code 
by the PNA in 1996 and 1997 provided an opportunity to break out of the traditional 
centrally dominated structure and unify the legal system in Palestine. 
The local government system in Palestine is responsible for supplying the main utili-
ties (water and electricity supply, waste collection, road surfacing, and so on). When 
Palestinian Authority took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994, it had to 
deal with pre-existing local government institutions dominated by socially prominent 
families.   Revision of this situation and promotion of the prerequisites for an effective 
and widely representative system of local government were among its first priorities.  
 
                                                 
27
 Reema Hamari, Civil society and governance in Palestine. See online:  
http://nt1.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/docs/Palestine.doc Retrieved in July 9th, 2006 
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Among these prerequisites were legal structures and therefore the PA was asked to 
reconstitute the laws and regulations which had historically governed the local govern-
ment system.  However, the PA, out of concern to avoid a possible legal vacuum did not 
make any immediate fundamental changes in the legal status quo. On 20 May 1994, 
accordingly, the then President Arafat issued his presidential decree number one, in 
which he declared all the laws and regulations of the pre-Israeli occupation period 
would continue to be in force and enacted (Al Waqaea’, 1994: No.1).  The decision im-
plied keeping working to the 1934 municipal law as far as the Gaza Strip municipalities 
was concerned, and the 1955 municipal law for the West Bank municipalities. As we 
have mentioned before in chapter two, these two laws confer sweeping powers in the 
hand of the rulers, including the appointment of mayors and councilors. Having taken 
the benefit of this power, President Arafat made the first appointment for a municipal 
council in the post-Oslo era, specifically on 26 July 1994 for the Gaza city municipal 
council.  On 24 September 1994, he vested his authority over the local government in-
stitutions in the newly emerging Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), coinciding 
with ratification of the Law no. 1 for the year 1994. The new law brought all the issues 
related to local government institutions under the ministry’s control and responsibility. 
Therefore, the MOLG became the official body responsible for any issue related to local 
government institutions, including the initiation of regulations and laws governing these 
institutions. Nevertheless, the ministry – in accordance with this presidential decree 
which reverted to pre-Israeli laws – lacked the legal right to advance any legislation 
with relation to local government institutions other than the 1934 municipal law for the 
Gaza Strip, and the 1955 municipal law for the West Bank.  
In 1991, towards the end of the Israeli period and three years before the establish-
ment of the PA, the number of local councils in the Palestinian territories was 30, with 
four of them located in Gaza Strip. According to Abd Ela’tey (2005:30), the number of 
local councils increased rapidly to reach 108 municipal councils and 334 rural councils 
by end of 2002. Following the establishment of the PNA in 1994, the “Law of Elections 
of Local Government Units” was enacted28 on December 16, 1996. The aim of this law 
was to determine the organization and rules of local elections in the Palestinian local 
government units. It was prepared in co-ordination with local Palestinian and interna-
tional experts in the field of elections. This law was followed by another law in 1997 
concerning local bodies and council functions and responsibilities. Major features and 
aspects covered by these two laws are discussed below.  
Local councils election law of (1996): strengthening representative governance; 
potentials and limitations 
In 1996, the Palestinian Legislation Council (PLC) approved the local election law. The 
law set up the voting and nomination system for local council elections. Article (3) of 
the law empowered the minister of local government with rights to call for free and 
direct elections for the mayors and councilors. The mayors and councilors were to be 
elected for a period not exceeding four years (Article 51, 53). Article (4) enabled the 
minister of local government to postpone the local elections for a period not exceeding 
two weeks if this was to serve the public interest and electoral transparency. Article (8) 
expanded the electoral base of these councils by enabling every Palestinian aged 18 or 
over (male and female) and living in the municipality’s functional jurisdiction to vote in 
                                                 
28 The full text of the law cited in Al Waqaea’. The formal gazette of PA, No. 16, 4th year, 30/1/1997. 
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the municipal elections even if he/she did not enjoy tax-paying qualifications, as previ-
ously required.  
As far as those who wished to run for elections were concerned, article (24) enabled 
every Palestinian aged 30 or over and with tax-paying qualifications to run for the may-
oralty, and every Palestinian aged 25 or over with tax-paying qualification to run for the 
council’s membership. The law also laid down the procedure to be followed when there 
was a vacancy in the local council. Article (55) provides for new elections for the may-
oralty in case of the mayor’s departure or resignation. The election was to be public and 
direct, and held within one month of the date of the mayor’s departure or resignation. 
During this month, the deputy would take over the mayoralty. In case of a councilor 
departure or resignation, the one who won the highest number of votes among those 
who won the council seats would occupy the vacancy. But when more than half of 
council posts were vacant, a direct and public election would be held for the all council 
seats (Article 56). 
We can see that this law concerns regulation of direct representation of local com-
munities in local councils. It is intended to strengthen representative governance within 
the local government system, while recognizing the weaknesses and disadvantages of 
the appointment of local councils. Although this law was approved in 1996, it took an-
other ten years for the first local elections to be held in Palestine, at the end of 2004. 
What kind of potential and limitation does this particular law have with regard to 
strengthening general participation and involvement of NGOs in local planning?    
Potentials of the election law (1996) 
– The Law clarified a general organizational and procedural framework for local 
council elections. It arranged and ensured a direct, open and democratic process of 
nomination and election. It clarified the election procedures, specifically for elec-
tions and nominations, election campaigns, ballots and counting, vacancies and con-
tested results. 
– It opened the door for widening political participation for different parties. 
– It widens the electoral base to include every male and female of 18 years old or 
above.  
– It ensured a quota for women in the council (two members at least must be in-
cluded), which will ensure good representation for women in the local councils. 
Women may participate as nominees for councils’ membership or heads for the first 
time. 
– The council chairman cannot be elected for two successive periods.  
– In general, the law in itself would break the previously centralized systems and ap-
pointment policies for councils’ members and mayors. 
Limitations of the election law (1996) 
– There is still an ambiguous relationship between LGUs and the central authority. 
The law, it should be admitted, is considered as a significant step forward as far the 
electoral base of these councils are concerned. Nevertheless, the law lacks any clari-
fication concerning the functional jurisdictions and relations of these councils with 
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the central authority (i.e. the MOLG). To remedy this deficit, President Arafat rati-
fied the law of local government institutions on 12 October 1997.29  
– The election law of (1996) did not clarify the relationship of LGUs with civil soci-
ety in general and NGOs in particular. It was supposedly to give central government 
institutions (like the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Local Government) a role 
in issuing supporting codes and standards, in order to support and clarify the law re-
garding involvement of NGOs in planning processes and local governance. Unfor-
tunately this has not happened, which has created major legal ambiguity in this re-
gard. The law concentrates more on the procedural issues of local elections, and has 
left many other areas ambiguous, including the policy making domain, and relation-
ships with central government and civil society.  
– The law did not specify any exact date for conducting elections and left such deci-
sions to the president or minister of local government. Proposed dates were post-
poned till end of 2004, usually justified by the need to wait for clarification of the 
broader political context.  
– The monitoring of local council tasks was left to the ministry of local government 
without any involvement of civil society factions to practice their envisioned roles 
as watch dogs for local council operations and performance. There is also an ab-
sence of clarification that could specify the access of local communities to local de-
cision makers and how they could monitor or approach local councils. 
– The Palestinian Election Law of 1996 stated that the mayor would be elected di-
rectly by the people (Article 51). However, in the year 2000, the central authority 
sought to amend the law and to determine that the mayor would be elected from 
among elected local council members, thus moving from a proposed system of di-
rectly elected mayors to a system of council-elected mayors. The justification of the 
central authority for this proposed change has been to avoid the waiving of qualifi-
cations from attending the municipal council. In other words, if 15 persons nominate 
themselves for the position of mayor, only one would be elected and the other 14 
would be waived, while in the proposed amended law all the fifteen would be 
elected and would choose the mayor from among themselves. Another motivation 
perhaps, is that council-elected mayors tend to be weaker than directly elected may-
ors, and thus present a reduced risk of forming an effective opposition to the central 
government authority.  
Palestinian local bodies law of (1997); transferring more powers to LGUs  
The Local Government Law of 1997 provides the basic legal framework for the devel-
opment of municipal and village councils. It describes how local government is to be 
managed under elected councils, the functions and responsibilities of local councils, 
relative responsibilities of central and local government, and auditing and regulatory 
details. This law would be operable only after the holding of elections for these coun-
cils. This law was approved by the Legislative Council in 1997.  The term local body in 
this law refers to local government unit or councils. The main features of this law are as 
follows: 
                                                 
29
 The full text of the law is cited in Al Waqaea’. The formal gazette of PA, No. 20, 4th year, 29/11/1997. 
This law will be discussed in detail in the following sub-section 
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– The MOLG relation with local bodies: According to provisions of this law, the min-
istry shall perform: public policy for Palestinian local bodies and councils and su-
pervise functions and duties of such bodies, plan public projects, balance sheet ac-
tivities, financial, administrative and legal supervision and procedures for forming 
councils, technical and administrative activities pertaining to regional planning in 
Palestine, and systems and regulations necessary to implement duties stipulated in 
the preceding articles or according to provisions of law (Article 2).  
– Council sessions: The council shall convene an ordinary meeting at least once a 
week. The council may allow any one to attend meetings and discuss a topic upon 
approval of two-thirds of members present, but decisions shall be taken in presence 
of members only. Decisions and proceedings of the council shall be set down in 
writing in a special fixed paper journal that shall be signed by the chairman and pre-
sent members. Decisions of the council shall be taken unanimously or on a majority 
of votes. The council may form committees of its members for a certain purpose to 
handle any presented matter; recommendations of such committees shall not be in 
force unless approved by the council (Article (8)). Article (9) states that the council 
term of office shall be four years, which starts as soon as the council takes over du-
ties.  
– Duties and powers of the council: As described in article (15), a council may issue 
executive systems and legislation necessary to plan activities and ensure interests 
and needs such as: town and streets planning, building and construction licenses, 
water, electricity, sewage, markets, cleanliness, public health, public stores, parks,  
cultural and athletic institutions, land, and managing funds and properties of the lo-
cal body.  
– Financial Affairs30 are classified according to: 
– Loans:  A local body council may not borrow funds from any authority except 
after the MOLG approval (Article 21).  
– Revenues: According to article (22), revenues of a local body shall be from: 
taxes, fees, imposed funds or by provisions of this law or any system issued ac-
cording to this law or any system that stipulates collection of taxes, fees or viola-
tions fines for local bodies, donations (contributions and subsidies approved by 
the council) and any proportion allocated by the executive authority to a local 
body.  
– Buildings and lands tax: This tax shall be collected according to provisions of 
buildings and lands law within the local body’s borders, such as: assessment, re-
view, collection, exemptions and fines according to the laws and systems in 
force. (Article 22). 
– Auction Fees: A local body shall obtain a fee ratio of three percent of the sale 
value from movable property buyers, sold at an auction within the vicinity of a 
local body. (Article 24). 
– Transportation fees and charges: Local bodies shall be allocated fifty percent of 
transportation fees and charges according to transportation law within the vicin-
ity of a local body; they shall be from vehicles licenses, tickets and others. (Arti-
cle 25). 
                                                 
30
 Discussion of local government financing and budgeting in this part concerns only legal provisions. 
However, the implementation gaps are discussed in local governance practice in sections (6.4).  
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– Revenues distribution: according to article 26, revenues of local bodies collected 
by the executive authority shall be distributed as follows:  First, revenues col-
lected by the executive authority shall be entered on behalf of local bodies as a 
deposit at the Ministry of Finance. Second, outcome of such revenue shall be 
distributed with a ratio not less than 50% to local bodies where the revenues 
were collected; the remaining part shall be distributed according to the propor-
tions the cabinet shall state, according to a recommendation by the minister, in 
the light of the following considerations for allocation per local body: (a) num-
ber of inhabitants, (b) its contribution in revenues, (c) if it has a significant 
status, (d) if it undertakes non-local responsibilities, (e) basic needs according to 
certified developmental plans by the ministry  and (f) the cabinet may allocate, 
according to a recommendation by the minister, a portion of the revenues as fi-
nancial assistance to councils and common services councils to enable them 
execute significant projects.  
– Fund: The local body fund shall consist of total monies collected on its behalf or 
devolved according to provisions of this law or any other legislation. Expenses 
and expenditures stated by the council shall be paid from the fund. (Article 30). 
– Budget: A local body shall set an annual balance sheet that shall take effect upon 
approval by the council and the minister; annexes may be attached, in the same 
manner. Annual balance sheet shall have to be submitted during the last four 
months, two months prior the new fiscal year. Expenses shall not  exceed alloca-
tions of the precedent balance till the new budget is signed (Article 31) 
– Closing account: The chairman shall submit a closing account, two months prior 
ending of the fiscal year and deliver to the MOLG for certification, after being 
approved by the council (Article 32). 
– Supervision: Checking of the local body’s accounts, examination of all its finan-
cial, administrative and legal formalities and inventory of assets by specialist 
auditors assigned by the MOLG or administrative and financial supervision de-
partment (Article 35) 
– Annual report: The chairman shall have an annual report of local body activities; 
a copy shall be delivered to the MOLG, in addition to the council’s remarks (Ar-
ticle 36).  
Potentials of the local bodies law (1997) 
– The law of 1997 provides the basic legal framework for the development of munici-
pal and village councils. It describes how local government is to be managed under 
elected councils, the functions and responsibilities of local councils, relative respon-
sibilities of central and local, and auditing and regulatory details. 
– The law has tried to fill the gap – though they are very primitive efforts – in the 
ambiguous relationship between local and central government particularly with rela-
tion to the ministry of local government. 
– It has arranged the procedural framework for conducting of the councils’ tasks. 
– It envisages more delegation of administrative power to the councils. 
– It increases the resource base for local councils and delegates more financial power 
to them in terms of central allocations of revenues and would enable them to take 
part (although partially) in collection of fees and taxes. 
  
           
84 
– The law sets up some of the accountability and transparency measures but only 
when it comes to the monitoring and supervision of the MOLG of the LGU ex-
penses and budgeting, and not in the core functions, performance and tasks of the 
councils. Needless to say that civil society has been deprived any legal power to 
make LGUs accountable to citizens’ needs. 
Limitations  of the local bodies law (1997) 
– One can first notice that the name of the law is Local Bodies Law and not Local 
Government Law. Indeed, the central government officials used to consider local 
units as an extension administration and as subordinate units for the central govern-
ment and not as autonomous government units. 
– The law was mainly formulated by experts and central government officials with no 
input or feedback from local units. This indicates the central way of thinking and the 
limited access of local officials to central decision making. 
– There is no clear delineation between the tasks of the councils as a body responsible 
for policy set up and the mayor as a president of the executive branch of the council. 
– The law limits the power of LGUs to generate more financial resources from out-
side, which contradicts the statements made by senior government officials about 
the intention to create a more decentralized system and to create more space for 
LGUs to generate additional funds. 
– It is also clear that more power is conferred to the MOLG. A careful study of the 
law shows that it confers sweeping powers on the MOLG, whilst simultaneously 
limiting the functional jurisdiction of the local councils to delivery of certain ser-
vices.  Article 2, for example, empowers the ministry with the right to lay down the 
overall policy of these councils. It also empowers it with total control of regional 
planning and the setting of regulations. Article 4 goes further and enables the minis-
try to recommend the jurisdictions, formation, and structure of these councils to the 
Cabinet’s approval/disapproval. The same article enables the MOLG to ap-
prove/disapprove the abolishment, annexation, separation, and the expansion of the 
functional jurisdiction of any council. The powers of the ministry over these coun-
cils extends further to include the approval of these councils’ annual budgets (Art. 
31); the approval of the by-laws, taxes (including property tax), fees, and discounts 
(Art. 15, B); the approval of the loans of these councils (Art. 21); the approval of 
any cancellation, reduction or alteration in the fees and taxes imposed by these 
councils (Art. 28); the approval of any council’s deviation from the prescribed an-
nual budget (Art. 31); and the approval of the selling, yielding, or mortgaging of 
immovable property for a period exceeding three years (Art. 20). Furthermore, the 
ministry enjoys powers to approve/disapprove the council’s decision of dismissing 
any of the council members (Art. 13). The powers of the ministry cover the coun-
cil’s staffing, including its right to set up procedures for recruiting, promoting, pun-
ishing, and dismissing the council’s employees (Art. 19).  While the law enables the 
ministry to practice sweeping powers and authorities over these councils, it is limit-
ing the functional jurisdictions of these councils to very few civil domains such as: 
town and road planning, regulation the construction of buildings and some other 
spatial domains (Art. 15, A).  Though the law enables local councils to perform 
these functions, it denies them any right to perform functions in other important civil 
domains like, for example, regional planning. This function is performed by the 
MOLG itself (Article 2) in coordination with other ministries concerned such as the 
Ministry of Planning and other sectoral ministries. Additionally, health and educa-
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tion are almost all controlled by the central government represented by ministries of 
health and education. 
– The central government delegates the collection of fees and taxes to the LGUs al-
though 50% has to go the central government (Art.26). In addition, the LGU will 
obtain only 3% of the auction fees sold within the vicinity of the local body 
(Art.24), and determining the fees and tax rate still needs approval from the MOLG 
(Art 28). The law does not specify any relation to be established between budgeting 
plans and developmental plans and only asks for a need to formulate a one year 
budget sheet (Art31). Articles (33, 34, 35) go even further and gave the MOLG total 
supervision over the financial system of the LGUs. Hence, the LGUs have limited 
space to be more creative and active in generating additional financial resources to 
support their activities.  
– More importantly, the law does not specify any kind of institutive relationship be-
tween local councils and NGOs perpetuating legal ambiguity in this area. 
Indeed, one can not discuss these legal frameworks in isolation from the previous old 
legal frameworks (see chapter two). The Palestinian planning system was characterized 
by a centralized pattern of planning throughout, and especially during the British man-
date, Jordanian and Egyptian administrations and subsequent Israeli occupation. In all 
periods, decision making powers were held in the hands of the central authorities. In 
discussion of previous legal frameworks in chapter two, it was shown that all of the 
regimes that ruled Palestine tended to tighten their control over local government opera-
tions. Most of planning system arrangements were imposed from above without any 
groundswell of popular demand, and moreover were overly inspired by prevalent inter-
national discourses and tendencies to the neglect of home-grown discourses. 
Hence, having discussed legal frameworks that regulate local governments, their ma-
jor characteristics, limitations and potentials, one major observation is that these frame-
works either deliberately or accidentally omitted to provide legal definition for the rela-
tionship between LGUs and NGOs in local planning and policy making. The next sec-
tion will explore regulations that specifically target the NGOs in the Palestinian context, 
and how they indirectly impact on NGO performance and interactions with local gov-
ernments at the local level.   
Towards legal definition of NGO-state relations; dispute and confrontation  
The responsibility of the Palestinian NGO sector in the provision of services as well as 
in the overall development process has been steadily growing since the first Intifada 
(popular uprising) in 1987. With the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) in 1994, substantial changes occurred in the political and socioeconomic context 
in which the Palestinian NGOs had been operating, leading them to revise their strate-
gies and redefine their role (Jarrar, 2005:3). Since then, the relationship between the 
NGO sector and the government has been volatile and unstable, and NGOs have had to 
operate within an ambiguous legal framework which has left them vulnerable to politi-
cal pressure or changes. 
According to Hammami (2000) and Brown (2003) as cited in Al Shouli (2006:31), 
the first confrontation between the Palestinian NGOs and the PNA was in 1995 as they 
disputed over the legal framework governing the work of NGOs. The PNA required that 
all existing NGOs, regardless of whether they had been already registered with Israel, 
Jordan, or Egypt, renew their registrations with the PNA. Failure to register would re-
sult in cancellation of the registration. The most prominent NGOs refused to register 
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leading the PNA to assert more direct control by establishing a ‘Draft NGO Law’ in 
1995. The battle ended years later with the two parties reaching a compromise, yet the 
relationship has remained guarded (Al Shouli 2006:31).  
As mentioned above, the confrontation began as the PNA started drafting the NGO 
law in 1995. The first Draft was created by the Ministry of Social Affairs with some co-
operation from the Ministry of Justice without consulting the NGO community and 
moreover, ignoring a working paper prepared by the Palestinian NGOs Network that 
outlined a proposal for regulating the NGOs and creating legislation (Sullivan, 1996 as 
cited in Al Shouli 2006:32). The draft of the 1995 law not only required NGOs to regis-
ter with the Ministry of Social Affairs, but also to obtain a license from the Ministry of 
Interior and official permission to receive foreign funds. These two issues in particular - 
according to my view- were the core axes of disputes. As revealed by the representative 
of Palestinian NGOs Network in the field:  
 
“the government tries to impose more control over the NGOs’ works. The government 
doesn’t have a clear understanding of the importance of the NGOs’ role in develop-
ment. Instead of working to have a complementary relationship as we used to advocate 
through our network, the government has added additional restrictions. Getting li-
censes from the Ministry of Interior is not acceptable. We are working to change this 
to the Ministry of Justice only”  
Sources: Interview with director of PNGOs Network in Gaza, 2005 
 
As it is well known in Palestine, the Ministry of Interior has a military and intelligence 
nature. Empowering it to provide licenses would seem to indicate the suspicious and 
mistrustful attitude of the state towards NGOs, and its impulse strictly to monitor and 
regulate NGO work. 
The Palestinian NGOs were also disturbed with the constraining regulations that the law 
of 1995 imposed on them, and for it being drafted without any input or representation 
from them. Another problem as seen by the Palestinian NGOs network was the inten-
tion of the law to restrict the flow of donors’ funds to the NGOs, whereas the role of 
donors has been totally appreciated by many NGOs that are interviewed in the field: 
 
“Donors play a positive role in strengthening NGOs. They provide sufficient funds for 
NGOs on one hand and can help in applying additional pressure over the state for more 
democratic actions. Their assistance to NGOs should not be restricted  ”  
Sources: Interview with director of PNGOs Network  in Gaza, 2005 
 
The Palestinian NGOs, according to Brown (2003 as cited in Al Shouli 2006:32), feared 
that the 1995 law would “alienate donors and inhibit badly needed NGOs” (Brown, 
2003:155). Led by the Palestinian NGOs network, NGOs started lobbying against the 
law of 1995 both domestically and internationally. The PNA claimed that the drafted 
law was created to help the NGOs and regulate their work. However, the Palestinian 
NGOs network complained that: 
 
“..the law was drafted by only three men within the PNA and without consulting the NGOs” 
Sources: Interview with director of PNGOs Network in Gaza, 2005 
 
  
           
87 
The lobbying campaigns led by the Palestinian NGOs Network together with the Char-
ity NGOs Union, created domestic and international pressure on the PNA to amend the 
law31. Under this pressure, the PNA promised a second draft which would work on some 
of the issues of conflict such as registration and flow of donor funds. 
Concurrently, according to the Palestinian NGOs Network, the NGOs Network decided 
to work on its own draft, based on the same outline as the PNA draft of 1995. The Pal-
estinian NGOs Network’s draft was more coherent and suggested the following:  
– NGOs would register rather than apply for a license,  
– NGOs would register with the Ministry of Justice rather than the Ministry of Inte-
rior, and  
– They would be required to report funding rather than ask permission to receive for-
eign funds. 
Both drafts – once slightly modified by the PNA – were presented to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) which was elected in 1996. The issue that remained debat-
able in the law was that of registration. The Palestinian NGOs insisted to register with 
the Ministry of Justice and started heavily lobbying deputies in the PLC, whereas the 
PNA insisted they register with the Ministry of Interior. The battle over the law contin-
ued until 1999 when the Palestinian NGOs found it they had no other choice but to ac-
cept the law since it was largely drafted by them. However, it still required they register 
with the Ministry of Interior. The NGO law was endorsed by President Arafat in 1999 
and then adopted by the PLC in 2000. The law became the sole legal reference for Pal-
estinian civil society organizations and was called “The Law of Charitable Associations 
and Community Organizations”. 
In spite of theoretically adopting this law, the facts on the ground were more compli-
cated.  As for NGOs gains in the law of 2000, Palestine’s NGO law places virtually no 
limitations on the rights of an NGO. NGOs are free to raise funds from foreign and do-
mestic sources. The law also encourages the formation of NGOs by providing several 
economic incentives, including an exemption from tax and customs duties (Art 14). 
Finally, any actions taken against an association by the Ministry of Interior can be ap-
pealed in court (Art 38).  
In many ways, law of 2000 is an ideal NGO law. But as Nathan Brown puts it, “Pal-
estine is, in short, a model democracy. Its most significant flaw is that it does not ex-
ist.”32 (Brown 2005:3). The tragedy of Palestine is that on paper it has many of the insti-
tutions and procedures of a democratic sovereign state, but in reality it remains caught 
between the Intifada, crippling unemployment and insecurity, and Israeli occupation. 
Palestine is almost a photographic negative of its Arab neighbors: whereas most Arab 
states have overwhelmingly dominant state institutions but no democracy, Palestinians 
are well-versed in the methods and procedures of democracy, but their institutions have 
not been able to take root “in the midst of one of the world’s most intractable conflicts.” 
(Brawn 2005:103), Thus, as with many Palestinian laws, the civil society statute is on 
paper very close to a model of good governance; but the practical realities of life in the 
highly unstable, occupied country make it difficult to ascertain just how relevant the law 
actually is. 
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 see website of Palestinian NGOs Network: www.pngo.org Retrieved on October 16th, 2005 
32
 Nathan Brown, Evaluating Palestinian Reform, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Democ-
racy and Rule of Law Project, Number 59, June 2005, p. 3 
Online:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP59.brown.FINAL.pdf. Retrieved on July 8th, 2006 
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According to a study of ‘The legal and administrative procedures of registration of 
charitable organizations’ conducted by TAMKEEN (NGO), there were several practical 
problems with the registration process (as cited in Al Shouli  2006:33). First, overlap of 
administrative authority between various ministries, since NGOs were not only required 
to register with the ministry of interior, but also with the ministry of competence33. For 
example, health NGOs are also required to register with the ministry of health. This 
caused problems since there is a 60 day time frame specified by the law in which NGOs 
must complete their registration. In many cases, the competent ministry would not re-
spond in time to the ministry of interior with regards to approving a certain NGO, which 
would result in not granting a registration certificate for that NGO. Also, the competent 
ministries often rejected certain NGOs which led to the decline of registration applica-
tion.  (Qatamish, 2003 as cited in Al Shouli  2006:33 ). 
Another problem with registration was requests for unwarranted documents. These 
were usually made at the end of the 60 day period leading to setting the clock again for 
another deadline for the application. According to the TAMKEEN report, this resulted 
in having some NGOs wait for approval for registration for over a year and a half. Other 
problems according to the TAMKEEN report (2003 as cited in Al Shouli 2006:34), 
include political background checks on founders and board members especially in Gaza, 
lack of awareness of legal procedures, and lack of professionalism on the PNA’s side 
which resulted in giving negative or positive responses based on personal feelings of 
PNA officials towards an NGO or its leaders. More problems included delayed adjust-
ment of status which meant the NGOs must dissolve themselves and start all over while 
awaiting the PNA’s approval. This forced many well established NGOs to work outside 
the law for years while waiting for the PNA to register them. The researcher himself 
was able to count more than 70 NGOs working in Rafah municipality while only 47 
were found registered with the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, according to a 
senior official in the Ministry of Interior: 
 
“monitoring of NGO work and registration by the ministry of interior would contribute 
to better performance of these NGOs and to minimizing their misuse of funds. In the 
last three years, 183 NGOs were dissolved because they were found not active. Some of 
them were headed by military persons, which violates the law” 
Source: Interview with director general of NGOs department in ministry of interior, 2005 
In the case of rejection of the application for NGO registration, the Ministry of Interior 
has to explain why (in writing), and the NGOs can appeal in the court (Art 4 in the 2000 
law). According to the director general of the NGO department in the Ministry of Inte-
rior:  
 
“rejection of a license application must be made in writing and must specify the reasons. 
Our reasons are mainly related to whether papers requested with the application are 
complete or not”  
Source: Interview with general director of NGOs department in ministry of interior,2005 
However, according to the researcher’s observation, the statute does not stipulate the 
grounds on which an application can be rejected, which is a shortcoming. An applicant 
has the right to contest a rejection in a court, but it is unclear upon what grounds a court 
would reverse rejection by the Ministry of Interior.  
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 According to TAMKEEN report, the competence ministry is one that has to do with the activities of a par-
ticular organization such as health, education, environment..etc. 
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Indeed, the department in charge of registration in the Ministry of Interior in Gaza con-
sists only of four personnel. It is overloaded by work and cannot, by its limitations of 
structure, to do all of the work referred to it. This problem is recognized by the director 
of this department himself who stated: 
 
“We don’t have enough staff in our department. Hiring of additional skilled staff is 
complex due to limited state resources?” 
Source: Interview with general director of NGOs department in Ministry of Interior,2005 
 
In general, according to the researcher’s view, these problems confirm that the PNA is 
not serious in its attempts to regulate the work of the NGOs, but rather in governing 
NGOs and their entire activities by law. Also, these problems have shown that there is 
not a clear authority responsible for following up on the applications; also, there are no 
clear criteria for requesting additional information. Most of these problems seem in-
tended to hinder the work of NGOs, exerting pressure and obstructing their operations. 
More importantly, one can easily observe the discourse and debates between the Pal-
estinian NGOs and the state are focusing on registration (which ministry to register 
with) and licensing of donors’ funds (whether the NGOs has to get permission from the 
government to receive donors funds). The debate is still far from establishing a com-
plementary relationship between these two important actors in the field of development 
planning. Meanwhile it is just like a battle; with the state trying to impose more control 
while the NGOs struggle for their independence.  As will be shown later in this re-
search, competency over resources might be the leading factor emerging in this dispute. 
So to conclude, the direct laws target NGOs in Palestine, trying to regulate the estab-
lishment of NGOs and monitor their expenses. On the other hand, as in the case of the 
local government law, it lacks again any legal definition of what should be the role of 
NGOs in local governance or how to regulate both governments and NGO efforts in 
local planning and policy making.  
Having discussed current legal frameworks that tackled both LGUs and NGOs, we 
turn to explore practices of both actors on the ground at the local level. We will explain 
how the NGOs characteristics together with their knowledge would affect negatively or 
positively the potentials to create proper spaces for them where they can have an influ-
ence on local development planning and policy making, so as to hold local governments 
more accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs. 
6.2 Major characteristics of NGOs; implications on their motivation 
to participate in local planning 
 
In order systematically to investigate how NGO knowledge shapes policy spaces (sec-
tion 6.3), we begin by exploring the most important characteristics of the local Palestin-
ian NGOs that would impact on their knowledge, and hence, affect their motivation to 
create new spaces and their degree of involvement in policy making.  
The Palestinian NGO sector – in general – is often considered to be nearer to local 
communities than the state.  This phenomenon can be easily observed during the years 
of second Intifada (2000-2005), when the NGOs proved their capacity to reach the poor 
and families affected by the Israeli occupation’s aggressive measures more quickly than 
the government, supplying them with basic services and relief. The understanding of the 
characteristics of NGOs in terms of structure, ways of establishment, their focus and the 
  
           
90 
nature of activities implemented, and the representation of NGOs within local commu-
nities, is believed to pave the way for a better understanding of the environment where 
dialogue between NGOs and LGUs occurs. 
Structure of the Palestinian NGOs 
Talking about structure does not mean elaborating each individual NGO’s structure, 
which of course might differ from one NGO to another. It is rather a searching out of 
common structural features as observed in the field, which could have impact on NGOs 
potential to participate in policy making and local planning. 
 In general, and as revealed by the fieldwork interviews with 15 NGOs and the 
documents shared by them, the general structure of NGO is composed of four structural 
entities: the general assembly (or ordinary membership), a board of directors (or trus-
tees), a director general (or manager or chair) and administration units. The general 
assembly has to meet once a year to review and monitor the operation of the NGO, its 
budgeting and expenditure. Every two years, the general assembly and through democ-
ratic elections, will select new board of directors to oversee and operate the NGO. The 
board of directors will select among themselves a director general. Each NGO has an 
administration unit, which is responsible for administering the NGO’s day-to-day activi-
ties.  
The size of the administrative team depends on how extensive the NGO’s operations 
are. Small NGOs might not have any permanent staff (for example, TADAMON Or-
ganization for Social and Charity Works). The volunteers (mostly members of the gen-
eral assembly) together with the director general will be responsible for administration 
and operation of the NGO. According to the fieldwork interviews and documents shared 
by respondents, small and medium NGOs have administrative teams composed of two 
to ten employees, while a large NGOs could have a working staff of more than one hun-
dred (for example, the Union of Health Working Committees which had 223 staff work-
ing in 2003, though many were working on specific projects.  We should note here that 
many Palestinian NGOs are used to hiring additional staff temporarily on a project ba-
sis.  In addition, voluntary workers constitute a major facilitating factor in running 
NGOs activities, contributing skills in a variety of ways. 
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Figure  6.1: General structure of Palestinian NGOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As revealed by research fieldwork, all of the NGOs have a board of directors, composed 
of seven to eleven members, which is elected by a general assembly. It was observed, in 
some cases, that the board and general assembly have little influence on the NGO ac-
tivities, policies, fund raising and expenditure, particularly with small and medium or-
ganizations – which violates the law. In these cases, most of the work (policy making 
and implementation) is being performed by the director general.  
 
“..some of the board directors are participating in these voluntary works just seeking  
social status and prestige and to have a channel to find jobs for their friends and rela-
tives”  
Source: Interview with Salah Abd Ela’tey/ expert in the NGOs field, 2005 
 
Another important observation in this regard, is that the general director dominates 
knowledge and information. That is why the researcher himself tended to interview the 
director manager of the NGOs as far as was possible.    
Larger organizations have well designed organizational structures with clear respon-
sibilities and mandates, as was the case in health and women organizations. Newly es-
tablished organizations also generally have better structures than traditional ones, due to 
the adoption of new and modern structures (as was observed in YABUS for Social and 
Charity Works and the Palestinian Housing Council). Most of the medium and small 
organizations have well drafted structures but they are not efficient as the team is 
smaller and may lack certain skills, and internal monitoring systems may be observed to 
be weak.  
According to the NGOs’ law of 2000, every NGO has to have a clear structure, ob-
jectives and a budget system. The formation and operations of NGOs have to be moni-
tored by the Ministry of Interior as discussed in the previous section. However, due to 
the weak monitoring system within the ministry combined with weak internal monitor-
ing systems of some NGOs, the do not always work as efficiently as they should. In 
fact, the Ministry of Interior itself lacks sufficient qualified personnel to follow or moni-
tor the activities and expenditures of NGOs. In some cases, it was observed, where the 
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head of the NGO belongs to the ruling political party, the ministry will ease its restric-
tions and monitoring measures. 
In another area and regarding voluntarism in NGOs’ activities, a strong trend was ob-
served towards working in a voluntary capacity, especially among the youth.  Twelve of 
the 15 NGOs interviewed in the field emphasized that volunteers are an essential ele-
ment in the ability to implementation their activities successfully. According to Mass 
(2001), volunteers are working for 62.3 % of Palestinian NGOs. According to my ob-
servations, volunteers in most cases enjoy being able to use their technical skills to pur-
sue their tasks. The high tendency towards working as a volunteer in the social arena 
might be interpreted as due to: 
– The culture of voluntarism that prevails in the Palestinian society, particularly in the 
political arena, which encourages the desire to work for general causes without re-
wards. 
– The Islamic environment that encourages working for others without expecting re-
wards. 
– High unemployment rate (60%) particularly among the youth and new graduates 
who like to engage themselves in such activities either to gain experience or while 
waiting for a chance to be employed in such an NGO. 
Voluntarism is a vital component for successful implementation of NGO activities. It 
strengthens the culture of participation and the desire to be involved and informed. It 
helps in raising the capacity of local communities and increases their awareness of their 
rights, particularly in taking decisions that influence their life.  
With regards to permanent staff working for NGOs, and according to the figures avail-
able from respondent NGOs, the female: male ratio is almost the same (47% women 
and 53% men).  This figure is close to the MAS (2000)34 figure which stated that the 
ratio of women was even higher than men in 2000 (54% women and 46% men)  
Figure  6.2: Ratio of women and men working in NGOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the researcher’s view, the high trend of NGOs to hire women might be 
interpreted as due to two reasons: first, the donors influence. It was noticed that many 
donors emphasized providing equal opportunities for both men and women to be em-
                                                 
34
 MAS: Economic Policy Research Institute: see online www.mas.org.ps. Retrieved November 6th, 2005 
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ployed in the projects they were funding. Second, the high literacy rate among women 
in Palestine (88% in whole Palestine and 92% in Gaza Strip according to PCBS35 2004). 
Women have proven their qualifications; they have received a good education to a high 
level, and therefore have the required skills to perform their tasks effectively. 
 On the other hand, if we assume that the respondent NGOs are representative of the 
wider NGOs sector in Palestine, the apparent slight decline in hiring women in the 
NGOs sector between 2000 (54%, MAS statistic) and 2005 (47%, at the time interviews 
conducted) might be due the very difficult work circumstances that resulted during the 
second Intifada (2000-2005) which might have hindered some women from leaving 
their houses for work. 
Initiation for the NGO establishment; influence over NGOs’ agenda 
The nature of founders whether they are individuals, communities, political parties, 
government or donors, is an important factor in determining the purpose for which a 
NGO was established.  It will indicate the extent to which the NGO is established for 
political, development or social reasons and hence, their motivation to establish new 
spaces with local governments so as to have influence over policy making.  
 It might be very difficult to determine exactly how each NGO was established. How-
ever, the following figures are derived from long discussions with three local experts 
who have long experience working with NGOs in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian NGOs (as 
revealed by these experts) tend to be established in five ways: 
– Community initiatives: More than 75% were established by individuals or through 
community initiatives. The heads of most of these organizations are qualified per-
sonnel and in most cases belong to one of the political parties. These organizations 
are usually specialized in social and relief areas. Included among these organizations 
are those that were initiated by independent activists in the community to work 
chiefly in the domains of research and democracy. 
– Government: Some organizations were established and initiated by the government 
itself in order to compete with existing NGOs for acquiring resources and donor 
funds. A very well known example would be the Palestinian Housing Council. 
– Occasional: Some of the organizations were established to serve the implementation 
of a particular project funded by a donor at the local government level. Afterwards, 
they maintained their existence and continued to work as an NGO in a specialization 
far away from its real establishment purpose. An example of that would be the 
committees formed through one of the CHF (Co-operative Housing Foundation) 
projects in Rafah, which after the project had finished, turned to work as an NGO 
after gaining accreditation from the Ministry of Interior. 
– Transformed: Some of the UNRWA institutions became independent community 
NGOs in the areas they used to serve, in order administer themselves. It was noticed 
that the donors did not withdraw from funding these groups although they are no 
longer under the auspices of the UN, but continue to support and influence these 
newly established NGOs. An example of that is El’Amal Association for Handicaps 
Rehabilitation that used to belong to UNRWA. 
                                                 
35
   PCBS: Palestinian Canter Bureau of Statistics: online: www.pcbs.gov.ps . Retrieved on January 15th , 
2005 
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– International: Some of the organizations are established by foreign or international 
agencies (as branches in the Palestinian territories). The Palestinian Authority has no 
control over them, nor do these organizations have to register with the Ministry of 
Interior. An example of that is TAMKIN which is established and governed by 
USAID.  
The high tendency of Palestinian local communities to form and establish NGOs might 
be interpreted – according to the researcher’s view – as due to several reasons. People 
live under severe conditions caused by Israeli occupation which destroyed their lands, 
houses and infrastructure. Since the government is weak and cannot satisfy alone the 
community’s needs, communities have turned their attention to NGOs as an alternative 
institutional means to provide additional services. Communities and individuals have 
been very active in establishing new organizations as a way to get funds to help in pro-
viding them with basic services and for other survival and relief activities. That might 
explain why the number of NGOs almost tripled during the second Intifada (2000-
2005), from 256 NGOs to 700 NGOs in the Gaza Strip, by mid 2005.36 On the other 
hand, Palestine is a fertile area for international organizations’ work and interventions. 
This has provided the Palestinians with more spaces and additional opportunities to 
acquire funds. These issues have encouraged local communities to form their own 
NGOs as an institutionalized way for getting these funds.   
As also observed in the field, many NGOs are ruled by personnel that belong to political 
parties like FATEH (the ruling political party till 2006), HAMAS (Islamic Party), 
PUBLIC FRONT (Left party) among others. And since the environment in Palestine is 
very large extent politicized, this issue has two particular implications on NGOs work, 
according to the researcher’s observation: 
– The work of the political parties and their NGOs is thoroughly integrated and com-
plementary, to the point where such NGOs work as civil wings for their attributed 
political parties. In fact, the mixture between civil and political works might explain 
why HAMAS as an opposition party won the local council elections in 2005 and the 
Legislation Council in 2006. According to many observers, no small part of this vic-
tory was due to the extensive social work and services provided by these NGOs to-
gether with their good reputation as transparent and honest agencies. This appears to 
have mobilized many supporters of these NGOs and hence, for their attributed po-
litical parties. 
– On the other hand, most of these organizations were initiated by leadership from 
within the local communities, with strong local awareness of their potential and 
strengths, belief in their capacity for local advocacy and cooperation with LGUs, 
which would provide the NGOs with a strong local support base.   
Focus and nature of the programs implemented by the NGOs; efficiency and 
performance 
The nature of the activities and the existence of a clear (or unclear) focus of an NGO are 
important indicators in judging their capability to serve their communities. They also 
have implications on the ability of the NGO to networks with other organizations hav-
ing a similar focus, and to be influential in such fora. At the same time, they indicate the 
extent to which the NGO shares a similar or dissimilar focus with local government. 
                                                 
36 The huge number of NGOs should not mislead the reader since almost one third of these organizations 
are not active all according to ministry of interior, 2005. 
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, PNGOs are engaged in a wide range of activities 
and sectors, with a dominance of social and relief. In general, Palestinian NGOs are 
engaged in sectors covering: health, rehabilitation, research, agriculture, human rights, 
training, democracy, handicaps, friendship associations, charity organizations, youth, art 
and culture, education, childhood, heritage, environment, woman, housing, religious 
organizations, and economic development. The Palestinian NGOs are also engaged in 
basic service delivery, building social awareness, institution building and lobbying and 
networking. According to Abd El Hady (2004 5:14), the PNGOs adopted a variety of 
programs, such as: 
– Programs for social care and protection and developmental services: The Palestinian 
NGOs have contributed together with the state in the delivery of services in the 
fields of health, education, social welfare, agriculture, relief and others 
– Informal education and community awareness: In this field, the PNGOs are in-
volved in various activities such as general lectures, workshops, booklet publica-
tions, general libraries, rehabilitation, counseling, entertainments activities, and 
awareness programs particularly for women and summer camps for students and 
children. These programs and activities are aimed at building and empowering the 
Palestinian community and providing them with necessary skills and information   
– Institutional building and human resource development: Many activities could be 
included under this heading, such as providing training and workshops for voca-
tional education, training the trainers, computer skills, management skills, budgeting 
and consultancy. These programs are important and considered a step forward to 
move from relief projects to adopting developmental strategies that would benefit 
the communities at the long term. 
– Lobbying and networking to influence government laws and policies: In this regard, 
the PNGOs are active particularly at the central level. They have established net-
works and relations with international organizations to seek for more support. 
– Human rights and democracy: This includes the involvement of NGOs in various 
activities, for example establishing several active organizations concerned with hu-
man rights and democracy, support for women, children and handicapped, and so-
cial and economic rights for citizens. 
– Creation of job opportunities: Many NGOs concentrate their work on this issue by 
looking for ways to support citizens, alleviate poverty and overcome the high unem-
ployment rate in Palestine. Some NGOs have begun to shift their vision from creat-
ing jobs in relief frameworks towards tying them into medium and long term devel-
opmental objectives.  
As the fieldwork revealed, around 40% of the NGOs operating in the Gaza Strip have a 
central focus in social, charity and relief work. It was also observed that some operating 
NGOs had no particular specialization in either the coverage sector or target groups – 
particularly the small and medium organizations37. Having no specialization or clear 
focus might be interpreted as due to the total dependency of most Palestinian NGOs on 
donors and international organizations for finance. Wherever there is any opportunity 
for getting funds, these NGO will apply regardless their interests in such proposed pro-
jects. In many cases the projects are found far from the original focus of such NGOs.  
According to TADAMON for Social and Charity Works: 
 
                                                 
37
 This would not cover NGOs working in health sector that focus only in health activities. 
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“we tend to apply for many projects in several fields at the same time. We hope that at 
least one of our proposals will be accepted by the donors. Any project we get in any 
field will be considered as a good achievement for our NGO” 
Source: Interview with TADAMON for  Social and Charity Works, 2005 
Some might argue that having wide focus is positive in the sense that such NGO can 
hire experts in any field in a way to maximize the ability to provide additional services. 
In the absence of another NGO covering a needed project, they would argue that a non-
specialized NGO can be useful in having the contacts to bring in the expertise needed. 
While that could be true, however, from another angle it would appear that a huge effort 
is expended in trying to cover a wide range of fields, and this might be contrary to the 
NGO's ability and capacity. According to the researcher's view, an NGO is able to have 
a far more positive impact if it concentrates its efforts on one or a limited field, with 
more efficient performance and structure. More importantly, it is able to increase its 
potential to form influential networks with other NGOs that share a similar focus, and to 
become more expert in its chosen field.   
Due to the critical political situation prevailing in Palestine and due to the emergency 
requirements and needs for food and basic services, most of NGOs tend to divert their 
focus to relief works and activities when necessary, without tying these activities to any 
long term development strategies or visions. This issue has been observed when check-
ing the lists of projects for several of the NGOs interviewed. In addition to poorly for-
mulated measurable objectives there is a tendency to continue to widen the NGOs gen-
eral goals without clear plans to achieve them. The active Palestinian NGOs vary in 
their missions and programs but the common feature is that the majority fail to focus on 
specific goals, objectives and programs. In other words most of the Palestinian NGOs 
are not specialized in specific areas but tend to have a wide range of missions and goals.  
To conclude, the absence of specialization has weakened the NGOs' ability to per-
form efficiently in serving their local communities. It also weakened their ability to 
form strong networks with others in the same sector of specialization and hence, weak-
ened their advocacy roles in influencing government decision making and policies.  
Availability of financial resources  
The field work findings and observations have clearly revealed that the Palestinian 
NGO sector lacks financial resources, particularly the smaller ones and the ones work-
ing in rural areas and with refugee populations. The fieldwork findings of this research 
revealed three major sources of funds for NGOs: 
– Around 80% of  the NGOs interviewed depended mainly on foreign assistance and 
donor funds; 
– Some organizations can raise around 15% of required finance from their internal 
activities, members’ fees and community donations; and 
– Government assistance is very limited and can cover only around 5% of the required 
funds. Such government assistance goes to a very limited selection of organizations 
(mainly those affiliated with the ruling party).  
 
According to the researcher's view, the almost total consequent dependence on foreign 
and international funds has four implications: 
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– Limitation of the influence of the local NGOs over the agenda of donors. The NGOs 
need the funds and are unable to influence the nature of the projects funded, even if 
they are not in the line with their priorities. 
– When it comes in particular to the Arab assistance, it goes mainly to relief activities, 
such as distribution of foods, money and clothes, which lack any sustainable devel-
opment strategies. The focus on short term needs has lead to the emergence of a new 
culture among the Palestinians that perceive and delineate roles of both internal and 
external NGOs as relief agencies.  
– Increase in competition between NGOs and the government in acquiring foreign 
funds, due to poor resource base for both sides. This worsens the relationship be-
tween government and non-government organizations because of the absence of co-
operation between them on one side, and also among the donors themselves on the 
other side. 
– On the other hand, it has a positive implication. Many of these externally funded 
projects require implementation of participatory strategies and approaches. This 
could contribute to shifting from old fashion planning strategies that consider bene-
ficiaries as recipients of the services, to actors participating in determining their 
needs. The influence of donors in this regard would help to introduce and build a 
new participatory culture. 
Representativeness of NGOs to local communities 
Do existing local NGOs truly represent their communities? Or rather do they represent 
factional interests? This research is launched in the belief (assumption) that NGOs as 
organized groups of civil society have a great potential to represent the needs of com-
munities to other groups. In this section, we investigate the extent to which NGOs can 
represent their communities. In this regard, we focus only on distribution of NGOs in 
urban, rural, and refugee areas in such a way to find out whether marginalized groups in 
remote areas are represented by NGOs or not. 
 
According to figures collected by the researcher from the Ministry of Interior in 
2005, around 60% of the registered NGOs in the Gaza Strip are located in Gaza city. 
This indicates the high tendency of NGOs to locate themselves in big urban areas that 
enjoy better infrastructure, at the expense of more undeveloped areas. This observation 
is supported by figures for the whole of Palestine from the Palestinian Economic Poli-
cies Centre (MAS 2000), which indicate that most of the NGOs are located in urban 
centers (60.2%) followed by some in rural centers (29.3%) and a few in the refugee 
camps (10.6%). These figures are relatively close to the number of population for each 
centre. For example, according to MAS (2004), the population of urban centers is 
53.1%, that of rural areas 31%, while the population of refugees camps as 15.9 % of the 
total population.  
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Figure  6.3: Distribution of Palestinian NGOs in urban and rural areas in Gaza Strip  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These figures from the fieldwork and MAS indicate that the distribution of PNGOs is 
proportional to the numbers of the target population. The population of Gaza city for 
example is almost 40% of the total population of Gaza Strip. However, we have to keep 
in our mind the differences in terms of capacity and size between the NGOs in different 
areas, which is in favor of those located in urban areas. Our observations in the field 
confirm that urban communities have more Palestinian NGOs (and therefore more 
choice) and also enjoy a better caliber of organizations in terms of capacity and effi-
ciency. Palestinian NGOs working in rural communities and refugee camps are fewer in 
number and are also generally weaker in structure. 
Regardless of the biased distribution of NGOs favoring urban areas, our question will 
continue to be valid. Do NGOs represent communities or rather factional interests? An-
swering this question while depending on limited fieldwork data, is very difficult. The 
question can rather become: do local communities trust NGOs or believe that they rep-
resent them? To measure exactly this trust is also difficult. However, based on many 
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informal interviews with ordinary citizens, the research showed that citizens to some 
extent do suspect the work of some NGOs, accusing some of them of working to serve 
personal or political interests. According to public poll number 17 of the Development 
Study Program in Bir Zeit University in 2004, it was found that 47% of Palestinian 
population trust NGOs and find their work credible in development and serving com-
munities. This figure in particular indicates that NGOs still need more improvement in 
terms of functioning and performance to increase their receptiveness to communities 
and hence, improve their reputation among citizens. This would help to widen their 
support base among citizens, and hence, improve their representation to local communi-
ties either in urban or rural areas.  
6.3 NGOs Knowledge: implications on their participation in local 
planning and policy making processes 
This research sought as part of its objectives to gather information from NGO respon-
dents about their perception of local government planning processes, and their involve-
ment in policy making and program implementation. This study distinguishes between 
two types of knowledge: formal and informal. Informal knowledge includes knowing 
how to organize and influence within communities, while formal knowledge has three 
perspectives: 
– Most obviously, it is directly related to the information that is used to generate the 
substance of the plans like statistics, reports and other technical data; 
– Knowledge of planning languages and procedures; and 
– Know how of participatory approaches which indicates their skills and capacity to 
participate in local planning and policy making in any current or future created 
spaces.  This item includes also the NGOs’ perception of participation either by 
looking forward to their involvement in local government planning or looking back 
to involvement of communities they serve in their activities. 
Knowledge of information used to generate substance of the plan and access to 
government information 
Most of the NGOs interviewed in the field have emphasized their satisfaction at their 
degree of access to government information. However, this information only includes 
the technical data and statistics required for their non-governmental work. It might be 
interesting to notice that this information has nothing to do with the preparation of gov-
ernment plans, but is rather information that is used by NGOs to implement their activi-
ties. Further, the NGOs' access to this information depends to a large extent on the per-
sonal relationship between the NGO personnel and LGU staff.  Half of the NGOs inter-
viewed believed that access to information depends on personal relationship.  
Personal relations, according to the researcher's view, is the enemy of institutionali-
zation. However, readers should not consider it as totally negative issue. As it appears to 
the researcher, policies in the Palestinian institutions – whether government or non-
government – are made by persons not by institutions. That is why there is no sustain-
ability in such policies since it is linked to persons who might lose their power and 
hence, policies formulated by them will be powerless too. In this sense, providing ac-
cess based on personal relations is being criticized since they don’t provide institutional 
and sustainable access to information. However, the existence of good personal rela-
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tionships among the personnel of both LGUs and NGOs is totally appreciated when 
they are accompanied by institutional measures. 
 
The NGOs interviewed emphasized this issue, particularly when it comes to proposing 
government reforms. According to the direct manager of the Palestinian NGOs network: 
 
“government has to come up with new initiatives concerning new reforms. The reforms 
have not to depend on the personality of ministers or mayors. It should be the policy of 
the state and the municipality to provide easy access to all kinds of information” 
Source: Interview with direct manager of Palestinian NGOs Network, 2005 
Innovation of new measures that could provide easy access to all kinds of information is 
critical, particularly where that is related to the substance of creating governmental 
plans and policies. This issue is believed as positive facilitating factor for the creation 
for better policy spaces to involve NGOs. 
Knowledge of planning language and procedures 
Other serious shortcomings, as revealed by the NGOs interviewed, include their very 
limited access to major LGU operating systems such as budgeting, revenue raising and 
expenditures. None of the NGOs interviewed showed any knowledge of these proc-
esses, considering them as government business.   
 
“the planning languages and procedures used by the government are not clear to me. 
The LGUs tend to work with big infrastructure projects that are beyond the capacity of 
our NGO. It requires some degree of professionalism which we can not offer. I think it 
is their task to plan and implement such kind of projects” 
Sources: Interview with direct manger of General Service Association for KANADA camp,2005 
 
When asked about direct knowledge of what kind of plans are prepared by local gov-
ernments, and if the NGO is aware of the languages and procedures used, majority of 
the NGOs interviewed (73%) expressed their total ignorance of these issues. The few 
NGOs which had shown some knowledge in this regard revealed that this knowledge 
has never been utilized by them. 
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Figure  6.4: Knowledge of planning languages and procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The limited knowledge planning languages and procedures, particularly when it comes 
to central issues like LGU policy formulation, budgeting and expenditure, might indi-
cate lack of transparency at the local government level. The researcher himself experi-
enced some difficulties in collecting figures in relation to financial issues. 
Knowledge of know how; capacity of PNGOs and perception of participation  
‘Know how’ of participatory approaches is an issue of great importance in this research. 
It indicates the extent to which NGOs would be able to participate effectively in plan-
ning process.  The degree of knowledge which is our concern refers to investigation of 
areas like training in related participatory approaches and skills. It also includes investi-
gation of NGO civic competence and know how of formulating networks, lobbying and 
advocacy groups to influence decision and policy making. The more competent, well 
organized and skilful the NGO is, the greater the potential and opportunity to participate 
effectively. 
This research made use of two methods to assess the extent to which the NGOs in-
terviewed have knowledge and hence, capacity to participate. First, by looking at train-
ing received by an NGO, and second, by raising a discussion concerning participatory 
approaches and observing the extent to which such an NGOs is knowledgeable. 
 Four NGOs out of the 15 interviewed, responded that at least one or more of their 
key staff have received training for more than one week in participation or related fields 
such as community mobilization, project cycles or planning and management. These 
trainings are either offered by major local NGOs or international organizations. Accord-
ing to the project coordinator of the Rafah WORLD VISION branch: 
 
“Working for the WORLD VISION had provided me with additional opportunities to 
improve my skills either in planning or participation. I have attended several trainings 
inside and outside Palestine. The knowledge I gain helps me a great deal in my work on 
the ground with local communities” 
Source: interview with project coordinator of World Vision branch in Rafah,2005 
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It might be very difficult to assess how exactly an NGO is knowledgeable considering 
the limitations of the field work. However, as observed in the field, quite a few NGOs 
respondents were able to show their competency in this subject. The question that fol-
lows is whether and how this knowledge is being used to create new spaces for NGOs 
in local planning? It was clear for the researcher, that all of the NGOs interviewed in the 
field did not have any kind of institutional relationship with LGUs in field of local plan-
ning and policy making. This indicates that even if the NGO could prove its knowledge, 
there is little space – in actual sense – to practice it. 
Regarding competency of NGO staff, it was observed that small NGOs principally 
depend on the NGO director to run most of activities, including generating funds. The 
director is sometimes assisted by an expert working with them in a voluntary or project 
based capacity. The almost total dependence on one person would make it very difficult 
for the NGO to participate in all of the activities of the LGU, even in case that there 
were sufficient spaces for them. While, larger respondent organizations, such as those 
concerned with health and women, enjoy a wider high qualified staff base. 
 It is very well known in Palestine that the NGOs sector pays the highest salaries in 
the Palestinian territories. That might justify why this sector attracts the most qualified 
personnel.  In the smaller and also some of medium sized organizations it was noticed 
that the director general of the NGO is usually qualified in terms of technical capacity, 
knowledge and communication skills. However, some of the NGO directors tend not to 
hire qualified personnel since they want to keep their dominance over the decision mak-
ing within their organization. According to one of the experts who observed this issue: 
 
“some of Palestinian NGO directors don’t like to hire qualified persons because they 
will be able to uncover their misuse of money and their corruption” 
Source: Interview with Salah Abd ELa’tey/an expert, 2005 
 
Indeed, the corruption in some of the NGOs is considered as a major hindering factor in 
strengthening the technical capacity of these organizations. Another main observation 
when raising questions concerning participation of NGOs in local government planning 
was the low interest of some interviewed NGOs in this regards. Some of the interviewed 
NGOs respondents used to divert discussion away from this issue to the need to raise 
additional resources from local governments.  They perceived participation in local 
government as follows:  
 
– Eleven NGOs responded that government should share resources with NGOs.  
– Among the eleven, seven NGOs emphasized the importance of participating in LGU 
project implementation, while only five NGOs highlighted the importance of par-
ticipating in government policy formulation.  
– Four interviewed NGOs could not show a clear idea of how they perceive participa-
tion with local government. 
Sources: Interviews in the field, 2005 
 
It was observed that the interviewed NGOs perceived local governments as weak insti-
tutions and thought it might not be worthwhile for NGOs to co-operate with them. 
NGOs would rather prefer to work either with donors or central government, perceiving 
them as more powerful institutions from which they could also get additional resources.  
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When looking back to the communities they serve, while investigating perceptions of 
NGOs about involvement of ordinary citizens in their activities, many emphasized the 
importance of involving target groups and communities in implementing their programs 
and activities. In spite of the fact that donors of these projects emphasize this aspect as a 
requirement for getting such projects funded, citizens have no input in shaping the na-
ture of these projects which are already planned by the donors. Some respondent NGOs 
revealed some additional difficulties encountered by them in promoting citizen partici-
pation in their projects. These were principally the lack of NGOs resources and skills, 
lack of community awareness, and family and tribal restrictions (particularly for gender 
participation). 
As regards ability of NGOs to coordinate among themselves to influence local gov-
ernment policies, the researcher did not observe any substantial strong network or pres-
sure groups formed by local NGOs, either in Rafah or Gaza Municipalities. However, 
many respondent NGOs emphasized their cooperation among themselves to implement 
mutual projects serving their local communities, and the Palestinian NGOs network 
located in Gaza was seen to be very active in lobbying for amendments to the NGO 
laws of 1995 and 2000 as discussed in section (6.1). The Palestinian NGOs network for 
example concentrates its efforts at the central level. According to the director general of 
PNGO network in Gaza: 
 
“We might not have strong coordination with municipal councils, but we do work to 
influence public policies that target the democratization of Palestinian society and hope-
fully these reforms will result in improving governance practices at all levels” 
Source: Interview with PNGO network, 2005 
 
The PNGOs have been affected by changes in the general environment in which they 
operate. They are working under conditions of transition towards the formulation of a 
national authority, via political agreements and a continuation of the Israeli occupation. 
These conditions are not stable and are vulnerable to further changes in the future.  
At the same time, A decline the flow of external financial support to consolidate the 
ongoing political process coincides with the decline in the role of political parties and 
social movements. According to a study prepared by MAS (2001:1)38, coordination and 
cooperation among Palestinian NGOs reveals various patterns and relationships govern-
ing coordination in all aspects and at all levels. The degree of coordination is subject to 
the general environment in which the NGO functions and the various circumstances 
leading to the establishment and development of a particular NGO. It also varies ac-
cording to the date of establishment of the NGO, its size, expenses, number of employ-
ees and type of work. The various degrees of coordination are reflected in the type, 
form, scope and essence of the relations among NGOs themselves and also between 
them and Palestinian Authority and donors. The establishment of the Palestinians Na-
tional Authority (PNA) weakened the role of the PNGOs as relief providers as the PNA 
started to taking over some of that role. As a result, a new role emerged for PNGOs in 
advocacy and lobbying to impact public policies. Meanwhile there is no uniform PNA 
policy and vision towards PNGOs. The general environment governing the work of the 
PNGOs in West Bank and Gaza Strip has had the effect of transforming grassroots or-
ganizations and political activists into institutional NGO work. This has weakened 
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http://www.mas.org.ps/publications/R_P_Sumaries/2001/Networking_E.pdf Retrieved November 6th, 
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many traditional organizations, while the new PNGOs have expanded and emerged as 
professional organizations with political perspectives (MAS 2001). 
Within such a framework, PNGOs have pursued efforts to secure financial support from 
donors and adjust to the newborn PNA. This has created a competitive relationship 
amongst PNGOs to acquire funds and financial resources, creating a specific pattern of 
relations with the PNA and the consolidation of organizations to increase their impact. 
On the other hand, as emphasized by some interviewees from the NGO side, there is 
also the significant effect of the personal characteristics of such NGO leadership and 
management on networking with others.  
 
“competition over resources and personal conflicts among NGO leaderships having 
different political stands, has hindered NGOs in forming effective networks” 
Interview with Salah Abd Ela’tey, An expert 2005 
According to MAS (2001: 2)39, newly established modern institutional organizations run 
according to clearly defined objectives, programs and implementation plans, are usually 
efficient in networking and in employing these networks to serve their goals. There is a 
decline in a capacity of certain NGOs, particularly the small and peripheral (which are 
usually located outside urban centers) to access information crucial to their work. There 
is also a decline in their ability to benefit from available training opportunities to de-
velop the skills of their employees or voluntary workers. This reveals a clear ‘class 
structure’ with the large and privileged NGOs rooted in the major cities gradually taking 
the role of ‘intermediary guardian’. 
There are various patterns of cooperation among NGOs in Palestine depending on 
the variety and the scope of the NGO work. These together with the internal structure 
and vision of each organization, influence the form, substance and degree of coopera-
tion. The substance of the relationship includes identification of goals, formulation of 
work programs, financing, implementation and training. According to MAS (2001: 2-3), 
consultation basically means exchange of views, ideas and information on specific is-
sues or aspects of work, but not for joint activities or any institutionalized relationship 
building. Coordination means an advanced degree of consultation, where NGOs would 
have a joint framework for the short term, relevant for a specific project but probably 
not embracing joint financing. Collaboration is a result of consultation and co-
ordination and includes planning and implementation of joint projects and might also 
include joint financing. A relationship would reach networking when the long term 
common interests of NGOs are ruled by institutionalized and financed frameworks 
(MAS 2001: 2-3). Palestinian NGOs in various sectors and geographical areas form 
associations and networks. The General Union of Charitable Societies and the Palestin-
ian NGO Network play an important role in encouraging NGOs to join associations and 
networks. Yet, when the membership is examined (according to MAS (2001:3) , it was 
apparent that most members are inactive, with only a few organizations involved in 
joint planning, collaboration and financing among themselves. Consultations and co-
ordination are common among PNGOs, with more organizations are involved in consul-
tations than in coordination. The high levels of consultation result from the fact that 
such relations only require temporary agreements on immediate issues (MAS 2001: 3). 
According to (Abd Elhady 2004:8), the small number of jointly financed programs 
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amongst NGOs is indicative of the low level of coordination, especially noting that this 
joint financing is usually the result of donors’ requirements in distributing funds. Joint 
workshops are common, as well as partnership, for large projects such as a community 
based rehabilitation program. 
 In general, the relationship between government and NGOs is characterized by 
competition and is far from the cooperation necessary for seeking development in the 
Palestinian community. According to Abd Elhady (2004:9), “cooperation between 
NGOs and local government is poor at all levels”. Nowadays, the PNGOs have realized 
the importance of cooperation among themselves in order to achieve their developmen-
tal and social objectives. The last decade has witnessed the establishment of the PNGO 
Network (PNGON) in 1994 which is composed of 92 organizations covering several 
developmental sectors. In addition, the General Union of Charitable Societies is com-
posed of more than 500 organizations throughout Palestine. In order to achieve their 
objectives, PNGOs with similar specializations and sectors began to coordinate among 
themselves by establishing mutual committees, in order to consult the relevant minis-
tries or government institutions at central level. As a result, according to an interview 
with the Palestinian NGO Network in Gaza (2005), several networks were established 
such as Women Affairs Network, Educational Network, Cultural Network, Health Or-
ganizations Network, Agricultural Committee Network, the Palestinian Network for 
Institutional Building and so on. 
 To conclude, the existence of effective coordination among NGOs is vital to make 
strong pressure groups to shape the government’s policies and advocate citizens’ needs 
or priorities. Within the political domain, PNGOs have shown a strong tendency to co-
operate as a way of defending their general cause and advocating for their needs. When 
it comes to local level planning activities, disagreements and disputes either over lim-
ited resources or due to personal conflicts prevail, which has hindered the NGOs in 
playing an influential role in this regard.  In general, large and medium size modern 
developmental organizations working at national level are more efficient in networking 
and in employing these networks to serve their goals, while it is the contrary at local 
level.  
6.4 Local government practice; characteristics of local councils and 
implications on creation spaces to involve NGOs 
This research made use of data and information gathered in the field within Rafah and 
Gaza municipalities to indicate major characteristics of LGUs in the Gaza Strip.  The 
following sub-sections aim to explore local government structure; LGU sizes, roles and 
responsibilities; and budgeting systems, in order to indicate implications over creating 
spaces to involve NGOs in major LGU operating systems and planning.    
Structure of LGUs: inadequate structural set up to foster participation  
This research differentiates between local council and municipal government, whereas 
both together constitute the local government unit (LGU). According to the law, the 
local council – being appointed or elected – is the body responsible for formulating the 
LGU’s policies and approval of local plans, while the municipal government is respon-
sible for running operating systems, planning, budgeting, implementing projects and 
administering the LGU. The municipal government in some sense works as an execu-
tive arm for the local council. Members of the local council, according to the law of 
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1996, will select among themselves the mayor, who will at the same time be the head of 
the municipal government. 
In practice, local councils as observed in the field were very inactive and non-influential 
in LGU operations. The mayor with his local administration (municipal government) 
dominated every activity concerning the LGU.  
 
“local councils approve our formulated plans as a routine. It is their responsibility to 
forward these plans to upper levels for final approvals”  
Source: Interview with Rafah planning officer, 2005 
 
Local councils represent the legal and institutional channel for forwarding local plans to 
upper levels in order to get them approved.  The mayor as an individual person is the 
strongest and most influential person within the LGU. The strength of the LGU depends 
mainly on the personal characteristics of the mayor in terms of his communication 
skills, personal relationship, his ability to approach central officials or donors, and his 
efforts to raise additional funds.  
 
According to Abdela’aty (2005:30), the number of LGUs in Palestine in 2003 
reached 442 LGUs. Among them, there are 108 municipalities (for urban areas), and 
334 villages councils (for rural areas). The total number of employees of these LGUs 
was  6400 employees, with 2260 working in the Gaza Strip, which represents more than 
one third of the total employees in Palestine.  
In general and as observed in the field, larger LGUs are well organized with a clear 
hierarchy and are composed of large departments and sections (such as Gaza Municipal-
ity).  Such as LGU can coordinate among its different departments due to the well or-
ganizational structure, while this is not the case in other LGUs. Indeed, the laws con-
cerning local councils do not specify any internally systemized monitoring arrange-
ments.  The following figure shows the composition of Gaza municipality as an exam-
ple. 
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Figure  6.5: Gaza municipality structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rafah municipality has the same structure as that of Gaza. The difference is in size, and 
the number of departments and employees. Rafah has nine Departments and 36 sections 
while Gaza has 16 departments and 52 sections. Most of these departments, whether in 
Gaza or Rafah, concentrate their operations on fee collection, road construction, water 
and waste management.  As observed in the field, the LGUs lack concentration on the 
social and economic domains as central concerns. Palestinian laws have left these issues 
to the central institutions as a characteristic of the centralized planning system that pre-
vailed historically in Palestine. 
The number of permanent employees in Rafah municipality reached 330 in 2005, of 
whom only ten are women. Rafah municipality serves a population of 151,000 citizens. 
In Gaza municipality, situation differs. It has enjoyed a long history since its establish-
ment in 1893, and is considered the biggest LGU in Palestine in terms of size. It serves 
a population of almost half a million. It has 1761 employees in 2005, which represents 
51% of total LGU employees in Gaza Strip.  221 of these employees have a bachelor 
degree or above but the number of women employees is still only 4.5% of the total. 
 
Table  6.1: Distribution of employees in Gaza and Rafah municipalities 
Item Gaza Municipality Rafah Municipality 
Employee 1,761     (0.4% of total population) 330           (0.2 of total population) 
Women 79             (4.5 of total employees) 10            (3% of total employees) 
Population 500,000  151,000 
Source: Field work, 2005 
Previous figures show a very limited trend towards employing women in local govern-
ment. The proportion in Gaza municipality is 4.5 % and in Rafah municipality 3% of 
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the total in each. However, these figures are close to the national standards. According 
to Mekky (2005)40, the average proportion of women employees in local governments is 
4%. It is even lower when it comes to their membership in local councils (appointed): 
the percentage of women councilors is only 1.5%, with only one woman mayor, of a 
small village in the West Bank (Mekkey 2005).  
In Palestine, there are no systematic approaches to classification of LGUs and deter-
mination of their size and jurisdictions. Some are big and serve hundreds of thousands 
of population (like Gaza) and some are very small and serve only hundreds of people 
(such as El Nasr, a small village council near Rafah). Some of the LGUs have a very 
high number of employees since it is the policy of the state to create job opportunities 
for people regardless the need for them or their qualifications. That is why some of the 
LGUs are overstaffed. In some cases, this has made them unable to pay the salaries of 
their employees, as it was the case in Gaza municipality during the Intifada period in 
2002.  
All of the LGUs staff that were interviewed in the field complained lack of enough re-
sources to implement their activities. As a result, LGUs could not hire required qualified 
staff in their organizations.  
 
“We are totally aware of our needs for additional skilled and more qualified staff par-
ticularly in fields like planning, participation and computerizing. But what can we do? 
Our budget is very limited and the government cannot pay good salaries. Experts would 
rather prefer to join private and non-governmental sectors since they can offer them 
much better payments” 
Source: Interview with Planning officer in Rafah municipality, 2005 
 
However, it was observed that some planning experts are being hired on a project basis. 
These projects are funded by external donors and require knowledge in participatory 
approaches. As was the case in Rafah municipality, the Canadian government funded a 
project of preparation of a long term comprehensive plan for the municipality and re-
quired using some participatory approaches. It was noticed that, after the withdrawal of 
donors, and due to the absence of any institutionalized measures, the LGU staff returned 
back to their previous centralized and traditional planning methods. Thus, these new 
learnt participatory approaches are adopted randomly, on project basis and not on a 
sustainable and institutional manner.  It was clear that the staff concerned still need 
more skills and training. Training should be accompanied by new innovations in laws 
and regulations. This issue highlights the importance that should be given to the legiti-
mization of this process as an important dimension for institutionalizing participation 
which must be integrated in the political and decision making structure. 
Role of LGUs; developmental versus physical focus 
It was clearly observed in the field, that the LGUs concentrate more on the spatial and 
physical aspects of planning at the expense of the social, economical and developmental 
domains. These fields are left to the central government and sometimes to some locally 
operating NGOs or donors. In addition, and according to the Law of Local Bodies 
(1997), the LGUs are responsible for construction arrangements and licenses, water and 
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electricity supplies and maintenance, fee collection, and construction of some infra-
structure projects such as roads, sanitation and sewerage. According to the deputy min-
ister of the Ministry of Local Government (as cited in Abd Ela’tey 2005:34), “according 
to our experience, we feel that the councils’ roles in development are marginalized since 
they are not responsible for sports, education, cultural and health development. In addi-
tion, some of the services that used to be provided by councils are gradually taken to the 
central government like electricity, water and sewage”.  
Role of local council members and their influence over planning process is seen as very 
weak, as mentioned in the previous section. According to the planning officer of Rafah 
municipality: 
 
“the local council members do not meet regularly and they have limited influence over 
the LGUs and MOLG policies” 
Interview with planning officer of Rafah municipality, 2005 
 
The local councils are supposed to be responsible for setting up policies for LGUs. But 
in practice, this was left to the mayor. In general, as observed in the field, local council-
ors are not active and some of them utilize their position for their personal interests. 
 
“some appointed councilors consider their positions as a prestige” 
Source: Interview with Salah Abd Ela’tey, 2005 
In practical sense, municipal governmental institutions and local councils remain subor-
dinate to a central management system in which decision-making is made at the highest 
levels. While the law enables the Ministry of Local Government to practice sweeping 
powers and authority over these councils, it is limiting the functional jurisdictions of 
these councils to very few civil domains, including town and road planning, regulation 
the construction of buildings, supplying water and electricity (There is even a govern-
ment plan to withdraw last two functions to the central government).  Though the law 
enables local councils to perform these functions, it denies them any right to perform 
functions in other important civil domains like, for example, regional planning. This 
function is performed by the MOLG itself in coordination with other sectoral ministries 
(Article 2 in 1997 law). Meanwhile health and education are almost totally controlled 
by the central government represented by the Ministries of Health and Education re-
spectively. 
This limited role of the LGUs is believed to deepen further the separation between 
the NGOs and LGUs in terms of functions, focus and objectives. The NGOs’ focus is on 
social and relief works, while the LGUs' is physical and spatial. This has left each actor 
working independently and resulted in characterizing the relationship with mere neutral-
ity, thus, limiting further the potentials to create spaces for collaboration between the 
two. 
Adequacy of LGUs' financial and budgeting systems: weak community control 
over resources 
According to Sha’ban (2003), the total income of the LGUs in Palestine developed from  
$5m in 1968, to $84m in 1990, to $188m in 1998 (cited in Abd Ela’tey 2005:34). Arti-
cle 22 of the local council law of 1997 defines three sources for revenue for local coun-
cil income: taxes and fees determined in Palestinian law, donations and grants, and fi-
nally, the budget of the executive authority. However, local councils do not have the 
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authority to collect taxes and fees nor to determine spending. They are obligated to ob-
tain MOLG approval to do so according to the same law. Articles 8 and 11 of the finan-
cial system of local councils issued on 4th of March 1999, provides that the council does 
not have the authority to amend budget articles without the approval of the Minister. 
 
“..local municipal councils also do not receive their share (90%) of local property 
taxes and professional licensing fees collected by the Ministry of Finance. Municipali-
ties also suffer budget deficits due to the failure of residents to pay fees and their dues” 
Source: Interview with manger of financing department in Rafah municipality, 2005 
 
According to the Palestinian Human Development Report (PHDR 2002:67), before the 
Intifada of 2000, no more than 70% of the people paid their bills, dipping to 30% during 
the first two years of the Intifada. As for donations, according to PHDR (2002: 68-71), 
they come from four sources, the residents, residents living abroad, sisterhoods’ pro-
jects, and other donors. Residents and residents living abroad offer both monetary dona-
tions and non-financial contributions, such as land, schoolrooms, clinics and mosques. 
As observed in the field, the building of these new projects requires a large amount of 
money. For example, one of the mosques that was built in Rafah municipality in 2003 
consumed about half a million dollars. However, the municipalities can cooperate with 
the Ministry of Waqef  (responsible for religious affairs, including administration of 
land and other resources) in order to regulate mosque building and decrease their high 
costs of construction, in order to use the savings to build other facilities like schools or 
health centers. Community participation is a characteristic of the Palestinian local 
communities, and many of them have proved they are able to cooperate in building 
schools, donating land, and providing funds, equipment and labor. For example, accord-
ing to PHDR (2002:72), in 1999-2000, the local community in Hebron donated 483 
classrooms, compared to 187 offered by the Ministry of Education. In Nablus, the mu-
nicipality offered only 34 classrooms while the city residents donated $1m to build a 
school. As for government grants, they are – when available – considered as another 
source for income for local councils. The issue is that these grants do not have a profes-
sional basis (such as linkage to the size of the town or number of residents) for distribu-
tion. It is the prerogative of the President or Minister of Finance to distribute these 
grants based on political consideration. 
However, the research fieldwork revealed three major financial sources for munici-
palities: donors; government and internal projects; fees and donations. Donors are the 
major source for financing projects (95%), while government and municipal sources are 
used for the running expenses and payment of staff salaries. For example, the ratio of 
implemented projects in Gaza municipality in the year 1994-2000 was:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: fieldwork, 2005 
The government’s share, as indicated in the table, is very limited (4%). The proportion 
of projects financed by government is almost the same as that of donations (3%%). Ac-
cording the planning officer of Gaza municipality: 
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Table  6.2: Ratio of implem n ed projects in Gaza municipality during 1994-2000 
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“most of the government’s share goes to pay salaries and running costs. And very little 
remained for investment in developmental projects” 
Source: Interview with planning officer of Gaza municipality, 2005 
 
It is clear that the LGUs seriously lack sufficient budgets in order to implement their 
programs and plans. Most of the LGUs in Palestine complain shortages in their financial 
resources. Indeed, the LGUs share many of the same complaints as NGOs.  Both  lack a 
strong resource base. Both look toward the international community to provide assis-
tance through donors and international organizations. According to a study done by the 
Development Study Program in Bir Zeit University in (2002:54),   81% of the NGOs 
and government officials believe that competition over financial resources and funds is 
hindering the flourishing of a healthy NGO-government relationship.   
In Palestine, as observed in the field, the system for collecting revenues is mixed and   
somehow confusing, being both centralized and decentralized. For example, it includes:  
– Revenues that are defined, enforced, collected and used by the central government 
(e.g., income tax, VAT, customs taxes); 
– Taxes that are centrally enforced and are transferred to municipalities. For example, 
the property tax where 90 % is supposed to be transferred to the municipalities (but 
never happens systematically according to interviews with LGUs officials);  
– Taxes, such as the fuel tax, that are centrally collected and are supposed to be par-
tially transferred to the municipalities but this also has not happened; 
– Central taxes that are centrally enforced and collected and partially transferred to 
municipalities. In this case, municipalities are supposed to receive a percentage of 
revenues from car licenses and traffic violations; 
– Municipal taxes that are enforced, collected and used by the municipalities, such as 
the revenues from building work and street permits; and 
– Municipal taxes on services such as water, electricity, sewage, garbage, slaughter-
houses and markets, which are collected and used by municipalities. 
This complex system, in addition to the dominance of central government over reve-
nues, had contributed negatively to the financial capacity of LGUs. Some might argue 
that, in order to the increase resource base of LGUs, power to collect taxes and revenues 
must be decided at the local level.  However, this would raise questions concerning the 
efficiency and capacity of Palestinian LGUs to handle these issues.  
 With regard to community awareness of budgeting, civil society institutions (par-
ticularly NGOs) have shown total ignorance of municipal budgeting systems and proce-
dures. It was clear that NGOs have no access to influencing the budgeting or expendi-
ture of LGUs. NGOs even did not attempt to influence them in favor of neglected seg-
ments of the community. According to Toqan (2001:35-37), community awareness of 
the importance of budgets is still weak. The circumstances surrounding the inception of 
the PNA and its failure to implement human development in the broader sense, in addi-
tion to the absence a national policy of local government within a comprehensive politi-
cal vision, explains the lack of planning, allocation of funds, and delegation of author-
ity. 
To conclude, the relationship is characterized mainly by the dependency of LGUs on 
central government in terms of policies, budgeting and plan formulation. The LGUs 
depends mainly on donors to raise resources for their investment in development pro-
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jects with limited influence on donors’ agenda. This continues to weaken local munici-
pal councils’ influence over central decisions and limits their ability for autonomous 
actions that could strengthen the involvement of civil society in local planning. 
6.5 Actors relations and power dynamics 
The aim here is to explore dynamics for the making and shaping of planning spaces that 
involve a complex configuration of interests between differently positioned actors 
whose interactions are shaped by power relations. Hence, this research is concerned 
with exploring how power in making planning decisions is being exercised and created 
at the local level. Where is decision making power located? How do the dynamics 
among actors utilizing their power position affect the locus of decision making, and 
hence, affect the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in policy making and planning?  
 In order systematically to investigate previously mentioned issues, the researcher 
made use of interest group analysis as a simple tool to explain each actor’s roles, re-
sponsibilities and interests in a way to reveal conflicts, problems, potentials and impli-
cations (the full detailed matrix is attached in Appendix B).  Based on interest group 
analysis, we will explore in detail the dynamics of power relations, particularly between 
NGOs and LGUs at the local level. We then look at the relations of local councils with 
line government institutions indicating at the same time the roles played by central gov-
ernment and donors in influences spaces created to involve NGOs in local planning. 
The last issue to be discussed in this section is the elaboration of locus of decision mak-
ing as experienced in the field. The research uses the power distribution matrix as an 
analytical tool .  
LGUs and NGOs relations: motivation of NGOs versus LGU receptiveness 
One major observation in the field is that the relationship between the NGOs and local 
councils is limited. The weak cooperation between the NGOs and local council mem-
bers, particularly in areas of policies formulation, is widening the gap between the 
LGUs and NGOs. The laws do not specify any kind of institutive relationship between 
councils and NGOs. According to the Palestinian Human Development Report 
(2002:85), 67.5% of residents of the Gaza Strip believe that local councils do not in-
volve residents in decision making even on important projects that affect their commu-
nity. A possible explanation for the levels of dissatisfaction among citizens may be that 
members and heads of local councils are appointed by the PNA.  Appointment is reliant 
more on tribal and factional interests rather than on the input of citizens or the mem-
bers’ own professional standards. As a result, people tend not to trust the LGUs (neither 
the local councils nor their municipal governments).  Citizens blame them for not per-
forming their functions effectively.  
As revealed by the fieldwork interviews, the LGUs officials consider the participa-
tion of Local Neighborhood Committees41 in data collection during the formulation of 
long term physical plans is participation. Also, according to the planning law, LGUs are 
committed to conduct a public hearing to reveal citizens’ negative responses to their 
plans. Therefore conducting a public hearing after the formulation of the physical plans 
to get feedback from public (who are selectively invited) before getting planning ap-
proval is a second piece of participation, as understood by LGUs.  
                                                 
41
 Structure and performance of local neighbourhoods committees will be discussed in details in section 
(6.6) 
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On the other hand, and due to the recent interventions and huge efforts exerted by do-
nors and international organizations, NGOs and community representatives have begun 
to be invited to attend workshops and public meetings at the stages of data collection 
and formulation of local governments’ visions. According to the planning officer of 
Rafah municipality, the experience gained by the government staff during the formula-
tion of the long term comprehensive plan for Rafah (donor project) 42 has improved their 
understanding of participatory approaches.  
 
“during the formulation of the plan, we have divided Rafah municipality into twelve 
sub-areas. We have conducted at least one workshop in each area where we invited lo-
cal neighborhood committees together with NGOs working there. During these work-
shops, participants revealed their visions together with their suggested projects” 
Source: Interview with planning officer with Rafah municipality, 2005 
However, it was observed that this plan is kept in the drawers of the municipal planning 
department and has never been used to guide other planning or budgeting documents. 
Thus, the communities’ inputs have not been utilized. 
In actual fact, the local government officials do not trust the professionalism of the 
NGOs' contributions to planning formulation. According to the planning officer of 
Rafah municipality: 
 
“NGOs cannot participate proficiently in our planning activities. They do not have the 
technical ability neither the skills. They are very clever in listing huge projects that we 
cannot offer. In addition, we focus on spatial planning while they tend to engage in re-
lief activities” 
source: Interview with planning officer with Rafah Municipality, 2005 
 
This view was also shared by the planning officer of Gaza municipality who perceived 
NGO involvement in planning as luxury issue, only applicable in developed countries: 
 
“We do not have sufficient time nor resources to invite NGOs to participate in our plan-
ning activities. It is luxury issue, time consuming, and we need to concentrate on other 
urgent and basic issues” 
Source: Interview with planning officer with Gaza Municipality, 2005 
From the point of view of the NGOs, there is a misunderstanding of what should be the 
role of LGUs. NGOs, in addition to other sections of civil society, historically perceive 
LGUs as the only body which has the obligation to deliver services without the paying 
or even participating of communities. Hence, this perception has contributed to weaken-
ing citizens’ interests in participating in LGUs operations. 
 As described in (section 6.2), access of the Palestinian NGOs to the LGUs information 
base was found high when it concerned statistics, working data and technical reports, 
but that it did depend very much on the personal relationship between the personnel of 
the NGOs and LGU, and was not done in an organized or institutionalized manner. 
Most of the LGUs lack an adequate and institutionalized framework for engaging the 
civil society organizations in local planning which has resulted in poor NGO access to 
their operating systems and information. This issue in particular raises a big question 
regarding the accountability of LGUs. As accountability refers to the level of govern-
ment response to public interests, it implies responsiveness to the demands of the gov-
                                                 
42
 This project is financed by Canadian government and last for two years and has been implemented 
using some of participatory approaches under foreign consultancies.  
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erned, exercising widespread access to information. According to many observers, some 
of the major problems facing Palestine as a new emerging state are corruption, lack of 
transparency and accountability. It was clearly observed in the field the NGOs (as part 
of Palestinian civil society) do not have any institutionalized channels to hold local gov-
ernment staff accountable to citizens' needs and demands. The laws might impose some 
measures to hold LGUs officials accountable to central government but not to the com-
munities they serve. Lack of accountability makes it difficult for NGOs to have an in-
fluence over LGUs central operations. 
Indeed, the inception of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) after 1994, intro-
duced a great opportunity for the Palestinian NGOs to strengthen their role in develop-
ing the Palestinian community and shift their activities from relief frameworks to sus-
tainable development. NGOs began to work independently from the Israeli occupation 
interventions for the first time. To what extent did Palestinian NGOs utilize this oppor-
tunity? In the field interviews, when asked about their willingness to establish collabo-
rative relationships with local governments, many of the NGOs interviewed expressed 
their high willingness. 
 
– “establishing new channels for NGOs to participate in local government planning 
will provide the NGOs with potential to influence government policies ” 
Source: Interview with manager of PNGOs Network, 2005 
 
– “participating in governmental planning activities would increase the ability of the 
NGO to implement additional projects and create additional channels for acquiring 
more resources ” 
Source: Interview with Union of Agricultural Works Committee, 2005 
 
– “the existence of any systemized and strong relationship between both LGUs and 
NGOs would increase levels of trust, streamline the information exchange, consoli-
date their mutual works, help in a better determination of needs and priorities”  
Source: Interview with manger of the Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, 2005 
 
However this high willingness has never been translated into practical strategies or poli-
cies. When asked what deters NGOs from optimally participating in local government 
planning and policy making, respondents raise quite some important issues. NGOs 
mostly blame the government for having limited involvement in local government plan-
ning.  The reasons for poor involvement as revealed by NGOs vary among the follow-
ing issues: 
 
– “High tendency of central government to dominate local planning” 
– “Absence of the participatory policies at the government level” 
– “Absence of comprehensive development vision” 
Source: Interview with Salah Abd Ela’tey/ NGOs’ expert, 2005 
 
– “Weak NGOs networks” 
– “Weak communication mechanisms with the government”                                                  
Source: Interview with director of The Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, 2005 
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– “Absence of the law to regulate NGOs-LGUs relationship” 
– “The government mistrust NGOs, hence not able to understand their roles” 
Source: Interview with director Palestinian NGOs Network 
 
– “There is no defined spaces known by NGOs where they can make an influence” 
Source: Interview with project coordinator in El Amal Association for Handicaps Rehabilitations, 2005 
 
–  “Weak culture of participation among government staff” 
 Source: Interview with director of TAMER Institute for Community Education, 2005 
 
– “Both LGUs and NGOs lack resources and qualified staff” 
Source: Interview with director of TADAMON for Social and Charity Works, 2005 
 
– “Government in principle prefers to restrict NGOs work instead of promoting it. 
They fear the NGOs’ political role which might be played against them” 
Source: Interview with director of Islamic Association, 2005 
 
 
It was also observed that NGO respondents used term 'government' when talking about 
local governments. It was clear to the researcher, that NGOs perceive local and central 
government as one bundle or entity, and accordingly this might partially explain the 
absence of NGO policies to deal specifically with local governments. 
According to a study conducted by Bissan Centre for Research and Development in 
2001 about the role of NGOs in building civil society which covered 207 NGOs43, 
89.4% of the respondent NGOs mentioned that establishing a strong and positive rela-
tionship with the government would be an essential step for building civil and democ-
ratic society. When asked about the extent to which it is necessary to establish such 
relations, 71.3% pointed out that roles complement the other. Around 14.6% said that 
such relations with the government would provide a good opportunity for the NGOs to 
influence the government rules, policies and regulations, while 18.9 % mentioned that it 
would enable the NGOs to acquire financial and material support from the government. 
It is also useful to mention that 10.6% of the surveyed NGOs did not believe establish-
ing such relations was important or necessary for building civil and democratic society 
(Bissan 2001). 
In another study conducted by MAS (Palestinian Economic Policies Research Cen-
tre) in 2003, it was revealed that competition between government and NGOs for get-
ting funds and financial assistance contributed to weakening of the mutual relationship. 
Another study prepared by the Development Study Program in Bir Zeit University in 
2004, revealed that 81% of the NGOs and Government officials believe that competi-
tion over financial resources and funds is hindering the flourishing of the NGO-
government relationship.  Another reason for weakening this relationship indicated by 
MAS (2001) is the political role played by some Palestinian NGOs, which has lead in 
some cases to confrontation between them. The third reason, according to MAS (2001), 
is the absence of a unified vision for the NGOs, particularly regarding attitudes towards 
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 BISSAN centre for research and development.  See Online: bissan.org. Retrieved on January 18th, 
2006 
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the government. The fourth reason is the tendency of the government to impose a cen-
tralized pattern of ruling and planning. 
All of previous issues reveal clearly that Palestinian NGOs have the willingness to 
build a strong coordination relationship with the government from their side. But since 
they both fight and compete for acquiring financing resources, their cooperation has 
never reached an optimum level. The fieldwork revealed that there are other two main 
reasons that dissuade NGOs from sharing their resources with government: first, their 
limited available resources, and second, the prevailing attitude of some NGOs that the 
“government has to support them and not to take from them”, as one of the NGOs inter-
viewees expressed it. 
 More interesting, as mentioned early in this section, is the observation that the 
strong willingness of NGOs has neither been accompanied by clear policy frameworks 
to establish such a strong coordination nor have efforts been exerted by NGOs to create 
new spaces for their involvement.  Neither the NGOs nor the LGUs have a clear vision 
of how to translate this willingness into practical operating strategies in an institutional 
manner.  
However, at the central level, the situation might be different. Although a central 
government policy to work with NGOs in a complementary basis does not exist, some 
central institutions like the ministries of health and women's affairs have, to some ex-
tent, clear policies and visions to work together with NGOs. They tend to conduct regu-
lar consultations, workshops and meetings with related NGOs specialized in these 
fields, particularly when formulating short and medium government plans. 
 
“We are totally satisfied and appreciate the works of the minister of women affairs. She 
is open to NGOs and tends to consult us in every activity. Do not forget that she - before 
being a minister - used to be one of the biggest activists in non-governmental work. She 
as minister aware of the importance of NGOs”   
Source: Interview with director of Women’s Affairs Technical Committees, 2005 
 
Both the ministries of health and women's affairs recognize the huge work and activities 
introduced by the NGOs specialized in these fields. According to the project coordinator 
in the Union of Health Works Committees: 
 
“the ministry of health also recognized their inability in terms of resources and person-
nel to meet alone all of the health needs and services. As a result, they are enforced to 
consider NGOs as supporting agencies for their program implementations. They cannot 
ignore our huge input and capacity”   
Source: Interview with project coordinator in Union of Health Works Committees, 2005 
 
The Ministry of Health tends to involve health-specialized NGOs in the early stages of 
formulating its policies, plans and strategies, and delineates clear functions and respon-
sibilities among each other. The question is whether involvement of NGOs in such ac-
tivities is a policy of the government or being done occasionally? According to the head 
of the public relations department of the Union of Health Works Committees: 
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“the involvement of the health organizations in government policy formulation depends 
mainly on the personality of the minister; it is not a sustained policy of the ministry”   
Source: Interview with the head of public relations in Union of Health Work Committees, 2005 
This issue in particular indicates some of the serious problems that face the general 
management system in Palestine: the lack of vision, inconsistent policy, and institution-
alization. The attitude of senior government officials would be the strong driving force 
to determine the nature of the relationship with NGOs.  
Are NGOs able to monitor implementation of the policies and the plans where they 
have been consulted? According to the head of the public relations department in the 
Union of Health Work Committees: 
 
“   the health organizations do not have any access to follow up the implementation of 
the formulated policies or plans. The ministry starts very active then, as usual, falls 
asleep”    
Source: Interview with the head of public relations in Union of Health Work Committees, 2005 
The Ministry of Health tends to consult NGOs in early stages because it cannot ignore 
the NGOs’ high capacity. The health organizations have proved their high capacity and 
enjoy a good reputation among local communities. It is well-known in Palestine, that 
NGOs provide better services than the government itself in terms of quality.  According 
to the Ministry of Health (MOH 2004)44, there are 99 primary health care centers 
(PHCs) in the Gaza Strip. Among them, around 49 are administered by the MOH, 33 by 
NGOs and 17 by UNRWA. There are 32 PHCs in Gaza city alone. With regard to hos-
pitals, there are a total of 19 in the Gaza Strip, 12 under the MOH and seven with 
NGOs. Ten of the 19 hospitals are located in Gaza city as the dominant city in the area.  
 
Table  6.3: Distribution of health centers and hospitals in Gaza Strip 
Item Government NGOs UNRWA Total 
Primary health care centers 
Hospitals 
49 
12 
33 
7  
17 
-- 
99 
19 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2004. Online: www.moh.gov.ps Retrieved on September 26th,  2005   
Lastly, the experience in cooperation of health activities reveals clearly, the more NGOs 
have resources, skills and capacity, the more opportunity they have to force the gov-
ernments to coordinate their activities with them. The question is whether these NGOs 
are being used to implement government programs and policies, rather then establishing 
a truly collaboration process? It might be difficult to judge this question, since the co-
operation itself did not reach an optimum level and did not go beyond consultation in 
early stages. However, this issue has to be kept in mind as a caution when entering a 
partnership relationship with government at any level.    
Beyond the health and women's affairs sectors, the weak cooperation in general between 
NGOs and central government can be justified as being due to weak policy and an ab-
sence of central commitment to engage NGOs in development planning. According to 
the director of the NGOs department in the Ministry of Interior (MOI):  
 
 
                                                 
44
 Ministry of Health, Palestine. See online: www.moh.gov.ps. Retrieved on September 26th,  2005   
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“weak involvement of NGOs in government ministries’ planning and policy making can 
be easily observed.  According to my view, this is due to an absence of clear ministries’ 
visions and policies from one side and the absence of specialization on the NGOs side” 
Source: Interview with director of NGOs department in MOI, 2005 
 
In the field, it was also observed that some central government officials do not trust 
NGOs and suspect their roles. They fear that this sector would replace their roles and 
continue to weaken the state's relationship with public. In addition, some strong NGOs 
are affiliated with strong opposition political parties, which makes cooperation difficult 
due to political conflict. One interesting suggestion raised by a senior official in the 
Ministry of Interior to promote NGOs involvement, is to construct a new body (commit-
tee) from NGOs and government, to be integrated into the government structure:  
 
“There is a need to establish a mutual committee from the NGOs and government at the 
higher level. This committee to be responsible for forming clear visions, policies and 
operating strategies to organize their mutual works” 
Source: Interview with director of NGOs department in MOI, 2005 
 
Though this suggestion seems interesting, it might face incredible difficulties in trans-
lating it into reality. How to select representatives of the very diverse NGOs in Pales-
tine? And who has legitimacy to decide which NGOs should participate in this commit-
tee? Would the decisions of this committee be binding on all actors? How to give it 
legitimacy and how to integrate it into the government structure? How to ensure its de-
cisions are followed? Would it be a government or non-government body by its nature? 
Indeed, Palestinian history, both past and present, is full of committees formulated for 
many reasons. In view of the failure of these committees to achieve their goals, how can 
this new suggested committee differ from them? 
To conclude, it is apparent that relationships between NGOs and government institu-
tions are poor at all levels, apart from a few cases, and the relationships that do exist 
lack organization and consistency. This does not negate the existence of some success-
ful examples at the central level, in addition to those discussed, such as the Welfare 
Association Consortium for the Management of the Palestinian NGO project45; the Na-
tional Committee for fighting poverty46 and the Palestinian Human Development Re-
                                                 
45
 This institution was initiated by the World Bank and was highly supported by the PNGOs. The main 
aim of this association was to cover the financial shortages of the NGOs due to the tendency of the 
donors to support the PNA in a way to strengthen the developmental work of the NGOs particularly in 
alleviating poverty. The Consortium Association is managed by a committee composed of several 
NGOs networks such as The PNGO Network, the General Union for the Charitable Societies, The Na-
tional Committee for the PNGOs and a number of civil society representatives. In addition to these 
civil society representatives, the management committee also included PNA representatives from 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of NGO Affairs, representatives from the private sector and 
also from the World Bank as monitor. The main objectives of this initiative were to provide social and 
economic services in various developmental sectors; development of the organizational and institu-
tional building for the PNGOs; strengthening of the relationship between the PNGOs and the state 
46
 It is composed of representatives from the NGOs, the government institutions and ministries, private 
sector, UNRWA, Charity (ZAKAT) committees, and representatives of some donors. This committee 
is managed and coordinated by the Ministry of Planning. This committee has published the first report 
about poverty in Palestine with support from the United Nations Development Program. The commit-
tee did wide research on poverty in Palestine using (Participatory Poverty Assessment "PAA") .  
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port47. However, the analysis and discussion of these forums would go beyond the re-
search focus, which is limited to the local level.  
Relationship between LGUs and line government institutions: degree of local 
autonomous actions 
The official government planning system is composed of development planning institu-
tions, including the Higher Council for Planning, Ministry of Local Government, Minis-
try of Planning, regional planning committees, and other permanent and temporary bod-
ies entrusted with addressing issues or executing specific tasks. At the community level, 
the local government system includes local councils and municipal governments. In the 
following sub-sections we shine more light on the complexities characterizing the local- 
central relationship and their implications towards creation of policy spaces to involve 
NGOs in local planning and policy making. 
Palestine enjoys a long history of authoritarian regimes since the Ottoman Empire, 
passing through British mandate, Egyptian and Jordanian administrations and finally 
with Israeli occupation. Even after the inception of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA), centralized authority continues to hold power. This issue of authoritarian char-
acteristics has weakened the civil domain and restricted effective participation of civil 
society in general affairs. It has also imposed many restrictions on the vertical relation-
ship within the government line agencies themselves as more power is centralized at the 
top level of government.  
One of the major conditions in establishing effective participation of civil society in 
general affairs is the commitment of the central and local government to adopt partici-
patory methodologies in their development planning. This commitment has to be trans-
lated into political will that results in clear policy frameworks and specific institutional 
measures. The absence of this commitment weakens the efforts exerted by NGOs and 
by some governmental officials to promote participation. The absence of these institu-
tional measures that are supposed to streamline the participatory activities and delineate 
a clear mandate and responsibilities among actors involved, had also resulted in widen-
ing the gap between the civil society on one side and the government on the other. 
 According to many observers, disputes over power are one of the major characteris-
tics of Palestinian society, whether this power is political, social, economical or admin-
istrative. The central authorities tend to neglect segments of civil society and the lower 
government units at the local level. In the Palestinian society – as the Arab world gener-
ally – personal relationship is paramount in getting access to power and to determining 
the extent to which effective action measures may be expressed in laws, policies or in-
stitutional structures. 
While most of the recent Palestinian laws have emphasized the need for elected local 
councils to represent local communities and to manage their affairs, local elections were 
not conducted until ten years after the arrival of the Palestinian Authority. In the past, 
local elections were conducted occasionally and on a very limited basis. The previous 
elections were conducted in the Gaza Strip in 1944 and in the West Bank in 1976. The 
conducting of a local election at the end of 2004 would constitute a crucial step in assur-
                                                 
47
 It is composed of representatives of NGOs, PNA, and private sector and supported by United Nations 
Development Program. It publishes annual reports concerning human development in Palestine. This 
report is supervised by the Development Studies Program in Bir Zeit University. The preparation and 
publication of these reports contributes positively to strengthening the relationship among the various 
actors involved and in determining relevant strategies and formulating priorities for human development 
and fighting poverty. 
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ing proper presentation for citizens in local planning through democratic selection in-
stead of appointment. Meanwhile the need for a proper relationship between local coun-
cils and civil society organizations is still missed, which continues to weaken the influ-
ence of locally-based organizations over decision making processes. 
The continuing occupation and the absence of an independent Palestinian state in an 
actual sense combined with the scarcity of resources, hinders the contribution of local 
councils to the development process. Through recent decades, the Palestinian people 
have gained significant experience in development work, social organization, and de-
mocratic practices. A consensus appears to exist on the philosophical basis and the de-
sirable organizational structure for local government and its relationship with the central 
government. Various constitutional provisions lay out a framework for this structure. 
Article (176) of the temporary Palestinian Constitution 48 provides for “organizing rela-
tions between the administrations of local units on the basis of non-central democracy in 
managing units of local government”. Article (168) provides that “local councils should 
enjoy authority, be elected according to the law, and practice their legally established 
authorities. Local councils shall not be forced to sign commitments or agreements ex-
cept in their area of specialty and in coordination with the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment.” Article 95 of the Constitution Draft provides that the law shall establish “the 
tasks of local councils, their financial resources, and relation with the central govern-
ment, as well as their role in preparing and executing development plans and supervis-
ing various activities. Distribution shall be based, as much as possible, on the number 
and distribution of residents.” However, what had been promised by the constitution 
was not properly articulated in the legal frameworks as discussed early in this chapter. 
The provisions of the draft Basic Law envisage a democratic, non-centralized, 
elected local government that should perform an active role in planning, execution, im-
plementation and monitoring.  However, in reality, and according to the Palestinian 
Human Development Report (2000:66), what exists is “..a centralized, and somewhat 
chaotic system, one that limits community participation in the decision-making process 
and implements regulations in an inconsistent fashion. In preparation of national plans 
and budgets, there is weak community participation. Furthermore, the allocation of 
budgets among local councils has been inconsistent. Local civil society groups are not 
actively engaged in the work of local councils”. 
PNA institutions have made important steps in working with local governments and 
communities, but according to the Palestinian Human Development Report (2002:51-
66), these steps remain modest and fail to achieve Palestinian potential and to be com-
prehensive and consistent. Although the Israeli occupation and other external factors 
have compromised the role of the PNA, there are local, self-imposed factors that have 
limited the ability of the PNA to build a more fertile relationship with the local commu-
nity and its representatives. While justified to a large extent, the PNA has focused atten-
tion on political matters at the expense of addressing economic, social and development 
concerns, and has not paid enough attention to the necessary connection between short 
and long term development requirements, and the necessary relationship between 
achieving national goals and development goals. Public support for the establishment of 
the first-ever PNA has been unprecedented. However, there was disapproval at what 
was seen as a dereliction of duty in the delivery of services and in security; a sentiment 
in evidence at the beginning of the Intifada. This has led to calls for greater responsive-
ness and a more effective central government, especially with the establishment of hun-
                                                 
48 The Fourth Draft of the Constitution for the Interim Status Stage, a document prepared by the Palestin-
ian Legislative Council and published on 22 January, 1996. 
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dreds of local councils with no, or limited, experience and ability in service delivery, 
democratic practices, and development approaches (Palestinian Human Development 
Report 2002:51-66).  
The administrative structure law “obligates the council and strips it of all authority, 
turning it into an employee of the district” (Yaqoub and Al-araj 2001 as cited in Human 
Development Report 2002:103). The law diminishes local councils’ authority and pre-
vents them from exercising authority spelled out by the law. The abilities of a local 
council to play a partnership role in decision making vary according to the council’s 
reliance on self-funding, and its relative influence within the ranks of executive author-
ity, decision making powers and donors. Some larger municipalities, whose reliance on 
executive authority ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, is limited, are able to 
overcome obstacles that seem insurmountable for smaller municipalities. They are aided 
in doing so by their great ability to influence decision makers and donors, which enables 
them to avoid complications. On the flip side, smaller, weaker municipalities (especially 
newer ones) do not enjoy such influence and resources, increasing the gap between 
them and their larger counterparts (Palestinian Human Development Report 2000:104). 
Also, the overlapping of the roles of ministries and other institutions regarding their 
relationship with local councils confuses the latter, causes conflict within the authorities 
of the ministry itself, and also wastes resources because of lack of effective coordina-
tion. Cooperation among municipalities is very limited. In addition, the General Union 
of Local Councils is considered very weak due to the absence of clear vision and lack of 
resources. 
The ministry of local government formulates some local plans for small LGUs when 
such LGUs lack the technical ability to formulate their own.  According to the Legal 
consultant of the Central Planning Committee at the Ministry of Local Government 
(MOLG): 
 
“..talking about small local councils, we have encountered some examples as in El-
shouka, and Elmasadar councils where they ask us for technical assistance to formulate 
their plans”  
Interview with Legal Consultant in MOLG, 2005 
 
With regard to participation of LGUs in regional and national planning, the LGUs 
themselves perceive their influence as limited due to the centralized decision making 
pattern that characterizes the planning process.  According to the planning officer of 
Rafah Municipality: 
 
“It is true that the central planning committee and some ministries ask us about our 
views or for information. But it is also true that our input in many occasions is disre-
garded and not taken into consideration. There are no mechanisms that enable us to 
monitor formulation of regional and national plans. Making decisions in this regard is 
centralized and even our representation in such central committees is formal and not 
actual”  
Source: Interview with Planning officer of Rafah Municipality, 2005 
 
The central and local governments co-ordinate the physical planning activities through-
out the Central Committee for Building and City Planning (CCBCP) that composed 
from representatives of all government ministries and municipalities. This committee is 
under the supervision of ministry of local government. It concentrates its tasks on 
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physical activities and is considered as a governmental department under hierarchy of 
MOLG. In order to increase their influence on the central government, the LGUs formu-
late the UNION of LGUs. As revealed by both planning officers of Gaza, and Rafah 
municipalities, this union is inactive due to absence of a clear organizational structure, 
policies and due to the very limited resources available for the Union.  According to the 
planning officer of Rafah municipality: 
 
“the Union of Municipalities started strongly, then its role has been  rapidly diminished 
and weakened”  
Source: Interview with Planning officer of Rafah Municipality, 2005 
 
As observed in the field, the LGUs are concentrating on infrastructure projects and they 
are deprived partially or totally of the ability to practice their developmental roles in 
education, health, sports, cultural and social development, as mentioned before.  
Though the new Local Body’s laws of 1996 and 1997 are talking about decentralization, 
the MOLG did not delegate genuine power or resources to local councils. 
According to the Palestinian Human Development Report (2002:105), “the role of 
the PNA in achieving sustainable development is positive, but generally modest and 
greatly affected by external circumstances. Self-imposed factors influence both the suc-
cesses and failures of government and civic performance. The PNA has failed to build a 
relationship based on confidence and mutual respect with the Palestinian community, 
local councils and NGOs”. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Development 
Studies Program in Bir Zeit University in 2004, results have shown a low level of trust 
between citizens and PA institutions, where only 23% trust government performance. 
According to (Miree 2000:49), one of the PNA’s self imposed obstacles was the failure 
to provide policies of good governance and a balanced framework under which to or-
ganize key Palestinian initiatives. The PNA similarly failed to recognize the relationship 
between development and resistance. The political agenda consumed the lion’s share of 
human resources and available assets. Decision makers did not establish defined and 
institutionalized tools to arrange the priorities of the community. They did not exhibit 
ample understanding of the practical aspects of human development and, in general, did 
not take it seriously.  
To conclude, the PNA did not delegate authority or create mechanisms to enable lo-
cal councils to fulfill their potential role in development and administrative affairs. Cen-
tral PNA institutions currently find themselves unable to work harmoniously with local 
councils and other community institutions and appear increasingly bureaucratic in their 
outlook and function. In addition, few municipalities receive adequate funding to allow 
them to assume their tasks and most are not delegated sufficient authority to participate 
in decision making.  
In the following section we explore the relationship between the local government 
units and the Ministry of Local Government as a key central actor with direct influence 
over the key operations of Palestinian LGUs. 
LGUs and the ministry of local government; supportive administration versus local government  
The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) was formed by a decision from the exiled 
Palestinian leadership in Tunisia on 25th, February 1994. The Ministry was to imple-
ment a limited vision of a local government structure and to ensure that “local govern-
ment consists of local councils in the form of municipalities, town and villages councils, 
and joint service councils that work for the benefit of the residents. Each local commit-
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tee has an area of jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state” (PHDR 2002:62). The 
ministry adopted a general policy based on the following four basic objectives (PHDR 
2002:62-63): 
– Advancing the concepts of local government and decentralized management, and to 
create local government institutions that support the national objective of building 
Palestinian local communities that embrace democratic elections, 
– Raising the quality of services in the Palestinian rural community to bridge the gap 
between rural and urban areas, 
– Developing the abilities of local councils, and 
– Reviewing the performance of local councils established before the inception of the 
PNA in order to arrive at a local government vision concurrent with the Palestinian 
agenda. 
Nevertheless, there is a gap between the stated objectives and what was actually imple-
mented. The recurrence of terms such as centrality, decentralization, and participation in 
the literature of local government is interesting, in the absence of a clear context for 
interpretation. The legal system’s references to local government are marked by a high 
degree of ambiguity. These objectives are far from being achieved; members of local 
councils are appointed based on familial grounds, rather than professional merits; 
women are grossly underrepresented; there is a lack of clear planning and resources.  
There is low community participation in the work of local councils. This might have 
resulted in disenchantment with their performance. Various public opinion polls have 
shown a generally negative evaluation of the performance of local councils. According 
to PHDR (2000:64), “the Ministry of Local Government issued decisions regarding 
internal policies that conflicted with the authorities delegated to local councils by law. 
Also the appointment mechanism revived and strengthened the favoritism”. According 
to Abdel’aty (2005:54) this “orientation towards administrative decentralization is not 
accompanied by political decisions or commitments which have to be translated into 
operational policies and institutionalized strategies”. As discussed earlier in this chapter 
with regard to limitations of the law of Local Bodies of 1997, the law conferred sweep-
ing powers in the hands of the MOLG, whilst simultaneously limiting the functional 
jurisdiction of the local councils to delivery of certain services.   
Local councils and Higher Planning Council; weak involvement in higher decisions 
The High Planning Council and its affiliate bodies are considered vital to the work of 
local councils. The higher council was established by presidential decree which was 
issued on 21 August 1995, and is headed by the minister of local government. The 
Council’s membership comprises representatives from the ministries of planning, public 
works, transport, housing, health, labor, tourism and antiquities, industry, agriculture, 
trade, culture and environment, in addition to the Attorney General, the Jerusalem Cus-
todian, and the general director of urban planning at the MOLG. According to the Con-
sultation Group for Rural Development (ARD 2000:13), the higher council is noted for 
“centrality, especially in financial affairs”. Examining the composition and performance 
of the council, as noted by the Human Development Report (2002:64), “the absence of 
community participation is evident”. The administrative structures law reinforced cen-
tralization and failed to clarify administrative policies. However, the Intifada affirmed 
that decentralization, and local and community participation, are decisive factors in 
empowering the Palestinian community in view of the failure encountered by central 
state to respond effectively to urgent needs of the Palestinians. 
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In fact, “the PNA when issuing several decrees, works without guiding policies or 
planned frameworks” (Human Development Report, 2002:64). According to the field-
work interviews with LGUs, the influence of local councils on the work of the High 
Planning Council is minimal.  
 
“since its establishment, the higher council has conducted very few meetings. The meet-
ing themselves could not result in concrete actions” 
Source: Interview with the planning officer in Rafah municipality, 2005 
 
It was clear that there is a degree of dissatisfaction of local government officials with 
higher planning institutions.  According to them, these institutions, though established 
to increase LGUs participation in higher decision making, they rarely consider their 
views nor take them seriously. 
Local councils and governorate; conflict of mandates and weak co-operation  
As for relationship between local councils and governors, often the authority of the 
council and that of the governor entangle, and the authority extended to local councils is 
unclear due to the vagueness of governor authority.  More interesting, is how the LGUs 
themselves perceive the role of governorates. According to the interviews with the 
planning officers of Gaza and Rafah municipalities: 
 
 
“the LGUs focus on services delivery while the governorate focuses on relief. The gov-
ernor used to intervene in emergency situations” 
Source: Interview with the planning officer in Rafah Municipality, 2005 
 
According to the researcher’s experience as a regional planner, the governorate is a 
government unit that lies between the local level and regional level. Their input in 
preparation of the plans, whether local or regional, is minimal. They tend to work inde-
pendently in appraising additional projects suggested from outside and by donors, 
which are to be implemented in their local jurisdiction areas.  In general, the relations 
between LGUs and Governorates are neutral but in some cases, conflicts occur between 
them over some disputed responsibilities due to the overlapping of functions and man-
dates. 
To conclude, in examining the position of local councils and municipal governments 
in relation to the state agencies, it became evident that the weak commitment of central 
government to delegate more power in terms of resources, and administrative and deci-
sion making to local levels, has limited the LGUs in improving performance and  
achieving an effective service delivery system. It was also clear that in order to foster 
effective citizen participation, both of the actors involved in this equation (LGUs and 
NGOs) must enjoy enough power, resources and autonomy. According to many observ-
ers, the PA did not exert enough efforts to enable proper environment that could provide 
for citizens’ needs for economic and social security; ensure social justice and protection 
of human rights; strengthen the devolution of power and resources to local bodies; pro-
mote and facilitate the participation of citizens in governance; create and nurture an 
enabling environment for effective and collective citizen actions nor facilitate active 
citizenship.  More seriously, the locus of decision making power continues to be located 
at the top level of government. 
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Beyond local actors; role of the international and creditable organizations in local 
planning 
According to the fieldwork findings, donor countries were found to be the most impor-
tant source of funding for both Palestinians local governments and NGOs. It was also 
observed, that in many cases, those who receive the funds (whether government or 
NGOs) are restricted to the agenda of donors. Donors play a decisive role in how the 
funds are to be used, sometimes inconsistent with the real needs and priorities of the 
local community. This situation, according to a World Bank Report (2000), is created 
by the following:  
– Failure of the donors to grant the beneficiaries an active role in sustaining projects, 
– Failure of the donors to provide sufficient support to improve the abilities and ca-
pacities of local councils, 
– Failure of donors to co-ordinate their relief assistance and tie it with sustainable 
development within a unified strategy, 
– The donors emphasized projects with tangible results and effects on the expense of 
long term development projects except in some cases, 
– Difficulties in cooperation between donors and local communities and councils due 
to different values, culture and work style, and 
– Bias in allocating loans and budgets where some of local councils and NGOs do not 
attract the donors’ attention. 
As we have mentioned before in this chapter, more than 80% of the activities imple-
mented by NGOs or local governments are financed by donors. The limited resource 
base available for Palestinian NGOs and government has created a competing environ-
ment in order to acquire the donors’ funds. Thus, this has created an environment that is 
based on suspicion and confrontation.  
 
Palestinian NGOs rely in principle on donors to finance their programs and activities. 
Many donors expressed their commitment to enhancing the ongoing political settle-
ments process. According to (Abd Elhady 2004: 45), “external financial support for 
Palestinian NGOs is based on a vision of Palestinian needs from the perspective of do-
nors and in correlation with the donors’ goals and objectives. It is also obvious that ex-
ternal financial support is not independent of governmental influence. In other words, 
funding reflects the agenda of the donor country”. 
Palestinian NGOs exert a minimal influence on the agenda of donors due to the absence 
of joint understandings and agreements between Palestinian NGOs and the donor com-
munity in identifying the Palestinians needs. The relationship is based on the delivery of 
finance and in accordance with the priorities of donors. One important observation in 
this regard, is that large modern developmental organizations operating at national level 
enjoy better access to financial resources than small traditional organizations working at 
local level.  
 
“advocacy and research organizations are more advantaged as regards raising financing 
from donors” 
Source: Interview with Salah Abd Ela’tey (NGOs expert), 2005 
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By advocacy organizations, we mean the ones working at the national level to advocate 
for government reforms, human rights and democracy. The flow of funds to major or-
ganizations at the expense of small organizations has resulted in widening the gap and 
creation of a mistrustful relationship between large and small NGOs. This has led one of 
the interviewees from small NGOs to call big organizations “monsters” while another 
interviewee called them “fat cats”.  
 
“Donors’ funding goes to those who don’t deserve. Big organizations got these funds 
because they have the technical capacity, high proficiency, and better personal relation-
ship with outsiders. When will we get a chance as a small NGO to prove our self? It is 
really business and these big organizations behave as monsters” 
Source: Interview with director of TADAMON for Social and Charity Works, 2005 
 
“There are big fats in the NGOs sector, and we can’t compete with them” 
Source: Interview with director of TAMER Institute for Community Education, 2005  
 
“It is the donors who decide nature of implemented projects” 
Source: interview with project coordinator in EL Amal Association for Handicaps Rehabilitation, 2005 
Donors’ funds go to major NGOs since they are well structured and have better techni-
cal capacity, which makes them more able to comply with donors’ requirements. All of 
the small organizations interviewed in the field complained that they did not have the 
same opportunities as big organizations to get funding from international organizations 
or donors. On the other hand, and with regard to donors’ efforts in introducing new par-
ticipatory approaches, it was observed their positive roles in this regard. The donors 
tend to put firm pressure on both NGOs and government to use participatory approaches 
as a crucial activity in their programs and projects. The Palestinian NGOs interviewed 
in the field have taken various stands as to how they perceive role of donors. Following 
summarized these split views: 
 
– Donors play a vital role in supporting economically and technically the NGOs.   
Donors can put pressure on government to promote involvement of NGOs in the 
planning process. 
(Source: Interviews with Palestinian NGOs Network, Women’s Affairs Technical Committees, 
YABUS for social and charity Works, El Amal Association for Handicaps Rehabilitation, General 
Service Association for Kanada Camp , 2005) 
– Some NGOs suspect the donors’ agenda particularly the ones affiliated with opposi-
tion political parties (religious and leftist parties). All of the (leftist) NGOs stated 
that they will not cooperate any more with USAID and its affiliated organizations. 
(Source: Interviews with Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, Tadamon For Social and Charity 
Works, Tamer Institute for Community Education, Union of agricultural Works Committees, Islamic 
Association, 2005) 
– Some see the projects funded by these organizations as they don’t meet communi-
ties’ priorities and needs. 
(Source: Interviews with Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, Tadamon For Social and Charity 
Works, Islamic Association, El Amal Association for Handicaps Rehabilitation, 2005) 
– Most of the NGOs appreciate the role played by the UN organizations in develop-
ment fields calling for more cooperation with the NGOs side. 
(Source: Interviews with Union of Health Work Committees, Palestinian Progressive Youth Union, 
Tadamon For Social and Charity Works, Islamic Association, Palestinian NGOs Network, Women’s 
Affairs Technical Committees, YABUS for social and charity Works, El Amal Association for 
Handicaps Rehabilitation, General Service Association for Kanada Camp , 2005) 
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The politicized nature of some of Palestinian NGOs might have an effect on the nature 
of their relationship with the international community.  Some of the donors, such as 
Japan, Canada, GTZ, WORLD Bank and the UN organizations, have strong reputations 
since “their works can be seen on the ground in terms of building new infrastructure and 
creation of new jobs” - according to interview with Salah Abda’ltey (NGOs expert).  
 In a public poll conducted by the Development Study Program in Bir Zeit University 
2004, 49% of respondents believed that international assistance has lessened the human 
suffering of the Palestinian people. A slightly higher proportion (56%) of Gaza respon-
dents believes this to be the case than in the West Bank (44%).  The overwhelming ma-
jority (62%) of respondents believe that donor countries and funding agencies have a 
hidden political agenda when it comes to the granting of international financial aid to 
the Palestinians.  
On a related aspect, and as the NGO sector has grown and funding has increased, 
there is a concern that this may actually decrease the legitimacy and accountability of 
some NGOs. In some cases, it was observed that NGOs are more accountable to donors 
who provide funds than to communities who receive benefits. According to the re-
searcher’s view, this issue might negatively affect the legitimacy of these NGOs in the 
eyes of community. Another issue which is of great concern is the emphasis placed by 
donors on service delivery strategies at the expense of advocacy roles that could be 
played by NGOs. In other words, donors contract Palestinian NGOs to implement their 
programs. This emphasis, according to the researcher’s view, has undermined the Pales-
tinian NGOs’ envisioned vital role in advocating citizens’ needs at the government 
level, and shifted their concentration to project implementation and service provisions.  
As regards the influence of donors on state policy, the donors have exerted consider-
able efforts in creating new spaces where LGUs and NGOs can meet and discuss vari-
ous issues of concern. This was clearly observed in the projects implemented by both 
Rafah and Gaza municipalities which are funded by donors.  The donors put pressure on 
the government to establish new relationships with NGOs when implementing their 
programs and plans. The donors put strict conditions on the government in order to get 
the funds, and ensure that citizen participation is among these conditions.  
Although donors’ efforts are helping to break the previously dominantly centralized 
way of planning, it was also observed that these new approaches have never been ac-
companied by any institutionalized measures that would ensure sustainability in the 
adoption of participatory approaches after the withdrawal of donors. It is clear that the 
donors have to exert more effort to promote the creation of lasting changes in Palestin-
ian policies, regulations and laws and not to concentrate only on short term projects. 
They also have to emphasize more training and capacity building for government staff. 
The efforts of donors have to be accompanied by a tremendous internal effort on the 
part of both the state and civil society in order to institutionalize these approaches – 
when they are relevant – in a sustainable manner. Both sides have to be innovative and 
creative and to adapt participatory approaches that would match their culture, environ-
ment and resources.  
To conclude, the total dependence on donors in terms of finance has increased the 
dependency of government and non-government institutions on donors, limited the 
space for more autonomous and innovative actions, increased competition and disputes 
between NGOs and government over resources, and this might lead to development of a 
conspiracy relationship and finally weakening of the state.  
Having discussed the dynamics of actors’ relationships at the local level, the next 
step is to examine the input of each actor within the planning and policy making proc-
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esses.  Due to its simplicity, the researcher used a power distribution matrix to meet this 
goal, as will be discussed in the next section.  
Locus of decision making power at the local level and power distribution matrix; 
exclusion versus inclusion 
By exploring where decision making power is made or located, we will have more 
understanding of the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion affecting each actor at the local 
planning and policy making levels. The actors having potential contribution at the local 
planning level are include: the High Planning Council (HPC), Ministry of Planning 
(MOP), Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), and Ministry of Finance (MOF) at the 
central level. At the regional level there is the Central Committee for Building and City 
Planning (CCBCP), and at the local level, which is our focus, these actors  include the 
local councils (LCs), municipal governments and governorates. From the civil society 
side, there are the Palestinian local NGOs, local neighbourhood committees (LNCs) and 
political parties (some may call them political society) and donors.  
The locus of decision power covers the following functional components: policy 
making, planning, implementation, finance and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation 
The following power distribution matrix was made by the researcher based on the 
fieldwork findings, documentaions shared by respondents, and observations together 
with the researcher’s experience as a regional government planner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
           
129 
Table  6.4: Power distribution matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Distribution Matrix
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CSOs: Civil Society Organizations                                     LCs: Local Councils                    
HPC: High Planning Council                                          LGUs: Local Government Units
MOP: Ministry of Planning                                           LNCs: Local Neighbourhood Committees
MOLG: Ministry of Local Government NGOs: Non-governmental organizations
MOF: Ministry of Finance                                             CBOs: Community based organizations  
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With focus on inclusion and exclusion of LGUs (local councils and municipal govern-
ments combined) and NGOs, the following are important considerations as revealed by 
the power distribution matrix: 
Policy making 
– Setting of local policy: The decision making power is mainly located in the hands of 
the ministries of local government and of planning. Local councils have no concrete 
input in this regard, while municipal governments just provide information to the 
upper level. NGOs might also provide some information to municipal governments; 
however their cooperation with local councils (appointed or elected) is totally ab-
sent. It is important to emphasize, that according to the law, the local council is the 
government body which is supposed to formulate local policies – which has never 
happened on the ground. 
– Guidance and principles for planning: This operation is totally dominated by both 
the Ministry of Local Government and the Central Committee for Building and City 
Planning. There might be some occasions where municipal governments provide 
some information. Neither local councils nor NGOs have any input or feedback in 
this regard. 
 
Planning 
– Vision building and goal setting: the power to take decisions in this regard is shared 
among the ministries of planning and of local government, and the Central Commit-
tee for Building and City Planning, with limited cooperation among them which has 
confused the LGUs. The LGUs might provide some information, but there is no 
guarantee that their input will be considered. The NGOs have no input except for 
some occasions when the projects are funded by donors, in which case consultation 
with local NGOs becomes obligatory.  
– Data base and collection: This operation is mainly practiced by the ministries of 
planning and local government while local NGOs and municipal governments pro-
vide information.  
– Determining priorities: Priorities are mainly determined by the central level institu-
tions for example, the ministries of planning, and local government and other sec-
toral ministries like health and education. The local councils and municipal govern-
ments might be consulted, while, NGOs are totally excluded.  
– Physical planning: Though municipal governments prepare these plans, the final 
decision for physical planning is dominated by the Central Committee for Building 
and City Planning together with the Ministry of Local Government. These central 
institutions can amend, change, approve or reject the plans. Sometimes these central 
institutions prepare the physical plans on behalf of some small LGUs. Once again, 
the NGOs are totally excluded. 
– Socio-economic planning: Decision power in this sector is mostly located in the 
hands of the Ministry of Planning. LGUs and NGOs might share or provide some 
information, but their views are not binding. 
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Implementation 
– Strategies and delivery mechanisms: At the local level, although there are consulta-
tions with central institutions, the municipal governments are the bodies responsible 
for implement these mechanisms.  
– Formulation of action plans: Under the guidance and supervision of central institu-
tions, the municipal councils decide on action plans. In the implementation of the 
plans or the projects at local level, NGOs have minimal input. 
Financing and budgeting 
– Determine tax and revenue collection: These issues are mainly decided by the cen-
tral authority represented by the Ministry of Finance. LGUs and NGOs are totally 
excluded and do not have access to influence these decisions.  
– Resources share: Central government provides a small share (5%), while donors 
provide around 90% for development projects. The NGOs’ share in implementing 
government projects is absent.  
– The budgeting plans are formulated by the municipal governments under the super-
vision and guidance of the Ministry of Local Government. As a matter of formality, 
the local councils have to approve the plans before forwarding them to the Ministry 
of Local Government which can amend, approve and reject the budgeting plans. The 
NGOs have no access to local government budgeting and expenditure. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
– Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of local plans and projects is being 
done mainly by central institutions in cooperation with municipal local govern-
ments. The NGOs are totally excluded from these operations.   
So far we have explored the legal frameworks, interplay of actors, knowledge and 
power in the planning process in creating and shaping policy spaces. The following 
section concludes the review of these spaces, looking at whether they exist by invition 
of the government or are autonomous attempts made by NGOs.  
6.6 Spaces for NGOs involvement in local planning; invited versus 
autonomous  
It was clear from the previous discussions in this chapter, that the interplay between 
knowledge, the dynamics between actors, and power relationships has resulted in lim-
ited spaces in which NGOs become involved in local planning and policy making proc-
esses. Policy and planning spaces have been identified as moments in which interven-
tions or events throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring relationships between actors 
within these spaces or bringing in new actors, and opening up the possibilities of a shift 
in direction (Grindle and Thomas 1991 as cited in Brock et al. 2000:37). Policy spaces 
as understood by this research are not just boardrooms or meeting halls but moments of 
intervention where actors negotiate possibilities, mobilize discourses and play out 
power dynamics.  
In this section we examine some of the spaces that we have encountered during the 
course of research and think about their construction and their boundaries and the im-
pact these spaces have on the agency of the different actors in the policy process. What 
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opportunities do different kinds of spaces offer for the elaboration of policy? What con-
straints exist on the representation of organized groups of civil society? 
Invited spaces are the ones that are created by the local government in the shape of 
forums, venues or committees to meet and consult communities in planning and policy 
making.  These spaces – as found by this researcher during fieldwork – are local 
neighborhood committees, public hearing workshops and media (usually newsletters). 
Autonomous spaces are attempts created by organized groups within civil society (fo-
cusing on NGOs) to create new potentials to influence government policies and plans at 
the local level. Here it is important to emphasize two issues: 
First, with reference to the invited spaces created by the government, it was observed 
during fieldwork that these are not targeted at NGOs specifically, but intend to include a 
wide range of community actors and representatives. Some NGOs might participate in 
the public hearing if they are invited. Though local neighborhood committees are con-
sidered in this context as spaces, and since they differ totally from NGOs in terms of 
structure and functions, they represent as well some sort of organized institutions for 
civil society. This will be the angle from which it will be tackled. 
Secondly, at the Palestinian local level, the researcher did not encounter any serious 
attempts of NGOs to open or create new spaces to influence decision making and plan 
formulation. However, some Palestinian NGOs tend to focus their influence on the cen-
tral government by lobbying for example to influence health policies or the NGOs law 
as was explained before (in sections 6.2 and 6.4). However, since the focus concerns 
only the local level, the absence of autonomous attempts of NGOs to create new spaces 
to influence local decision making and planning process is an important finding.   
The Palestinian civil society perception of planning and policy spaces is that they are 
the exclusive domains of government. There is marked disconnection between what 
may be regarded as “government business” and “civil society business”. There is a gen-
eral impression that government officials have particular mindsets which in a way ren-
der them unable to engage effectively with civil society in policy making and planning. 
Yet the central government, according to many NGOs respondents, makes rhetorical 
claims of its collaborating with civil society, probably in order to secure funding from 
donors. Here are the perceptions of some Palestinian NGOs, revealed in the interviews:  
 
– “those in government are not ready to listen to NGOs advice” 
    TAMER Institute for Community Education 
 
– “usually when planning documents are being prepared, the views of NGO represen-
tatives  even at the later stages of public hearings, do not get reflected in the final 
outputs. NGOs don’t have capacity to influence final output” 
                                                          The Palestinian Progressive Youth  Union  
 
– “government makes contacts with NGOs when they are obliged to do so. It is just to 
amuse and to satisfy donors’ requirements” 
TADAMON  for social and charity works  
– “local governments concentrate on infrastructure projects which is their exclusive 
business while we as NGOs tend to focus in relief works” 
General Service Association for Kanaka Camp 
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The policy spaces are sometimes nothing more than mere pronouncements by the ex-
ecutive municipal government through the media, and the pronouncements may not be 
followed up with the appropriate guidelines, yet they may constitute the effective poli-
cies.  Indeed, the fact of non-inclusion of NGOs in planning spaces is not a new devel-
opment in the Palestinian context. Historically, throughout the absence a the Palestinian 
state, NGOs used to run their affairs independently from the various ruling authorities, 
practicing their important role in providing communities with basic needs, but remain-
ing isolated from government. In other words, NGOs used to fulfill the function of para- 
state institutions. Currently, neither the NGOs nor the Palestinian government could 
solve this dilemma by recognizing the need to create new spaces where both can meet, 
discuss and collaborate seeking to satisfy citizens’ needs. As mentioned on several oc-
casions in this chapter, they rather tend to compete over resources and the government 
seeks to restrict and control NGO works.  
As mentioned in chapter two, due to Palestinian NGO history and the transitional and 
uncertain nature of the political context in Palestine, the relationship between NGOs and 
the government according to Jarrar (2005)49  , has gone through different phases: 
– The first phase took place directly after the creation of the Palestinian Authority. It 
was mainly characterized by uncertainty about the role of NGOs in the emerging po-
litical context and the creation of governmental organs. The government was of two 
minds in this respect: on the one hand, it recognized the need for the services pro-
vided by NGOs to fill the gap which it was unable to do. On the other hand, NGOs 
were regarded as competitors to the service-delivery system of the government.  
– The second phase was defined by mutual acceptance. It marked the initiation of 
dialogue between the NGOs and the government. As a matter of principle, the 
NGOs started to formulate their own political discourse on civil society, democracy 
and the rule of law. In this phase, the NGO movement witnessed a major shift in 
funding priorities from service delivery to a program approach with its main empha-
sis on gender, democracy and human rights. This led to a change in the activities 
and strategies of some of the NGOs. 
– The third phase was characterized by the emerging collaboration between the Pales-
tinian Legislative Council and the NGO sector related to the drafting and endorse-
ment of the Palestinian NGO law. A professional cooperation between the NGOs 
and the relevant ministries also took place. 
According to the researcher’s view, the first and second phases, which covered almost 
the first seven years of establishment of the Palestinian Authority, have made both ac-
tors aware of the importance of their cooperation and collaboration. It seems that the 
Palestinian Authority as a new emerging state is not yet prepared to create efficient in-
vited spaces for NGOs, particularly at the local level, nor can they allow for autono-
mous attempts by NGOs to have an influence over its policies. The third phase might 
prove to be the most important for at least clarifying the legal environment where NGO-
governments interactions are to occur. Although these initiatives are still primitive (as 
discussed in 6.1), the dialogue among NGOs and governments is expected to extend to 
cover all the missing and ambiguous areas, particularly those identifying the NGOs-
LGUs relationship at the local level.  This hopefully might take the shape of the fourth 
phase. 
                                                 
49
 as cited in the Palestinian Israelis Journal (Vol.12 No.1 2005: 39-51) 
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Local neighborhood committees 
The local neighborhood committees exist at local level of the Palestinian local govern-
ment system. They are created to serve a purpose of representing their local communi-
ties in the formulating of local physical plans. However, to what extent are these com-
mittees representative? And to what extent do they have the potential to influence local 
decision making?  These issues are what we intend to disclose in this section. 
At the time this research was being conducted, there were no meetings between these 
committees and LGUs to be observed directly by the researcher for more analysis and 
in-depth investigation. The research rather depended on retrospective data (mainly vo-
cally since meetings are not documented ). The researcher made use of the interviews of 
three local committees that work within Rafah municipality together with municipality 
planning officers  in order to investigate the questions. We will begin by introducing the 
structure of these committees then investigate their roles and influence. 
As revealed by the fieldwork interviews, the neighborhood committees are distributed 
across an LGU jurisdiction. For example in Rafah municipality which serves a commu-
nity of 151,000 population, there are twelve formulated local committees. According to 
the planning officer: 
 
“the number of local committees was even more than twelve. We used to work with 49 
local committees. But since it was very difficult to work with all of these committees, 
we divided our LGU into 12 sub-areas in the year 1999”. 
                            Source: Interview with   Rafah municipality planning officer, 2005 
 
It was interesting to observe – as revealed by interviews – how these local committees 
are formulated. It is not based on election, nor on a community meeting where the group 
select representatives from among themselves. It is rather a process that is supervised by 
the mayor who consults heads of families and the prominent community leadership 
which exists in that area. He asks them collectively to come up with a number of five to 
nine persons (depending on the size of the area). Sometimes the community leadership 
can generate a consensus for selecting their representatives at their first meeting to-
gether, or with the mayor.  Sometimes the community itself can come directly to the 
mayor suggesting names even if the mayor did not ask for this. These committees, after 
forwarding their names to the Mayor, will then be legally accredited by the Ministry of 
Local Government, unlike the NGOs which have to be accredited by the Ministry of 
Interior.  
To what extent do these committees truly represent their local communities? According 
to Rafah municipality planning officer:  
 
“ we have experienced a lot of problems when working with local communities. When a 
committee is formulated to represent an area, some other people from the same area will 
come up with another committee claiming that they are not consulted in the formation 
of the previous committee” 
                            Source: Interview with  Rafah municipality planning officer, 2005 
 
It was clear that the formation of local committees is not systemized nor organized in an 
institutional manner. Indeed, this problem is created because the local committees are 
not created on the basis of general consensus or through a general meeting that could 
result in a committee that truly represents all of the community. As was observed in the 
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field, these committees do not even have internal regulations (law) nor do they meet 
regularly to discuss community needs or problems. Regardless of the structural weak-
ness of these committees that are not truly representative, they represent – by their exis-
tence at the local planning level – a potential for inclusion of local communities in  pol-
icy making. The issue is that these committees have to be better organized and could be 
formatted through elections (for example as it was the case in two local committees 
exist in Rafah municipality, namely Kanada and Elbarazil areas). These two local com-
mittees brought to light problems and weaknesses caused in the process of their forma-
tion. They decided to launch elections to select the members of their committees. By 
doing elections, these two local committees were considered as NGOs and therefore 
they had to be accredited by the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Local 
Government. Although transforming to being NGO is not enforced by law, it was rather 
the determination of these committees to enjoy being NGO and neighborhood commit-
tee at the same time. According to the head of Kanada Camp Local Committee: 
 
“transforming to NGO structure would mean more empowerment for the committee. It 
would be in a better position to apply for further project proposals independently from 
local governments. Local government is weak and poorly resourced, and being NGO 
would provide additional channels for other financial sources”  
Source: Interview with head of kanada Camp Local Committee 
 
As with regards to the degree to which the committees influence local policies, it was 
observed to be very minimal. As revealed from the interviews with municipality plan-
ning officers and the local committees themselves, their area of cooperation is deline-
ated in providing information for the planning officer regarding their needs and projects. 
The planning officer then makes a long list of all suggested projects for all communities 
as revealed by their local committees.  It rests solely with the planner officer and his 
team to decide what to include or exclude from these projects in their long term physical 
plans. It was observed that most of the projects have to be physical in nature and related 
mainly to roads, parks and playground areas, water supplies, sanitations and electricity. 
Although committees can reveal other social needs like health or education activities, 
these projects will be kept in the municipal planning department and to be revealed to 
upper levels – if asked for – who control planning for these sectors.  
 After formulation of government plans, they will be forwarded to the upper levels of 
government (Central Committee for Planning and City Building) for approval. When 
they are approved, the LGUs then use other two ‘spaces’ to involve communities. One 
is public hearing and the other the media (i.e. newsletter).  
For a public hearing, the LGU invites the relevant local neighborhood committees, 
some NGOs, tribal chiefs and some prominent community leadership. The plans will be 
deposited in the LGUs for 60 days to be accessed by anyone for inspection. This deposit 
of the plans will be announced through local newsletter.  According to the researcher’s 
experience in this field, the public hearing and opening the plans for inspection is just a 
matter of formality in order to comply with the law. The comments or rejections that 
could be revealed by the public hearing workshops or by any individual are not listened 
to nor accepted in most cases. It is not even the LGU who decides about them, the LGU 
will only receive and collect the comments and it is up to the Central Committee for 
Building and City Planning to decide.  
To conclude, the local neighborhood committees may participate as information pro-
viders but even then they will not have access either to formulate, monitor or to imple-
ment the plans. However, the local committees by their nature would have a potential 
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for widening a space for local communities to participate in policy making and the 
whole planning process if they were better structured and organized in an institutional 
manner. 
The nature of existing spaces for Palestinian local NGOs, either invited or autono-
mous, cannot provide genuine potential for them to have a substantial influence on the 
local government planning and policy making process. The following diagram describes 
these spaces as they are revealed in the field: 
 
Figure  6.6: Spaces for NGOs to have influence in local planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender relations in policy spaces 
As is almost always the case in traditional conservative societies, women were in gen-
eral deprived from participating in decision making in local government affairs. In the 
traditional view of the Palestinian society, women are perceived as housekeepers who 
are responsible for bringing up the children and taking care of the household activities. 
This view has lasted for centuries but there have been a observable changes in women’s 
status in the last two to three decades in Palestine.  Changes have happened, according 
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to the researcher’s view, due to the increasing literacy rate of women50 which could be 
expected to make women more aware about their rights and motivate them to participate 
in general affairs. The second reason could be the magnificent efforts exerted by local 
and international women organizations and NGOs in general in the field of training and 
building of women’s capacities. For example, according to our fieldwork together with 
MAS (2000), the percent of women employees in NGOs is almost same as men, if not 
higher. However, unlike within Palestinian NGOs, women were under represented in 
both LGUs and local neighborhood committees, both of which are mainly dominated by 
traditional and tribal leadership. 
In actual fact, we cannot discuss gender participation in isolation from the socio-
historical context of the Palestinian society.  As we have discussed in chapter two, Pal-
estinian women were deprived of their rights to elect or nominate themselves in the 
Palestinian local elections during the British mandate, Jordanian and Egyptian admini-
strations, and Israeli occupation.  During these eras, women were totally excluded from 
participation either in policy formulation or in the executive work of local councils. The 
development plans of these councils assumed that “development that targets man would 
necessarily benefit all the society including women” (Sa’eed 1996:10). The Israeli mili-
tary order number 627 of the year 1975 has amended section 12 of the Jordanian local 
council law with regards to participation of women in elections. As a result, women 
participated in local elections – as voters only not as nominees – for the first time in 
history in the local council elections of 1976, in West Bank only. The Israeli occupation 
widened the base of voters not to give women their rights but to counteract the increas-
ing dominance of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) over Palestinian soci-
ety (Sa’eed, 1996:16). 
In the 1970s, apart from the Israeli occupation and for the first time within the occu-
pied Palestinian territories, there emerged a distinct commitment to articulating 
women’s concerns both separately and in connection with the national movement, and 
to working towards the establishment of an organized women’s movement. Among the 
major concerns of these new organizations were: working women; women in rural ar-
eas; and the need to establish viable productive ventures and self-help opportunities for 
women (Sayigh, 1989 cited in Mekky 2005) 51. The women who took the initiative to 
establish these committees were relatively young, educated, and activists in their own 
right. They believed that by strengthening the role of women in the national struggle 
they would be able to realize women’s full potential in society. Their approach was to 
address daily concerns in various areas of women’s lives, rather than to focus primarily 
or intentionally on political issues. They paid careful attention to involving local women 
themselves (for example, in rural areas) in expressing their own needs and priorities, 
and invited local women to participate in setting up and running branches of these non-
governmental committees in their own communities (Sabagh 1993  in Mekkey 2005). 
 A study prepared by the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee in 1996, about  the 
involvement of women in development projects of the local governments from the year 
1976 till 1996, has revealed a low tendency to involve women in local planning and 
project implementation. The study revealed that 59% of these governmental projects are 
infrastructure projects (water, electricity, roads, etc). Around 44% of these projects were 
implemented after 1991. Indeed, the narrow vision of development that concentrated on 
infrastructure projects can be justified due to the prevailing political situation and lack 
                                                 
50 Time being, it reached 85% in whole Palestine and 92% in Gaza Strip according to the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of  Statistics, 2005 
51  By: Abdulnasser Makky. Online : http://www.amin.org/eng/uncat/2005/feb/feb11.html. Retrieved on 
February 11th , 2005 
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of human and financial resources. The absence of awareness on development related 
issues and the absence of national comprehensive plans that could consider the role of 
local councils in development continue to strengthen this narrow vision of development. 
More importantly, the study also revealed that 77% of projects implemented by LGUs 
did not include women as a direct target. The other remaining projects that targeted 
women were mainly girls’ schools and motherhood centers. Regarding consultation 
with women, the study indicated that 91% of projects implemented by LGUs did not 
include consultations or dialogues with women. 
How do women themselves perceive local governments? According to another study 
prepared by the Women’ Affairs Technical Committee in 1996, 86% of women believe 
that LGUs don’t have a positive influence on their lives. The majority of women evalu-
ate the works of LGUs as weak. Only 12% perceive the works of LGUs as good. The 
women justified the weak performance of LGUs as being due to the ignorance of these 
councils to the real needs, problems and priorities of women. 
The involvement of the Palestinian women in political, legislative and local levels is 
similar to the involvement of women in the Arab world but much lower than in many 
countries in Asia, Europe and United States of America. The percentage of women in 
the International Parliaments of the world was 15.2% in the 1990s. The high percentage 
was in Finland 44%, with 37.7% in Sweden, 31% in the European parliament, 17.6% in 
the United States of America, 15.4% in Asia, and the lowest percentage of 11.5 % was 
in Italy. In the Arab world, the percentage reached 5.6% while in the Palestinian legisla-
tive council reached 5.7%  in the legislative elections of 1996, which is similar to the 
percentage in the Arab world ( Sa’ed 1996:11). 
According to the Women’ Affairs Technical Committee, two major reasons prevented 
the Palestinian women from being elected  to the PLC: 
– The election law in 1995 adopted the multidistrict system and not one district sys-
tem and depended on the simple majority. In this way, the parties chose men as can-
didates because many districts got only one or two seats; and 
– The power of the family and kinship criteria restricted the participation of the 
women in the election. 
The participation of women in public administration in the year 2002 was 13% from all 
the employees in the PNA sectors; 3% in the higher level of government (Mekkey 
2005).  According to this fieldwork and other national statistics, the participation of 
women in the local government institutions is extremely limited and it has two aspects. 
Firstly, as employees in the local councils (4%) and secondly, as members in the ap-
pointed local councils (1.5%). According to the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee 
(2005), there are 63 women local council members out of 3597 in Palestine. This means 
that women occupied only 1.5% of the total council members’ seats. The locally famous 
example of the only lady who is the mayor of small village (Khirbt Qays in Salfit dis-
trict in the West Bank), is an indictor of how women were far from actively involved in 
local councils. It should be mentioned in addition, that some local councils refuse fe-
male participation, basing their rejection on religious or cultural reasons. Whatever the 
cause, many councils in Gaza Strip and in several locales in the West Bank do not have 
female members. The manner in which women were appointed to local councils was 
inappropriate and frustrating for many women, because tribal and fractional connections 
superseded merit and the desire to represent neglected segments of society, as there was 
clear preference to appoint people of certain clans that made up an influential percent-
age of the local community.  Though men were appointed directly, without the need for 
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consensus and the approval of the Ministry of Local Government, women on the other 
hand needed the approval of the local council members to become members – and a 
single objection could result in the rejection of membership. In many instances, women 
were required to hold elections among themselves to choose a candidate. From a practi-
cal standpoint, women were faced with obstacles and impossible conditions deliberately 
intended to keep them from becoming council members. Some officials played a nega-
tive role in appointing women because their interests were connected with those of resi-
dents opposed to the idea if involving women. Generally, women participation remains 
limited due to the absence of a clear and enforceable decision on the part of the con-
cerned PNA institutions. This under-representation of women in local councils lasted 
till 2004 when local elections were conducted. The percent of women council member 
jumped to reach around 20%, utilizing the quota provided for them in the law. 
To conclude, the previous discussion highlights the very limited spaces created for 
women to participate in local government in general and to influence local policies in 
specific. Women represent half of the community and without women’s participation, 
genuine participation will not be accomplished. The challenges for promoting women’s 
participation are common to both NGOs and LGUs: how to cope with an environment 
which is sometimes hostile to the concept of involving women?  How to motivate cen-
tral state for better policies that could result in better spaces to involve women in local 
policy making?  
6.7 Summarizing key dimensions for institutionalizing participation 
in Palestine 
The discussion of Palestinian legal frameworks, NGOs’ and LGUs’ characteristics, dy-
namics of their interactions and the interplay of knowledge, power  and actors, all have 
revealed several factors  that have disabled and hindered the establishment of effective 
spaces for NGOs to collaborate with LGUs, so as to have an influence over policy mak-
ing and planning processes. This research has also revealed that the domain of govern-
ment policy making and local planning is far removed from civil society. The NGOs 
believe that they are nearer to communities and therefore closer to the realities which 
exist at the local level relative to the government.  In spite of this, both sides of the 
equations (NGOs and government) are to be blamed for limited spaces for collabora-
tion. Palestinian NGOs have not shown sufficient knowledge to the degree that could 
enable them to have a professional contribution at the local policy level. On the other 
hand, the government dominates planning operations showing little interest in widening 
spaces to involve NGOs. Both sides – as revealed by this research – are still lacking 
capacity in terms of resources and skills in a way that will establish a mature and effec-
tive collaboration.  
There are critical disconnections at different stages and levels, and between different 
configurations of actors, knowledge and spaces. There is a disconnection between the 
diverse knowledge about the experience, causes and impacts of policy formulation and 
implementation. Although there are some scattered mechanisms which have appeared to 
be committed to enhancing bottom-up approaches, analysis of these spaces suggests that 
exclusionary power relations influence the kinds of knowledge that are created within 
them. Further, the staging of an event for participation to occur is little or no guarantee 
either that knowledge arising from the event will be used, how it might be used, or by 
whom. There is a disconnection between the perceptions of idealized roles (what should 
happen) and practice (what does happen).  There is a disconnection between ordinary 
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citizens and their representatives which is a major obstacle to the development of an 
accountable policy process. 
Several reasons as revealed by this research have contributed to the emergence of these 
disconnections at the local policy level. They include among others the following: 
– Government sees itself as the repository of expertise for planning and policy mak-
ing. In their minimal random efforts, they were merely condescending to involve 
NGOs in planning and policy processes. 
– NGOs’ non-professional contribution, their limited knowledge of central govern-
ment planning operations, planning languages and procedures, lack of tools of advo-
cacy and organizational deficiencies have contributed to the disconnections between 
NGOs and local governments. 
– NGOs do not see creating of policy spaces as a serious issue, emphasizing service 
delivery strategies and thereby undermining advocacy strategies.     
– Politicizing nature of some of NGOs’ work has resulted in creation of confrontation 
and a suspicious relationship with government.  In addition, lack of resources and 
absence of overall development vision has led to rendering the LGUs-NGOs rela-
tionship competitive instead of collaborative. State-civil society relations are marked 
by mutual mistrust and lack of familiarity 
Our analysis of the spaces created to involve NGOs in decision making, suggests that 
both actors are facing common dilemmas and dimensions around questions of decision 
making structure, capacity and legalizing process of involvement. Following are the 
illustrations of these dimensions.   
 Structure: ad-hoc involvement and lack of continuity 
The existing structure of the Palestinian local decision making process could not pro-
vide sufficient opportunities for NGOs to have an influence on local planning that could 
increase receptiveness and accountability of local governments to citizens’ needs. The 
Palestinian planning system is characterized by a central and traditional pattern of plan-
ning whereas the locus of decision making power is to a very large extent located in the 
hands of central government institutions. Centralized power is retained over fiscal mat-
ters (revenue-raising and allocation and budgeting) and no participation is envisaged in 
them, contradicting the spirit of decentralization and citizen participation and reducing 
incentives for citizens’ involvement in local governance. There is an excessive reliance 
on laws and on a legalistic approach, to the neglect of operational guidelines or the pro-
vision of practical support and capacity building for implementation. The overall cen-
tralized model of governance has narrowed down the room for local autonomous ac-
tions. 
Dominance of the individual person instead of development of effective institutions in 
both government and NGOs has also weakened institutions. In addition, the weak or-
ganizational structure has contributed to limit the NGO’s potential to effectively partici-
pate in the local planning process and decision making. In specific, the weaknesses of 
decision making structure are reflected in the following issues: 
– No structural dialogues or regular consultations: the NGOs lack any serious in-
strumentalized channels that are integrated in the political structure. This has re-
sulted in irregular consultations and dialogues with LGUs.  What was actually found 
in the field is that dialogue has been conducted randomly, temporarily and under the 
pressure of donors, rather than being embedded in the Palestinian institutions; also, 
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they were not equipped with instruments or forums for continuous dialogues, thus 
limiting the long term effectiveness of NGOs participation. The existing structures 
treat people and civil society as relatively passive subjects, to be engaged with only 
through non-binding consultations at relatively late stages of decision-making proc-
ess. 
– Information flow is erratic and unsteady: In order to have effective participation, 
information flow has to be accessible by any actor in any time. However, in the Pal-
estinian context, the unsteady of information flow, has narrowed down the access of 
NGOs to required information and thus, limiting their influence on decision making. 
Capacity: lack of appropriate knowledge and resources 
Lack of capacity is a strong driving factor which has negatively affected the ability to 
create effective spaces.  This research has revealed clearly that both LGUs and NGOs 
lack resources and skills of participatory approaches. Both sides failed to tie their ser-
vice delivery strategies to long term objectives and sustainable development.  
– Limited NGOs knowledge of central issues: Palestinian NGOs have shown total 
ignorance of planning process languages and procedures and limited knowledge of 
central LGUs’ operating systems like budgeting, revenue raising and expenditure. 
The NGOs’ contribution in policy domains is not professional. In addition, imma-
ture and relatively inexperienced civil society and local governments have nega-
tively affected the potential to establish collaboration between themselves. Both 
sides have revealed different visions and perceptions of what participation should be 
and how to achieve it. 
– Lack of financial, human and technical resources: this research has revealed that 
both LGUs and NGOs seriously lack financial resources together with technical ex-
pertise.  Both sides have failed to establish strong effective bonds either among 
NGOs or LGUs themselves. NGOs tend to have a wide range of missions and goals 
ignoring their limited abilities and capacities to accomplish these missions. The ab-
sence of specialization has weakened the NGO ability in performing efficiently in 
serving their local communities. This issue has also weakened the ability of NGOs 
to form strong networks among organizations of the same sector of specialization 
and thus, weakened their ability to formulate strong pressure groups to influence the 
decision making process at the local government level.  
Legitimacy: who is legitimized by whom? 
At the local level, even at the government line institutions themselves, it was confusing 
to determine who is responsible for what. It was observed clearly that there is overlap-
ping and conflict within government institutions mandates, while the exact legal defini-
tions of NGOs-LGUs relationship are still missing and ambiguous. The regulatory 
frameworks are imposed from above without a groundswell of popular demand and 
overly inspired by prevalent international discourses and tendencies. These frameworks 
seek only to make the institutions of representative democracy work better, not to chal-
lenge these or extend governance relationships beyond them. The initiatives of Palestin-
ian NGOs to change and adjust the system from the bottom have been weak. They de-
pend either on the upper level of government or donors to change situation. 
– Civil society is not legitimized nor well represented: the existing legal frameworks 
do not guarantee a representative scheme for NGOs in the whole planning process. 
Planning is seen as a government domain disregarding the need to include civil so-
ciety organizations and marginalized groups. The frameworks have not provided 
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clear and defined forums where civil society can hold local government more ac-
countable and responsive to citizens’ needs. The monitoring of local council tasks 
was left to the Ministry of Local Government with almost total absence of civil so-
ciety organizations to practice their envisioned role as watch dog in this regard. 
There is an absence of clarification that could specify the access of local communi-
ties to local decision making and how they could monitor or approach local coun-
cils. 
– Strong external influence: donorship versus ownership: donors are found by this 
research, to be the strongest and most influential player in identifying – though tem-
porarily – spaces for NGO involvement in local planning. This would imply raising  
the question of ownership of the created procedures. These spaces, according to this 
researcher’s view, since they are adopted just to satisfy donors and not are deeply 
rooted in the mindset and behavior of government officials, have never been inte-
grated into the legal frameworks to guarantee sustainability. The Palestinian local 
actors have not taken advantage of donors’ influence and could not adapt better ap-
proaches that could match their knowledge, skills, capacity and resources. On the 
other hand, failure of the donors to grant the beneficiaries an active role; failure to 
provide sufficient support to improve the abilities of local councils; lack of donor 
coordination; and difficulties in cooperation between donors and local communities 
and councils due to different values, culture and work style have worsened the situa-
tion. The donors have emphasized projects with tangible results and effects at the 
expense of long term development projects, except in some cases. The almost total 
dependence of the LGUs and NGOs on the foreign and international funds has re-
sulted in limiting their influence on donors’ agendas.  
Regardless of the existence of many limitations that hinder the establishment of effec-
tive spaces for NGOs to have influence over planning and policy making, there could be 
some potential as well, such as:  
– There is a great tendency to establish democratic regime and good governance due 
to pressures made by internal and international organizations. 
– Introduction of the new elections laws 1996, and local bodies' laws 1997, is consid-
ered as a great step forward in adjusting legal planning frameworks. The laws have 
tried to fill the gap – though they are primitive efforts – in the ambiguous relation-
ship between local government and central government represented particularly by 
the Ministry of Local Government. It has defined the procedural framework for 
conducting of the councils’ tasks.  
– The high literacy rate of the Palestinians that exceeds 90% for both males and fe-
males. This would create a good potential for a better understanding, more active 
and aware community. In addition, the existing culture of voluntarism among the 
Palestinians which emphasizes working for general causes without reward, can con-
tribute to the welfare of the communities. 
– The existence of a huge number of working non-governmental organizations active 
in social and relief activities would enrich the experience of this sector in develop-
ment domains.  
– The introduction of new participatory approaches and concepts by donors would 
help in breaking out of previous centralized planning methods. Donors can play vital 
roles in supporting state, LGUs, and NGOs and help in building their capacities. 
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– High willingness of NGOs to establish strong relationships with government al-
though this has not been translated into operational policies and strategic measures. 
– Relatively high trust of citizens on NGOs’ performance (47%) compared to gov-
ernment (23%)52, which would create stronger local support for NGOs particularly 
when they advocate citizens’ needs and address their problems. 
– There are relatively good relations between Palestinian NGOs and the international 
community and organizations.  If it is utilized properly (which is not the case on 
ground), this would enable Palestinian NGOs to have influence on donors’ agenda 
and generate international support to influence state policies. 
– Many NGOs began to adopt participatory strategies in formulating and implement-
ing their activities and projects. This should be considered as a step forward for 
deeply rooting these ideas in the mindset of NGOs’ staffs. 
– Existence of larger highly qualified working NGOs in terms of skills and capacity 
(particularly in major urban areas) should help in training LGUs and other small 
NGOs in participatory approaches. This would also contribute to empowering local 
communities and raising of their capacity. 
In view of these potentials and limitations, the Palestinian civil society and government 
face particular challenges in strengthening their collaboration in local planning and pol-
icy making processes. These challenges are to be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
52
 According to public poll No.17 which has prepared by the Development Study Program, Bir Zeit Uni-
versity, 2004 
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7 Foremost challenges and lessons learnt: an account for 
evolution of participatory practices in Palestine 
Palestinian NGOs are working in a constantly changing context, and their relationship 
with the state has passed through many stages as mentioned before. In all of the stages, 
there has been no clear identification of each one’s roles and responsibilities, particu-
larly at the local government level. Palestinian non-governmental organizations have 
grown in scope and number in the wake of Palestinian government failure to overcome 
problems of satisfying citizens with basic needs. These organizations have supported 
traditionally marginalized communities in their efforts to improve the economic, social, 
and political conditions under which people live. Yet national policies increasingly un-
dermine their sustainable development efforts and often limit the ability of them to par-
ticipate effectively in planning and policies. As these non-governmental institutions, 
which are representing and serving grassroots groups, have gained experience and 
credibility in development, still many NGOs are not adding formal policy influence to 
their agendas. In order to utilize the existence of experienced NGOs, spaces that ensure 
their proper involvement in policy domains have to be created. These spaces have to be 
integrated in the political and decision making structure, be legitimized, and involve 
capable and knowledgeable actors. These issues represent the major domains where 
both NGOs and LGUs are challenged in their efforts for reforms as it will be detailed in 
the following section.  
7.1 Challenges for NGOs to have influence over local planning 
 
One of the foremost challenges facing the Palestinian NGOs is to have clear and unified 
definition and perception of institutionalizing their involvement in local planning and 
policy making. In other words, what should be success in terms of policy influence? 
How this success could be measured? This research has revealed clearly the different 
perceptions and disconnections both between NGOs and LGUs and among NGOs them-
selves. Quite a large number of Palestinian NGOs emphasize that their service delivery 
strategies undermine their advocacy roles, while some other organizations emphasize 
their involvement in implementing development projects at the expense of genuine in-
fluence on policies.  Quite a few organizations envisioned their roles as to hold local 
government accountable and responsive to citizens needs. On the other hand, LGUs 
perceive NGOs as information givers, and the involvement of NGOs in dividing the 
‘donors cake’53 is considered another side of LGUs perception.  What would successful 
involvement of NGOs in local planning process and policy making entail? Should 
NGOs implement government policies and plans? How can local government be held 
accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs? Palestinian NGOs have to unify first a 
clear vision among themselves about their collaboration with local government. Col-
laboration does not mean simply linkages or interactions, but rather working together in 
a mutually interdependent fashion.  How to stimulate domestic policy making at the 
local level towards the emergence of local generated strategies instead of dominated 
central policies?   
                                                 
53
 This term is used by planning officer of Rafah Municipality during the interview, 2005 
  
           
145 
Another challenge concerns NGOs’ accountability. At the NGOs level, it might be 
difficult to identify to whom NGOs are more accountable?  To donors who provide 
funds or to citizens which are served by NGOs?  It might be obvious that NGOs, in 
order to generate more local support, consider their beneficiaries first and foremost. 
However, it might be difficult for them, under the pressures made by scarcity of re-
sources, to apply more pressure over donors as to influence their agenda.  
 Successful collaboration between NGOs and local governments has resulted in more 
responsive government policies to communities’ needs. However, at the local govern-
ment level, it was difficult for NGOs to hold government officials accountable to citi-
zens due to absence of legal channels and the lack of access to information. In relation 
to this challenge, is the issue of how NGOs can carry out successful influence while 
remaining independent and within their charity law? Should networks of Palestinian 
NGOs remain politically affiliated in view of the fact that their alliances with political 
parties might create confrontation with government? Should NGOs seek to influence 
symptoms or causes of their disconnections from LGUs? Should they stress program 
design or underlying ideology? These debates have to be seriously raised and tackled 
among the Palestinian NGOs in order to clarify a road map for them. 
One of the most serious challenges facing Palestinian NGOs is to work with a dis-
abled state. Palestinian NGOs must work with the constraints of current government 
systems, poorly resourced, poorly motivated and bureaucratic agencies that are resistant 
to change. How should Palestinian NGOs cope with these practical difficulties in the 
government system? More seriously, how do Palestinian NGOs work under the um-
brella of an ever changing political context and ambiguous legal frameworks? Particu-
larly in view of this challenge, it might be useful for NGOs, utilizing first their rela-
tively higher capacity, to introduce training, launching awareness programs and advo-
cacy campaigns for reforms and legal changes. Secondly, Palestinian NGOs might util-
ize their better relations with donors to make collective pressure in order to have 
changes in the state policy. Indeed, according to the researcher’s view, the donors can 
play a positive supporting role in this regard.  
On the other hand, donors themselves might create additional challenges for Palestin-
ian NGOs. Donors might have narrowed down the Palestinian NGOs’ roles to focus 
more on short term objectives and service delivery strategies at the expense of their 
envisioned advocacy roles. How can Palestinian NGOs occupy a better position to have 
an influence on donors’ agendas?  As observed in the field, the NGOs’ dependency on 
donor funds has weakened their ability to have such influence. It might be suggested 
that more collaboration among NGOs in identifying key issues and strategies to work 
with donors would help in this regard. On the other hand, it would also be helpful if the 
donors were to coordinate among themselves so as to unify their efforts and strategies. 
The Palestinian NGOs show little tendency to collaborate with local government level 
either due to lack of knowledge or low capacity. How to utilize and relate the long ex-
perience of Palestinian NGOs in service delivery to an advocacy role? What kind of 
knowledge and training is needed and who can provide them? While it might be clear 
that donors and the larger knowledgeable and capable Palestinian NGOs can play an 
important role in this regard, this does not negate the need for home grown efforts, ei-
ther by small NGOs or the government itself. 
 At the government level, the LGUs themselves have shown their dependency on 
central governments in terms of policy making and administration. The LGUs are pow-
erless, lacking autonomy and experience in participatory approaches. They work as 
government administration to implement central policy. The question is how to make 
them more powerful, given that the central state itself is poorly resourced and powerless 
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too?  It might be obvious that central government has to relinquish some of its domi-
nance over local planning but the question of resources will still be a major challenge 
facing local governments in Palestine. They have to be more innovative in creating a 
variety of alternatives to overcome this issue. 
7.2 Account of evolution of participatory practices in a changing 
context: Lessons learned from Palestine experience 
It might be useful first to clarify what a changing context for NGOs would refer to. In-
deed, ‘changing context’ in its practical sense carries several dimensions. Firstly, it is 
linked with the changing general political environment which is unstable and vulnerable 
to any change (regardless its nature) which might occur in the region. It is very difficult 
to know exactly whether the peace process with the Israelis is still going on or has 
ceased. The clashes between the Palestinians and the Israeli occupation that started in 
2000 are ongoing, affecting negatively the prevailing of peace and order in the Palestin-
ian territories. The second, and more important, dimension of the changing context is 
that there is no stability at the state policy level. Government policies are made up by 
persons and not institutions. The implementability of these policies is tightly connected 
to these persons. In other words, if these persons lose their power, their policies (regard-
less of their efficacy) are powerless too. This implies that there are no unified policies 
for the state, it is always changing which means that the state institutions themselves are 
weak. Thirdly, the legal environment that regulates the NGO-government relationship is 
not settled yet and might be changed due to any reason. Hence, working in an ambigu-
ous legal framework is also a characteristic of the changing context. Fourth, the envi-
ronment in which NGO-government interactions occur depends sometimes on the do-
nors’ position on one side, and Palestinian political parties on the other. Since relation-
ship of donors and political parties with government is difficult to be predicted, this 
adds a further dimension of ambiguity and change. Fifth, the total absence of compre-
hensive development visions that could guide coordination among all actors (state, do-
nors and NGOs) has contributed negatively to clarity of the environment. All of the 
previously mentioned issues make it very difficult to present a scenario or even a trend 
delineating the future relationship between Palestinian NGOs and government based on 
any constancy. The nature of government itself is changing, right wing (FATEH – secu-
lar party) used to hold power till 2006, at which time the Islamic Party (HAMAS) won 
the elections and formed the government. Such a fundamental change in the govern-
ment’s nature would have certainly imply radical changes in government policies and 
receptiveness to NGOs’ concerns, which will also add another layer of opacity to the 
future scene. 
In such changing context, the argument of this research would be clear. Since the 
context is changing rapidly (politically and legally), and vulnerable to many kinds of 
change, both of the actors working at the local level (NGOs and LGUs) are more likely 
to work in an isolated and independent manner, maybe to protect themselves from being  
affected by these changes. NGOs are likely to concentrate more on service delivery 
strategies with short term objectives, undermining their advocacy roles and ability to 
influence local governments’ policies. Hence, spaces created for NGOs to have an in-
fluence on local policies and planning processes will be very limited. Collaborations 
between NGOs and LGUs are not likely to flourish unless there are changes in the clar-
ity of political, legal and decision making structures.  In such a changing context where 
NGOs are important and LGUs are weak, the NGOs tend to work in an isolated manner 
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from LGUs, diverting their efforts to both donors and central state (with more focus on 
donors). NGOs rather compete with LGUs over resources instead of collaborating. The 
processes that are existing among both NGOs and LGUs are used to simplify diverse 
knowledge, to reinforce unequal power relations, and to constrain alternatives. Spaces 
are only created to satisfy donors’ wishes and requirements. They lack the sense of 
ownership. Hence, they are never properly legitimized nor integrated in an institutional 
manner in the country’s political or decision making structures. 
Donors also, in such changing contexts, are being seen as of great effect on the 
spaces created for NGOs to have influence on government planning. Donors might 
weaken the state by emphasising their ignorance of the government’s role and favouring 
NGOs, and hence leading to widening gaps between NGOs and government. As en-
countered in the field54, some international organizations formulate medium term com-
prehensive plans for some communities through their attributed NGOs with total ab-
sence of coordination with local governments in those areas.  Which raises the question 
of whether they are willing to disregard the weak governments instead of strengthening 
them? Hence, this creates a kind of suspicious relationship between Palestinian actors. 
 According to Fowler (1992), and Bratton (1990) as cited in Clark (1993:3)55, “In 
many countries the voluntary sector concentrates on operating its own projects, improv-
ing the situation in micro regions but doing little to bring its experience to bear on the 
government's service delivery or policy making”. According to Clark (1993), traditional 
NGO activity has concentrated on the ‘supply side’: delivering services, providing de-
velopment programs, or assisting official bodies to increase the spread of their own 
programs. Much of the literature and pioneering work of operational NGOs now con-
centrates on what could be called the ‘demand side’: helping communities articulate 
their concerns and preferences, manoeuvring into a negotiating position with official 
bodies in order to amplify that ‘voice’, and mixing technical operational skills with 
communication, advocacy and networking skills both to give power to and to enhance 
the existing power of poor people. The literature which describes this evolution talks of 
NGOs becoming important agents of the civil society. This attention to the development 
demand side is a micro-level reflection of governance. The pillars of the latter implies 
greater participation in political decision making, transparency, accountability, freedom 
of expression, all have their counterparts at the local level in the grassroots mobilization 
efforts of NGOs.  According to Clark (1993), a healthy relationship is only conceivable 
when both parties share common objectives. According to this researcher’s view, if the 
government's commitment to involve NGOs is weak, NGOs will find dialogue and col-
laboration frustrating or even counter-productive. Likewise, repressive governments 
will be wary of NGOs which represent the poor or marginalized. In such situations, 
NGOs will probably prefer to chart their own course, giving all instruments of the state 
as wide a berth as possible (Clark 1993). Where the government has a positive social 
agenda (or even where individual ministries do) and where NGOs are effective, there is 
the potential for a strong, collaborative relationship.  
One other major findings of this research was the tendency of Palestinian NGOs to 
have a relationship (regardless its nature) with central government, while there are  
many disconnections with local governments as explained in chapter six. It might be 
                                                 
54
 In Rafah Municipality, the WORLD VISION formulates medium term socio-economic plans for the 
areas of AL Shaboora and Al Shokah with total absence of the government and with no clarity about the 
commitment regarding who is going to implement these plans. 
55
 Clark,  J. (1993), The Relationship between the State and the Voluntary Sector. The Global Develop-
ment Research Centre. See online:   http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/relationship.htm. Re-
trieved on February 25th, 2006 
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difficult to see this finding in other experiences world wide. It might require another 
research to find out at what level relations between NGOs and state are stronger – cen-
tral or local? And why? There might even be no general trend and the issue is country 
specific. However by reviewing McGee et al (2003) regarding legal frameworks for 
citizen participation, which is a project conducted in several north and south countries, 
and the report of the Commonwealth Foundation (1999), regarding challenges to civil 
society in the new millennium which investigated the situation in 47 countries,  one 
might get the impression that our finding in this regards contradicts the trend in other 
experiences in the world, where NGOs are used to being more active at local levels than 
central level. If this is true, then the question will be why we have this unique trend in 
the Palestinian context? According to this researcher’s view, this might be due to four 
reasons: First, it appears that the countries discussed in the previous two projects, have 
gone through many democratic reforms (e.g. developing countries like Philippines, In-
dia, Uganda, etc), or have well structured decentralized governance systems as in north-
ern countries. Neither is the case in Palestine. Power is still in the hands of central gov-
ernment which might force the NGOs to work with whoever possesses power. Local 
governments are weak and powerless and it might not be worthwhile for Palestinian 
NGOs to collaborate with them. Secondly, the Palestinian legal frameworks that define 
the relationship of NGOs to the state has not been maturely tackled or settled yet.  So 
before turning their eyes to the local level, NGOs tend to collaborate with central gov-
ernment in order first to defend their structures and to organize their establishment. The 
third reason could be the political nature of the civil works of Palestinian NGOs that 
have resulted in many disputes and conflicts with the state. Political disputes have to be 
resolved or tackled at the central level institutions and not at the local level. The local 
level is just the service provider and policies are made at the central level. The last 
might be related to the size of the area. Palestine is a very small area with no clear de-
lineation between central and local levels. The Gaza Strip as a whole might constitute 
one street in a big city like Cairo for example. So the perception of ‘central’ or ‘local’ 
might be relative. In the Palestinian context communities are used to perceiving gov-
ernment as one entity. 
  Since the inception of Palestinian NGOs, their practices and contributions to devel-
opment of the Palestinian society have been far from intersecting with those of the rul-
ing authorities. This might have been justified under foreign powers or the Israeli occu-
pation, which might have no interest in developing Palestinian communities. But after 
1993, the time Palestinian Authority was established, surprisingly, no tremendous 
changes have happened. This could be justified due to history of the Palestinian NGOs 
and the transitional and uncertain nature of the political context in Palestine as we have 
discussed before. Uncertainties and ambiguity of the picture of the NGO-government 
collaboration in local development planning is a characteristic of the Palestinian experi-
ence.  
In other related issues and as we have promised to view our assumptions with rela-
tion to our practical findings, it is important to emphasise that this research by its induc-
tive nature is not intended to test these assumptions. However, we will reflect on some 
of the research findings in order to enrich knowledge and to reveal more lessons that 
could be learnt from the Palestinian experience. This research was based on the assump-
tion that Palestinian NGOs are willing and able to advocate citizens’ needs within the 
local policy and planning spaces.  Second, NGOs are assumed to be a social virtue, to 
have an identity with clear boundaries and separate entity from the state. Thirdly, the 
participation process will certainly involve confronting of the power structures.  
Fourthly fair process is more likely to generate just results.  
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Regarding willingness of NGOs, the findings of this research have revealed clearly 
that almost all of the interviewed NGOs have high willingness to participate in local 
planning and policy making. Whether they are able or not depends on the degree they 
have translated their high willingness into operational policies or practices on the 
ground. It also depends on how knowledgeable are the NGOs, and how active they are 
in creating new spaces for them to have influence. More importantly, it depends on the 
position taken by the state. However, our research also suggests that the manner in 
which Palestinian NGOs practice is more as service providers rather than advocacy 
groups. The concentration on service delivery strategies is driven by donors’ attitudes 
that contract NGOs to implement their projects and development agenda. This has af-
fected negatively their interests and ability to practice their envisioned advocacy roles. 
The weak local government has also frustrated NGOs attempts to have an influence on 
local government policies. NGOs do not have a good access to information; hence, their 
knowledge is limited. Many NGOs interviewed in the field emphasised that they ‘don’t 
know how’ to have an influence on local policies.  
It might be true that NGOs are a social virtue and have exerted tremendous efforts to 
provide Palestinians with social services, but it is also true that they also represent fac-
tional interests. In many cases, they were found to be affiliated with their attributed 
political parties. NGOs have been also seen as a channel for livelihood, and hence serv-
ing for some personal interests, and not adhering necessarily to common social goals. 
Even the government might manipulate this sector by forming its own affiliated NGOs 
to compete with other NGOs to get additional funds, seeing that donors have committed 
themselves on so many occasions to work only with NGOs. Regarding whether they 
have an identity or not:  in addition to diversity of forms and functions, we encountered 
marked differences in NGOs identities between major urban areas and in the refugee 
camps or rural areas. In the urban areas NGOs are well structured, organized with a 
greater influence over central government (as was the case of health and women NGOs 
existing in Gaza city). They conform quite closely to the image of modern, formally 
constituted institutions and structures which are capable to some extent of advocacy (as 
Palestinian NGOs network), service delivery (Union of Health Committees Works) and 
contribution to public debates (Union of Women Affairs Technical Committee). This is 
the contrary to the NGOs located at the local level, particularly small ones in remote 
areas and refugee camps. 
With regard to the separate entity of NGOs from the state, interviews with civil soci-
ety actors at the local level suggest that this is far from the case. Examples range from 
Government leadership, where some have founded NGOs to take advantage of contracts 
might be arising from service provision activities of government, to government NGOs 
as mentioned before that are created to absorb donors’ funds. Some of the NGOs inter-
viewed declared that the Ministry of Finance pays the salaries and apartment rents of 
some NGOs who are affiliated with the ruling political party. Many of the functions 
ascribed to NGOs particularly that of holding government accountable for its actions, 
rest on the idea that civil society has a separate identity from the state. The act of hold-
ing government accountable also relies on there being adequate political freedom for 
dissent and criticism of government. The declaration of the Ministry of Interior that 
“they could not control NGOs activities” as the director of NGOs department said, con-
tributes to the assumption that there is not only a separate identity of NGOs, but that 
there exists adequate civil society autonomy for accountability to be exercised. The 
government use of its NGO registration statute and monitoring, however, suggest oth-
erwise; as the manager of Islamic Association commented: “whenever there is a contro-
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versy, they tell us we are violating our statute. The have frozen our bank accounts sev-
eral times in the past with no reasons”. 
With regard to confronting power structure, it was clearly observed in the field that 
local decision making structure is characterized by centralized planning pattern, and 
locus of decision power is in the hands of ministerial institutions or in the hands of key 
persons like ministers, mayors or governors.  And since power and privilege are hardly 
ever renounced voluntarily, the concept of a truly participative society will necessitate 
the struggle for power to create conditions for people to become effectively involved in 
shaping their own history collectively and individually. 
The last issue is whether fair process is likely to result in just outcome? In view of 
this research limitation and context, it is might be very difficult to judge this statement, 
since the research could encounter fair process of NGOs involvement in local planning. 
However we have also encountered unfair, non-institutionalized spaces, and poor access 
of NGOs to decision makers. Hence, we will not be able to judge how just the outcome 
is. However, we might change and reverse the question to ask whether unfair process 
will negatively affect the outcome? The outcome is perceived by this research as the 
increased ability of NGOs to hold local governments more accountable and responsive 
to citizens’ needs. In this sense, the NGOs interviewed have acknowledged their limita-
tions to have such influence. In addition, another indicator could be the high degree of 
dissatisfaction expressed by citizens in various national polls, where around 67% of 
communities believe that local government policies do not respond to their needs (Pub-
lic poll Nr.17, Bir Zeit University, 2004). However, it is important to emphasize that the 
high level of citizens’ dissatisfaction with local government performance is not only a 
result of unfair involvement of civil society factions in policy making. There could be 
many additional reasons, such as lack of financial, technical and human resources of 
LGUs among others.    
To conclude, in such changing contexts, NGOs face great challenges. How can NGOs 
become learning organizations that can be flexible and respond to changing geopolitical 
priorities? How can NGOs preserve their independence and freedom to advocate? How 
can NGOs be both accountable and maintain their priorities? Within these challenges, 
what kind of lessons can be learnt from the Palestinian experience? 
– As a first lesson, the presence in a space does not in itself constitute meaningful 
participation within it. Rather any space contains certain formal and informal rules 
which enable certain actors with certain forms of knowledge to participate more ef-
fectively and more powerfully than others. 
– NGOs must work within the constraints of the government systems, which are 
poorly resourced, poorly motivated and resistant to change. 
– Personal relationships with key government staff are crucial for promoting partici-
pation. 
– NGOs have to release the government’s fear of the political role could be played by 
them.  
– Policy reforms at the central level have to be accompanied by supporting reforms at 
the local level. 
– Extensively pursuing donors’ preferences for service delivery is likely to convert 
NGOs from agencies with mission into public service contractors and might de-
crease their accountability to the citizens they serve. NGOs might lose their interest 
to work as actors in policy dialogues. 
  
           
151 
– When NGOs’ knowledge is partial, this limits their influence on local planning and 
policy making. 
– The opportunity for effective NGO involvement is dependent on the state’s position 
and the NGO’s attempts to open new spaces for their involvement. 
– Absence of development visions and unclear perspectives of participation either 
among NGOs themselves or in relation to government, would hinder establishment 
of proper spaces. 
– Donors can either affect negatively or positively the creation of better spaces for 
NGOs. Negatively, if they disregard building capacity, if they continue to weaken 
the state, if they do not coordinate among themselves, if they disregard advocacy 
roles of NGOs and if they emphasize short term projects. Positively, by putting pres-
sure on government, building capacity of local actors, emphasizing long term strate-
gies and if they tie their interventions to institutional measures to be adopted by the 
state. 
– Losing sense of ownership when creating spaces for NGOs’ involvement in policy 
making, would mean that these spaces are more likely to die, will not be sustained, 
institutionalized nor integrated in the country political and decision making struc-
tures. 
– Actors may not formulate proper spaces, not because they do not want but maybe 
because they do not know how.  
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8 Conclusion and recommendations   
This research, by the nature of its objectives, gains enhanced value by enriching the 
current discourse concerning the Palestinian NGO-state relationship at the local level. 
The processing of data has revealed many disconnections between NGOs and local 
governments in policy making and planning, and hence, limited spaces for NGOs to 
have an influence over policies in order to hold LGUs more responsive and accountable 
to citizens’ needs.  The limited spaces which are created to involve NGOs are mainly 
‘donor led’ and more importantly, they have never been integrated in government deci-
sion making or the political structures. The government 'invited spaces' represented by 
local neighborhood committees and public hearings cannot provide sufficient channels 
for NGOs to have a genuine influence over policy making. These spaces face challenges 
of good representation and inculcation of key civil society actors and are bound to 
knowledge of local governments.  The research also found that the NGOs did not dis-
charge nor utilize their relatively high capacity in service delivery to initiate additional 
autonomous spaces where they could have influence over local planning. This was be-
cause, on one side, NGOs (lead by the donor agenda) have emphasized delivery of ser-
vice strategies undermining their advocacy roles. On the other, the location of decision 
making at the central level has forced Palestinian NGOs to concentrate, when working 
with government, at that central level thus frustrating their efforts and lowering their 
expectations in the establishment of a prosperous relationship with local governments.    
  The lessons from this research suggest that the creation of inclusive policy spaces 
will not occur without addressing the power relations which surround the interstices of 
policy and planning processes themselves. Addressing power relations in the Palestinian 
context means strengthening the capacities of less powerful actors (NGOs and LGUs) to 
engage with more powerful actors (central state). It also implies democratizing knowl-
edge through strengthening the capacity of weaker actors (NGOs), to present their own 
knowledge, and broadening the rules at the local level concerning what kinds of knowl-
edge count. In other words, it is not only expanding policy spaces from the top, and 
inviting the weak to participate in the spaces of the powerful, it also finding and sup-
porting the less visible and more autonomous spaces that are attempted by NGOs them-
selves in order to have influence and advocate for citizens needs.  
Much is yet to be learnt about which are the most appropriate entry points for creat-
ing proper spaces. Suggesting specific recommendations might be challenged by the 
same key issue that faces the Palestinian NGOs: namely, whether to target the symp-
toms or causes of the problem? Some might argue that targeting causes might be more 
influential and as a result symptoms will be resolved. However, causes might be so 
many, complex and interrelated and such action might lead to many inconclusive or 
ineffectual results. It is for sure that whether targeting symptoms or causes, it would 
require time, resources and much effort by the actors concerned. For this section, target-
ing symptoms of the problem will be headline, while targeting causes will be clarified 
under each headline. It is important to emphasise that this is not an attempt to solve the 
challenges facing the Palestinian NGOs (i.e. whether they should target symptoms or 
causes of the problem) but rather a device to simplify and classify recommendations.    
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8.1 Specific recommendations in how to institutionalize participatory 
spaces; important considerations   
 
The following recommendations – as shaped by interviewees in the field – are intended 
to target specific issues with the aim of paving the way for better NGO involvement in 
the local planning and policy making process. These issues would include two levels: 
policy level and capacity issues. They are categorized according to key actors: central 
government, local governments, NGOs and donors. 
 
At the central government level 
- Formulate a comprehensive development vision 
This might be the first important step to be addressed. A clear vision would clarify what 
the role of each actor should be within the decision making structure, and how all ef-
forts could be utilized and unified to achieve a specific development agenda for the 
country. This issue is important and the intention is to clarify roles and responsibilities. 
It is important to emphasize that it is not meant that central state alone with its own in-
stitutions are to formulate this vision. It is rather, the role of all government and non 
governmental institutions to come together and to formulate this vision. This recom-
mendation is mentioned here to underline that the central government is the legal level 
where this vision has to be formulated. As the director of the NGOs department within 
the ministry of interior (MOI) suggested: “There could be a legal committee, composed 
of representatives of government ministries and NGOs of various specializations, to sit 
together and decide policies and visions within each service sector”. However, even if 
this were implemented, there still remain challenging issues, such as: who would initiate 
such a committee; whether it would be governmental or non-governmental by its nature; 
whether its decisions would be binding or whether it would just offer consultations or 
recommendations; whether it would be integrated in the political structure; how repre-
sentation of the NGOs would be decided for such committee; and so on. 
If such committee were to be established with very clear legal mandates, structure 
and responsibilities, it would have the potential to contribute to, guide and organize co-
operation between government and non-governmental institutions at all level. But what 
has prevented a comprehensive vision being formulated till now, through 14 years of 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA)?  Some might argue that the PA was 
busy with the political development of the country, the peace process and negotiation 
with Israelis, at the expense of the development agenda. Though, this might be some 
justification, this does not relieve central government from its responsibility to work in 
parallel in institution strengthening and state building. Others might argue that central 
institutions themselves do not have the technical capacity to undertake this task. This is 
also true, but they can utilize the donors and external experts that could provide exper-
tise and consultancies. According to the researcher's view, neither Palestinian NGOs nor 
state institutions are totally aware of the importance of formulating a comprehensive 
vision. It might be all of the causes mentioned above have lead to the absence of formu-
lation of this comprehensive vision. 
 
- Create enabling legal environment; legitimizing NGOs participation and repre-
sentation  
This research has revealed many shortcomings in planning laws that have impacted on 
both local government structures and their relations with NGOs. It might be the role of 
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the parliament (Palestinian Legislative Council) together with other relevant central 
institutions such as the ministries of planning and local government to exercise their 
roles and issue additional supporting laws and codes. The purposes of these laws and 
codes should lead to widening spaces for NGOs so that they have legal rights to partici-
pate in local planning and policy making processes. This issue in particular would re-
quire strong advocacy and lobbying on the part of NGOs in order to achieve these legal 
amendments. Any new law or regulation must be able to be implemented and enforced 
which means that they have to be supported by additional codes or operational meas-
ures. According to the director of Palestinian NGOs Network: “Palestinian legal frame-
works must recognize important roles could be played by NGOs in development. Cen-
tral state, instead of restricting our works, must provide additional incentives and legal 
spaces for us to participate in its policies at all levels”. 
In addition, these legal frameworks have to strengthen institutions of representative 
democracy such as local councils. The local councils have to be guaranteed legal rights 
to practice all their envisioned roles as policy makers at the local level, which means 
that central government has to relinquish its dominance over key decisions. Thus, cen-
tral government, supported by new legal innovations, has to widen LGUs’ missions and 
roles to cover other developmental domains including education, health etc. This would 
provide LGUs with addition powers and lead to more autonomous local actions. It is 
believed this would create a better environment for the NGOs to have genuine influence 
on local decision making, since decisions would be made directly at local level.  
What caused the legal framework to be unresponsive? First, the laws of 1996 and 
1997 were formulated by central government and external experts without proper feed-
back from local institutions. Second, the socio-political environment that surrounded the 
issuing of the NGOs laws of 1995 and 2000: although the views of some NGOs were 
integrated, not many NGOs were able to be active in lobbying, except the Palestinian 
NGOs Network and Union of Charity Organizations. The laws concentrated on basic 
issues which have to be extended in the future to cover a clear identification of NGOs-
local government relationship particularly in development planning. The NGOs, as re-
vealed in the field, although expressing high willingness to participate in local planning, 
did not show a great knowledge of how to translate their willingness into either practice 
or practical policies. It seems that they did not even recognize it as the serious issue it 
should be. That means that the mindset of NGOs that emphasises mainly service deliv-
ery strategies has to extend, to consider the importance of their parallel advocacy role in 
order to hold local governments more accountable to local needs. This would take time, 
change in attitudes and methodology, and require training, awareness and capacity 
building programs. 
 
- Integration of NGOs participation in the country political structure.    
Integration of NGO involvement in development planning has to come as a direct re-
flection of the creation of new responsive legal frameworks. The currently existing po-
litical structure disregards NGO involvement in its institutions, and perhaps even   con-
siders NGOs as foreign entities.  Keeping NGOs outside the political structure will con-
tinue to undermine their contribution to development policy. It might be the mission of 
both NGOs and central government to create and describe a clear structure. However, 
these structures have to include well structured dialogue on a continuing basis. Compe-
tences and rights have to be clearly delineated. One other necessary part of these struc-
tures is an open information policy which allows a comprehensive insight into the im-
plementation of plans and strategies. It is important to emphasize that the conducting of 
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one or two workshops is not structural rearrangement, but merely interim ad hoc in-
volvement. 
 
 
At the local government level 
- Improve local governance practices: This issue implies the following: 
o Improve receptiveness and accountability: The absence of accountability at 
the local level is a major characteristic of the Palestinian government system. 
In order to ensure better accountability, access to all kinds of information 
(particularly budgeting, revenue and expenditure) has to be available to all 
civil society institutions. It might be the responsibility of local councils to 
work closely with civil society, ensuring regular consultations and dialogues. 
The general attitude of local government staff, which currently undermines 
NGO involvement and is suspicious of their professional contribution, can 
be resolved by close and continuous intact. It is important to emphasize that 
changing mindset would require time and many awareness and training pro-
grams.  
 
o Strengthen institutions versus one man dominated system 
One man dominated system (being mayor, governor or minister) is also a 
characteristic of the Palestinian government system. Hence, formulated po-
lices – regardless their efficiency – might become powerless at the point 
when such persons lose their power. This problem has come about because 
role of institutions in shaping policy has been undermined.  In order to en-
sure efficiency and sustainability of policies, decisions have to be made col-
lectively within the institution itself, before sharing them with other external 
institutions. 
 
- Improve the local decision making structure: The existing local structure should 
be improved to provide sufficient spaces for NGOs to have influence. Direct sug-
gestions to improve this situation follow: 
 
o Strengthening of civil society representation and inclusiveness in local plan-
ning  
The representation of local communities in the decision making process is 
totally inadequate. At the local neighbourhood committees level, they have 
to be reformed in a more democratic and representative manner together 
with strengthening of their institutions. These committees by their nature 
could provide legal representation to communities even superior to that of 
the NGOs themselves. Good representation of NGOs in these committees is 
believed to increase their capacity and performance.  Even if NGOs and lo-
cal committees continue to work as separate entities, this would increase the 
level of involvement of civil society in local planning, since NGOs enjoy 
high capacity and local committees can provide more legitimacy to commu-
nity representation. More importantly, local governments have to ensure 
proper representation of NGOs to include all interested actors at the appro-
priate time during planning. It is suggested that local NGOs select a commit-
tee among themselves (i.e. a limited number of NGOs representatives) to ne-
gotiate with local government about the best method for involving an im-
proved representation of NGOs in the whole planning and policy making 
process.  
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o Innovation of new spaces to involve NGOs in policy making and planning 
It was a critical finding, that the current spaces represented by public hear-
ings and local neighbourhood committees, have never provided NGOs with 
the potential to have a genuine contribution to decision making structure. 
Hence, current spaces have proved their inadequacy. New spaces have to 
emerge at the Palestinian local levels. These spaces might vary between 
formation of mutual committees, conducting of regular meetings or work-
shops, or using specific participatory planning tools. Most importantly, these 
spaces should be in line with local capacity, skills, knowledge and resources.  
 
o Smooth and institutionalize information flow 
It is critical to ensure that access to all kinds of information is accessible by 
NGOs at any time. Although having good personal contacts between the two 
sides is important to facilitate consultation, access to information should not 
rely only on personal relationships. The access to information which is used 
to generate the substance of plans, as well as government documents, infor-
mation about budgeting, taxing and expenditure, has to be organized in an 
institutional and sustainable manner. It is believed that not only would this 
lead to strengthening accountability and transparency as mentioned before, 
but would also increase the knowledge base of Palestinian NGOs. 
 
- Building capacity of local staff  
In order effectively to launch participatory approaches, local staff must have the 
skills and knowledge of how properly to implement these approaches. This would 
require proper training, facilitation, negotiation and communication skills and 
building capacity programs. These programs can be offered either by donors or the 
major Palestinian NGOs with appropriate experience.      
 
 
At the NGOs level 
- Building NGOs capacity and civic competence 
The weak local capacity, in particular in practicing of advocacy roles, is deterring 
the NGOs from being effectively involved in local decision making.  It might be 
the role the major Palestinian NGOs and donors to provide local NGOs, particu-
larly the smaller ones existing in rural areas and refugee camps, with relevant 
training that will help building capacities. These programs can vary to include 
planning, project cycle, participatory approaches, community mobilizations, 
budgeting and so on. It is important to emphasise that these programs are not in-
tended to let NGOs replace LGUs roles in planning. These programs are rather to 
strengthen the knowledge base of such NGOs that are working at the local level 
and to increase their professional contribution to the planning and policy making 
process.  
 
- Building strong networks to enhance NGOs advocacy roles  
Formation of strong NGO networks will strengthen the influence of NGOs over 
local governments. It is the challenge of NGOs to discharge their power and re-
sources effectively, resolve their leadership conflicts, and to overcome their dif-
ferent political stands for the sake of formation of strong pressure groups among 
themselves and in order to maximize their influence. One additional factor which 
has to be overcome by Palestinian NGOs is the unclear focus and missions of 
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some NGOs. When such NGOs match their focus to their capacities and resources, 
they are more likely to be able to integrate into networks specialized in the same 
sector, and thus maximize their influence.  
 
- Lobby for changes in legal frameworks 
Government alone might never recognize the problems caused by the non in-
volvement of NGOs in development planning. It is the role of Palestinian NGOs to 
facilitate their engagement by exerting pressure for reforms from below. The 
NGOs can utilize their close relationship with the political parties and donors to 
raise their voices in order to be heard in the Parliament.  The NGOs leadership can 
also utilize their personal relationship with parliament members and convince 
them of the needs for change.  It is important to emphasise that the NGOs them-
selves must first be clear about exactly what they are lobbying for, and have 
clearly drafting suggested plans, so they can be discussed by government decision 
makers to reach a consensus with NGOs. 
 
At the donor level 
 
- Influence state policy 
The degree to which donors can play an influential role, not only in development 
agenda but also in influencing state policies, is clear in the Palestinian context.  
Donors can co-operate with Palestinian NGOs and put additional pressure on the 
government for changes and reforms. These reforms can target integration of par-
ticipatory approaches in government structures. Donors, since they own resources, 
have more potential to make the government listen to their considerations.   
 
- Provide NGOs and LGUs with adequate training 
Donors might be seen as the most powerful provider for training and programs for 
both NGOs and LGUs. Although training here is meant to include learning of par-
ticipatory approaches and techniques, we are not calling for blue print participa-
tory approaches. It is rather that the trainees learn principles and methods, after 
which it will be up to them to create and innovate approaches that match their cul-
ture, resources and capacity.   
 
- Provide more spaces for NGOs to have influence over donors’ projects agenda 
Many NGOs complain about their lack of influence over the donors’ agenda. It is 
important that donors establish strong channels with NGOs for consultation. Do-
nors have to listen to NGOs’ needs instead of contracting them to implement ex-
ternally formulated projects.   
In addition to the previously mentioned issues, there could be some additional consid-
erations which have to be raised when targeting the establishment of institutionalized 
spaces for NGOs. For example: who should initiate this process and what is needed in 
order for institutionalized participation to happen?  
According to the researcher's view, the initiation of this process might come from 
any actor, whether government, NGOs or donors. Most important, is to ensure that all of 
actors are involved together in building a clear vision of their interrelationship and in-
teractions. For example, assuming that government has recognized the importance of 
getting NGOs involved and wishes to initiate the process without any pressure of any 
actor, then the NGOs must react intensively to such a government initiative, maximize it 
and advance it to the level that it can guarantee effective involvement. However, this 
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scenario has seemed unlikely, since the government has previously shown its low recep-
tiveness in this regard. But since the environment is rapidly changing in Palestine, and 
we have witnessed – the time of writing this research – a new political party come to 
power that is very experienced in NGOs work, there could be changes coming from top 
and some hope that the new government leadership will recognize the importance of 
non governmental works.  
A second possible scenario is that the NGOs initiate this process for change, which 
according to the researcher's view is more logical. Then, NGOs have to exert much ef-
fort, utilizing their good relationship with donors and their political attributes, to put 
more pressure on the government for creation of new legal spaces in the decision mak-
ing structure that ensure sustainable and effective involvement.  
  A third scenario is that the process can be totally led by donors, which this re-
searcher personally does not favour, because the environment of Palestinian society is to 
a large extent already very politicized.  It was revealed in this research that some work-
ing NGOs already highly suspect that some donors have a political agenda. If efforts are 
totally led by external donors, they are more likely to be rejected not only by govern-
ment but also by some strong NGOs. According to my view, recognizing the issue of 
the need to involve NGOs in policy making has to emerged first from the local NGOs 
themselves and also to be led by them. Strong well organized campaigns accompanied 
by awareness and training programs (by local NGOs supported by donors) are sug-
gested, to facilitate the initiation of institutionalized spaces for NGO involvement in 
local planning and policy making processes.  
8.2 Further research 
Through the journey of launching this research, some issues are suggested for more in 
depth investigation and research.  
Politicized nature of PNGOs works: Implications over public policy and 
development agenda 
This research has revealed that there is a tight connection between many working NGOs 
and political parties. It would be pertinent to find out the extent to which politicization 
of civil work affects the performance of such NGOs and their contribution to the local 
development agenda. Are the NGOs being utilized to serve political purposes? Do Pal-
estinian NGOs represent factional interests or social virtues? Why do communities trust 
NGOs more than government? 
Donors the third actor; negative versus positive implications over local agenda and 
state policy 
This area of the world, characterized by a very deep and long lasting conflict, has been 
the focus of the international community which has intervened in many key issues 
which are related to the Palestinian political and developmental agenda. We need to find 
out the extent to which international interference has affected negatively or positively 
the development agenda and public policy. Do donors weaken the state or influence its 
policies, and if so, in whose interest? How do they utilize their financial assistance to 
force NGOs or government to implement their agendas?  How do they influence state 
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policy? How can donors’ efforts be organized to serve the Palestinian interest? How 
does the changing political environment affect donors’ policies? 
From relief works to sustainability; starting point 
How to relate relief works of national and international NGOs to sustainability? How to 
create a comprehensive framework to accommodate long term strategic objectives? 
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